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Intelligence is often defined as the ability of an agent to learn, adapt to its environment, 
and solve novel challenges. However, despite over 100 years of theoretical development (e.g., 
general intelligence), widespread explanatory power (up to 50% of variance in cognitive 
scores), and the ability of intelligence measures to predict important life outcomes such as 
educational achievement and mortality, the exact configuration and neural correlates of 
cognitive ability remain poorly understood. This dissertation aims to make progress in this 
pursuit by exploring how human brain structure and intelligence correlate and co-develop 
with each other from childhood to early adulthood (ages 5 – 22 years). This endeavour is 
undertaken in three large cohorts (N range: 337 – 2072), guided by theory (e.g., crystallised 
and fluid intelligence), and implemented using rigorous, cutting-edge quantitative methods 
(i.e., structural equation modelling and network science). The results of this research provide 
robust evidence that the brain-behaviour relationships in intelligence are complex (i.e., 
consists of many independent yet interacting parts) and change nonlinearly during 
development.  
The first study sought to elucidate the factorial structure and white matter substrates 
of child and adolescent intelligence using two cross-sectional, developmental samples 
(CALM: N = 551 (N = 165 neuroimaging), age range: 5 – 18 years; NKI-Rockland: N = 337 (N 
= 65 neuroimaging), age range: 6 – 18 years). In both samples, it was found (using structural 
equation modelling (SEM)) that cognitive ability is best modelled as two separable yet related 
constructs, crystallised and fluid intelligence, which became more distinct (i.e., less correlated) 
across development, in line with the age differentiation hypothesis. Further analyses revealed 
that white matter microstructure, most prominently of the superior longitudinal fasciculus, 
was strongly associated with crystallised (gc) and fluid (gf) abilities. Finally, SEM trees, which 
combines traditional SEM with decision trees, provided evidence for developmental 
reorganisation of gc and gf and their white matter substrates such that the relationships among 
these factors dropped between ages 7 – 8 years before increasing around age 10. Together, 
these results suggested that shortly before puberty marks a pivotal phase of change in the 
neurocognitive architecture of intelligence.  
The second study builds upon the first by again examining the neurocognitive 




theory of intelligence presupposes direct (statistical) interactions among cognitive abilities 
(e.g., maths, memory, and vocabulary) throughout development. Therefore, this project used 
network analytic methods (specifically graphical LASSO) to simultaneously model brain-
behaviour relationships essential for general intelligence in a large (behavioural, N = 805; 
cortical volume, N = 246; fractional anisotropy, N = 165), developmental (ages 5 – 18 years) 
cohort of struggling learners (CALM). Results indicated that both the single-layer (cognitive 
or neural nodes) and multilayer (combined cognitive and neural variables) networks 
consisted of mostly positive, small partial correlations, providing further support for the 
mutualism/network theory of cognitive ability. Moreover, using community detection (i.e., 
the Walktrap algorithm) and calculating node centrality (absolute strength and bridge 
strength), convergent evidence suggested that subsets of both cognitive and neural nodes play 
an intermediary role ‘between’ brain and behaviour. Overall, these findings suggest specific 
behavioural and neural variables that may have greater influence among (or might be more 
influenced by) other nodes within general intelligence. 
The final study investigated the longitudinal relationships between human cortical 
grey matter structure and measures of decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial 
working memory from adolescence to early adulthood (ages 14 – 22 years). In the IMAGEN 
study (maximum N across time points/waves = 2072), latent growth curve models were used 
to estimate the baseline and longitudinal associations between behavioural measures and 
cortical surface area, thickness, and volume. Univariate models (only behavioural or neural 
measures) revealed that performance in decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial 
working memory, as well as brain structure changed nonlinearly from mid-adolescence (age 
14) to early adulthood (age 22). Furthermore, bivariate models (combined behavioural and 
neural measures) provided evidence for adaptive reorganisation (behaviour intercept predicts 
changes in brain structure) but not structural scaffolding (brain structure intercept predicts 
changes in behaviour). Furthermore, findings suggested that there were no correlated changes 
between behavioural and brain structure slopes (rates of change from mid-adolescence to 
early adulthood). 
This dissertation concludes by summarising the core results, addressing key 
limitations, and discussing avenues for future research. Taken together, this thesis hopes to 




determinants, they (we) must work more diligently toward building coherent, rigorous, and 
testable neurocognitive theories of intelligence—particularly under the conceptual and 





Laying the Foundations:  
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Human Intelligence 
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Spearman’s Positive Manifold of Cognitive Abilities and 
 the g factor of Individual Differences in General Intelligence  
Intelligence is often defined as the ability of an agent to learn, adapt to its environment, 
and solve novel challenges (e.g., see Gottfredson, 1997 and Legg and Hutter, 2007). It has been 
over 100 years since Charles Spearman published his landmark observations that, across 
domains (e.g., language abilities, mathematics and music), individuals who scored higher on 
one cognitive task also tended to score higher on all other cognitive tasks, in relation to their 
peers (Spearman, 1904). He termed his discovery the ‘positive manifold’ of cognitive abilities 
(as all abilities positively correlated with each other, top of Figure 1). Spearman attempted to 
explain his results by proposing the general or g factor to account for the shared covariance 
among individuals on cognitive tasks. Later on, he also postulated the existence of specific or 
s factors, which described the unique variance among individuals (Spearman, 1927). Taken 
together, Spearman’s “two-factor” (g and s) theory, commonly referred to collectively as the 
g factor model of human intelligence (Figure 1, bottom), states that differences in cognitive 
performance are jointly due to individuals possessing a lower or higher g, which relates to 
general cognitive abilities such as abstract reasoning and problem-solving, as well as 
possessing lower or higher levels of specific factors (s) that enable them to outperform their 
counterparts on more narrow cognitive tasks (e.g., mathematics, music, etc., see Spearman, 
1927). Under Spearman’s theory, individual differences in general intelligence are caused by 
the combination of general (g) and specific (s) factors, both of which vary from person to 
person. Moreover, g is assumed to account for most of the variance in general cognitive ability 
(e.g., innate ability through genetics) while s explains individual differences in narrow 





Across intelligence datasets, Spearman’s g factor model typically accounts for between 
20 – 50% of the total variance in individual differences in cognitive ability (Deary et al., 2010), 
as well as reliably predicts important life outcomes such as educational and occupational 
achievement (Deary et al., 2007; Hegelund et al., 2018) and mortality (Calvin et al., 2011). 
Today, the g factor is recognised as one of the most replicable findings in psychology and is 
not limited to WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic, see Henrich 
et al., 2010) samples, which are overrepresented in psychological studies, as g has been further 
verified in non-Western populations (see Warne and Burningham, 2019). Moreover, the g 
factor has been found in non-human animals such as dogs (Arden and Adams, 2016), 
Figure 1. Top: Example correlation matrix showcasing the positive manifold of cognitive 
abilities. Bottom row shows factor loadings from g to cognitive tasks. Bottom: g factor 
model of human intelligence including general (g) and specific (s) factors. Note that error 
(residual) terms are also estimated in this model but are not shown. x’s denote specific 




orangutans (Damerius et al., 2019), mice and primates (Locurto and Scanlon, 1998; Reader et 
al., 2011), and has even been extended to include performance of human groups (c factor of 
‘collective intelligence’, Woolley et al., 2010;  2015)1. Together, these studies strongly suggest 
that a single cognitive ability factor (whether it be in humans, other organisms, or groups) has 
extraordinary predictive power when examining a range of abilities and outcomes.   
Despite the efficacy of the g factor model to account for individual differences in 
cognitive ability, several other theories have been proposed, which give alternate ontologies 
of the positive manifold (rather than exclusively g). Most of these competing formulations 
posit the presence of group factors (e.g., crystallised and fluid intelligence, see Cattell, 1967, 
1963) that cluster abilities measured by tests with similar properties (e.g., verbal ability and 
working memory, see McGrew, 2009; Schneider and McGrew, 2012). Other models 
conceptualise the positive manifold (and hence g) as arising from network interactions among 
cognitive abilities during a given task or over the course of early development (e.g., childhood, 
see van der Maas et al., 2006) while others view g as the (population-level) emergent property 
of within-individual differences in executive processes such as working memory capacity 
(Kovacs and Conway, 2016). In the next section, I will briefly describe these theory types—
specifically gc-gf theory, Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory, mutualism, and Process 












1 Interestingly, c has been found to be only moderately correlated with average or maximum individual 
intelligence. Instead measures related to “social perceptiveness” (e.g., Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
(RME) Test, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and “moderate level of cognitive style diversity” (Aggarwal et 





Going Against the (g)rain:  
Refinements to the g factor Theory of General Intelligence 
Crystallised and fluid intelligence:  
Cattell’s gc-gf theory 
As described above, the g factor is highly effective in accounting for individual 
differences on cognitive scores (accounts for up to 50% of the total variance) and predicting 
important life outcomes. As a result, it provides a parsimonious framework (as it only 
assumes one general factor) for understanding how and why humans as well as other 
organisms perform well on tests of cognitive ability, relative to their peers. However, since 
Spearman first hypothesised g, several researchers, having conceptual as well as theoretical 
issues with his theory, have proposed alternative theories that have become prominent in the 
intelligence literature.  
One of these refinements to Spearman’s g theory came from his student, Raymond 
Cattell. According to Cattell, rather than of a single factor underlying all cognitive ability, 
general intelligence was instead composed of two distinct yet correlated constructs or types, 
which he labelled crystallised (gc) and fluid (gf) intelligence (Cattell, 1963; 1967). Cattell 
suggested that gc represents the capacity to effectively complete tasks relying on experience 
and knowledge obtained (mostly) from schooling (e.g., arithmetic, vocabulary, etc.), whereas 
he defined gf as an individual’s capacity to solve novel problems devoid of task-specific 
knowledge, instead using abstract reasoning and pattern recognition (also see Deary et al., 
2010). Hence, Cattell replaced Spearman’s g with his gc-gf theory (Figure 2) as the core 
psychological mechanisms that give rise to the positive manifold. In Chapter Two, I 
statistically compare Spearman’s g factor to Cattell’s gc-gf theory and investigate their 
structural neural correlates (via white matter fractional anisotropy) in two large 
developmental samples of children and adolescents (Centre for Attention, Learning and 





Let’s get it stratum: 
 Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory 
In addition to Cattell’s gc-gf theory of intelligence, other 20th century theorists put forth 
factor models hoping to elucidate the nature of the positive manifold. These include (but are 
not limited to) the Cattell-Horn Extended gc-gf theory (Horn and Cattell, 1966), the bifactor 
model (Holzinger and Swineford, 1937; also see Watkins and Beaujean, 2014 for illustration) 
and Carroll’s three-stratum theory (Carroll, 1993; 1997). Arguably the most comprehensive 
model of intelligence to date (see Flanagan and Dixon, 2014) is the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) 
theory of cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2009; Schneider and McGrew, 2012), which combines 
the formulations of Cattell, Horn, and Carroll into a single hierarchical model. 
According to CHC theory (Figure 3), general intelligence (g) sits at the apex of the 
hierarchy of cognitive abilities and is considered to be a ‘General Ability or Factor’ (stratum 
III), analogous to Spearman’s original conception of g. Beneath g comes the ‘Broad Abilities’ 
(stratum II) that include specific groups of cognitive abilities such as crystallised (gc) and fluid 
intelligence (gf) mentioned above as well as (but not limited to) short-term memory (gsm), 
mathematical knowledge needed for manipulating numerical symbols (gq), and processing 
speed (gs), which is required to quickly and accurately manipulate information such as 
numbers and to read sentences. As with gc-gf theory, the broad abilities represent ‘group 
factors’ that organise related tasks (e.g., verbal abilities such as reading and spelling) so they 
Figure 2. Cattell’s gc-gf factor model of human intelligence. Here, gc and gf are conceived 
to cause changes in the factor loadings of crystallised (Arithmetic and Vocabulary) and 
fluid (Matrix Reasoning and Analogies) tasks, respectively. Note, in this model, gc and gf 




are separate from more dissimilar tasks such as arithmetic and mathematical problem-solving 
(Maths). Although Spearman included s factors in his two-factor model to account for fine-
gained individual differences in specific abilities, he was aware that group factors might be 
necessary if the cognitive content of different tests significantly overlapped (e.g., see 
Thomson, 1947). Lastly, at the lowest level rest the ‘Narrow Abilities’ (stratum I), which refer 
to even more specific abilities than those of stratum II. In describing stratum I, Carroll stated 
that these abilities ‘‘represent greater specializations of abilities, often in quite specific ways 
that reflect the effects of experience and learning, or the adoption of particular strategies of 
performance’’ (Carroll, 1993, p. 634). This depiction can be compared with Spearman’s s 
factors in the sense that their contributions depend on the task and training level of the 
individual. 
The CHC theory has garnered widespread empirical and statistical support (Benson, 
2008; Flanagan, 2000; see Flanagan and Dixon, 2014 and McGrew, 2009 for overviews but also 
see Canivez and Youngstrom, 2019 for conflicts regarding CHC theory and its applications) 
and is a deeply influential paradigm for thinking about cognitive abilities in the cognitive 
psychology community. In closing, while the aforementioned models and their subsequent 
iterations differ from each other in terms of the constructs involved (e.g., g only, gc and gf only, 
or combined with additional factors) and statistical properties (i.e., correlational, orthogonal, 
and/or hierarchical structure), a comprehensive comparison of these models is beyond the 






The emergence of g through interactions of cognitive abilities throughout development: 
The mutualism theory of general intelligence 
An alternative perspective to traditional factor-model theories is to conceptualise 
general intelligence as the consequence of a dynamic network that evolves over time. This 
theory, known as mutualism, claims that the positive manifold results from positive, reciprocal 
interactions between cognitive abilities (van der Maas et al., 2006). Hence, early in cognitive 
development, cognitive abilities (e.g., vocabulary and reasoning) are weakly correlated with 
each other, resulting in little to no g factor/positive manifold. Instead, over time—for instance 
from early childhood until adolescence—these associations increase in strength and become 
more positive, eventually giving rise to the positive manifold and g. Mutualism (see Figure 4) 
has gained support from several studies (Ferrer and McArdle, 2004; Kan et al., 2019; Kievit et 
al., 2019, 2017) and reviews (Peng et al., 2019; Peng and Kievit, 2020) that have demonstrated 
that cognitive abilities such as vocabulary drive positive changes in other abilities (e.g., 
reasoning) and vice versa. Since its initial conception, the mutualism/network model of 
intelligence has been expanded and further formalised (van der Maas et al., 2021, 2017) to 
Figure 3. The Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities. General intelligence 
(g) is located at the top (stratum III), followed by Broad abilities (stratum II), and bottoms 
out with Narrow abilities (stratum I). Abbreviation key: crystallised (gc) and fluid (gf) 
intelligence (both studied in Chapter Two), short-term memory (gsm), quantitative 




incorporate additional psychometric theories (i.e., Spearman’s g factor, Cattell’s crystallised 
(gc) and fluid (gf) abilities, and the Dickens-Flynn gene-environment interaction model of IQ, 
Dickens and Flynn, 2001). Moreover, it has recently been further formalised to help explain 
cognitive development (Savi et al., 2019) and has even been applied to help understand 
sensitive periods in cognitive development (Kievit, 2020). In Chapter Three, I apply the 





Process Overlap Theory:  
General intelligence as a formative, emergent phenomenon  
One of the most recent psychometric theories of general intelligence (also see Savi et 
al., 2019) that attempts to elucidate the positive manifold is Process Overlap Theory (POT, 
Kovacs and Conway, 2016). POT attempts to elucidate interindividual (between-person) 
differences in general intelligence by including constraints on g in the form of intraindividual 
(within-person) differences. According to the authors, POT separates itself from previous 
accounts in “that it integrates psychometrics, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience” (p. 
152). Thus, unlike the formal theories described above, POT incorporates properties of brain 
structure and function, especially insights obtained from the Parieto-Frontal Integration 
Figure 4. Simplified model of the mutualism theory of cognitive ability. Single-headed 
arrows indicate interactions (positive reciprocal correlations) between cognitive abilities 




Theory (Jung and Haier, 2007, see the section The early years: The Parieto-Frontal Integration 
Theory (P-FIT) of intelligence below) as well as studies of the neural correlates of executive 
processes (especially fluid intelligence and working memory), which together emphasise the 
network properties of the brain and their links with intelligence as opposed to only individual 
regions. I discuss the neural interpretation of POT further in the section Overlapping 
processes in the brain: The neural determinants of Process Overlap Theory below.   
 To build their theory, Kovacs and Conway, 2016 first lay out the three fundamental 
assumptions or “axioms” of their theory (p. 152 – 153). First and foremost, the g factor is a 
necessary statistical consequence of the positive manifold. In other words, in any correlation 
matrix with solely positive values, it is inevitable that a single (latent/unobserved) factor can be 
extracted using factor analytic techniques (see Krijnen, 2004 for technical analysis). 
Furthermore, this general factor will have positive correlations (indexed by factor loadings) 
between it and its manifest/observed indicators or first- or second-order factors if the model 
is hierarchical (e.g., CHC theory). Secondly, independent from this inescapable mathematical 
result, any such latent variable must be assumed to causally influence the positive correlations 
among the measured variables (known as entity realism, see Borsboom et al., 2003). Lastly, as 
“differential constructs” (p. 153), there are no one-to-one mappings between latent variable 
between-subject variation and within-person processes (Molenaar and Campbell, 2009; 
Voelkle et al., 2014 but also see Schmiedek et al., 2020 for recent example in intelligence data). 
A corollary of this is that latent variables such as g do not exist in isolation, but instead depend 
on individual differences (variation in cognitive ability among multiple people). Therefore, g 
is necessarily a between-subject (population-level) phenomenon. To quote the authors’ 
explanation:  
“…the last survivor of a meteor collision with Earth would still have cognitive abilities 
and mental limitations but would not have g…Hence the scope of any explanation of 
the positive manifold, including but not restricted to latent variables, is not necessarily 
directly applicable to single individuals.” (p. 153) 
With these axioms, Kovacs and Conway put forth Process Overlap Theory (POT), which ties 
together robust evidence that implicates the overlapping roles of domain-general—for 
instance, executive processes such as working memory capacity (WMC, see Burgoyne et al., 




WMC and general (fluid) intelligence)—and domain-specific abilities that are recruited when 
individuals perform narrow tasks (e.g., verbal reasoning). The authors surmise that “Such a 
pattern of overlap of executive and specific processes explains the positive manifold as well 
as the hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities” (p.161, Kovacs and Conway, 2016). In other 
words, the reason many complex abilities such as WMC strongly correlate with measures such 
as fluid intelligence (gf) is that both involve a “multicomponent construct with overlapping 
processes” (p. 162). This also explains why more specific, elementary tests such as simple span 
tasks do not significantly correlate with each other and explain unique sources of variation in 
g (i.e., they do not share overlapping processes).  
Under POT (Figure 5), g is the emergent (formative latent variable) result of a finite 
number of distinct abilities rather than a single, unitary entity responsible for the shared 
variation among cognitive tasks (reflective latent variable). However, below g, specific 
abilities take on a reflective latent variable structure and are correlated with each other to 
formalise the overlapping process (i.e., not completely independent) that underlie them. In 
addition to arguing that g is an emergent phenomenon, POT claims that executive processes 
(e.g., WMC) function as limiting factors for successful completion of tasks requiring domain-
general abilities. For example, if a participant lacks sufficient working memory or inhibitory 
control, they will not be able to perform well on goal-related tasks (tapping g) such as playing 
a video game that consists of remembering rules (e.g., sequence of steps needed to pass a level) 
and avoiding obstacles (e.g., game-generated monsters that try to kill you before you finish a 
level). Moreover, these participants would also struggle on domain-specific tasks (e.g., 
gaining enough points to unlock a single item necessary to continue through a level). 
Kovacs and Conway mathematically formalised their theory (Equation 1 of Kovacs 
and Conway, 2016) in an item response model that estimates the “probability of a person (p) 
arriving at a correct answer on a test item (i) that taps component processes (C) from a number 
of different domains (D)” (p. 162). The model assumes that each cognitive dimension is 
relatively (ontologically) independent from each other. POT is formalised as a hybrid 
multidimensional item response model (see Reckase, 2009) with both compensatory (additive 
sums within cognitive domains) and noncompensatory (products of across-domain abilities) 
elements. Given that across-domain abilities such as executive processes act as bottlenecks to 




each individual dimension” (p. 163). Therefore, a person with below average capacity in one 
executive process such as working memory capacity will have a low probability of 
successfully performing a specific working memory tasks, even if they display high scores for 
that specific test. This is because their deficiency in nonlinear WMC (e.g., complex span) cannot 
be offset by additive satisfactory or above average capacity in the easier working memory tests 
(e.g., simple span). In closing, POT formalises g as a population-level phenomenon that emerges 
(formative) from the within-person overlapping of (mainly executive) cognitive processes that 
are tapped by various psychometric tests. Now, having described several prominent 
psychological models of intelligence, I next discuss how recent perspectives and findings from 
cognitive neuroscience have further informed understanding of intelligence.  
 
Figure 5. Simplified depiction of Process Overlap Theory (POT) as a latent variable model. 
Single-headed arrows (solid red: reflective, black dashed: formative) indicate causal 
directions among types of cognitive tests (boxes), latent constructs (circles), and 
error/residual terms (ε). Double-headed arrows indicate correlations between cognitive 
domains. General intelligence/the positive manifold (g) is an emergent property of 
interactions of theorised cognitive abilities (here gf, gv and gc) from lower stratum. The ζ 
term represents residual/unexplained variance (e.g., neural and environmental processes) 
that also contribute to the emergence of g. Note that ‘Fluid Ability’ is also an executive 
process but is coloured grey to distinguish it from other executive process (e.g., WMC) 




From Psychometrics to Cognitive Neuroscience:  
The Search for the Neural Foundations of General Intelligence 
In addition to the psychological literature, the field of cognitive neuroscience has 
provided an emerging source of insight in uncovering the neural causes of individual 
differences in general intelligence. These cognitive neuroscience approaches go beyond 
purely behavioural descriptions and formulations by also measuring the neural process 
necessary for cognitive ability. In this section, I will describe five leading neurocognitive 
theories of general intelligence (in chronological order in which they appear in the literature): 
Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory, the multiple-demand system, Process Overlap Theory, 
The watershed model of individual differences in fluid intelligence, and The Network 
Neuroscience Theory of Human Intelligence.  
    
The early years:  
The Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT) of intelligence 
The first comprehensive attempt to propose a neural basis of intelligence was Jung and 
Haier’s Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT,  Jung and Haier, 2007). P-FIT, formulated 
based upon a review and synthesis of many neuroimaging studies on cognitive ability, asserts 
that individual differences in intelligence derive from information exchange primarily 
between inferior and superior parietal (Brodmann areas (BAs): 7, 39, and 40) and dorsolateral 
prefrontal (BAs: 6, 9, 10, 45, 46, and 47) cortical areas, but also regions of the occipital (BAs: 18 
and 19) and temporal (BAs: 21 and 37) lobes, as well as the anterior cingulate (particularly BA 
32). Moreover, Jung and Haier proclaimed that white matter tracts, especially the arcuate 
fasciculus but also the superior longitudinal fasciculus, assist in producing intelligent 
behaviour by integrating informational content from individual grey matter regions through 
anatomical linkages. They assumed that occipital (e.g., the fusiform gyrus (BA 37) for the 
analysis of visual stimuli) and temporal (i.e., Wernicke’s area (BA 22) for auditory content) 
regions played an especially pronounced role in early processing of relevant information (i.e., 
a sensory stimulus). The results of this initial stage are then “fed forward” (p. 138) to parietal 
areas such as the angular (BA 39), superior parietal (BA 7) and supramarginal (BA 40) gyri for 




solutions to a given problem” (p. 138), eventually leading to a final decision made in the 
anterior cingulate.  
The acclaim of P-FIT theory is well-founded and justified. It represents a tour de force 
of scientific investigation, the culmination and synthesis of 37 studies (total N = 1,557 
participants) using various neuroimaging techniques (e.g., functional MRI, positron emission 
tomography, diffusion tensor imaging, etc.) and measures of intelligence (chess performance, 
analogy and maths reasoning, WAIS vocabulary, etc.), and even incorporating findings from 
lesion and genomics studies. Despite this, however, Jung and Haier never intended for the P-
FIT to solve the quest to understand intelligence. Instead, they argued that “the model 
provides a framework for testing new hypotheses in future experimental designs” (p. 135). 
Therefore, progress was still needed and welcomed despite their impressive achievement.     
 
Neural g?  
The multiple-demand system underlying complex problem-solving 
Shortly after Jung and Haier’s publication of P-FIT Theory, Duncan, 2010 presented 
his g-style theory of human intelligence, known as the brain’s multiple-demand (MD) system. 
The MD system (also see Fedorenko et al., 2013), also sometimes referred to as the 
frontoparietal control network (Vincent et al., 2008; see Uddin et al., 2019 for additional 
functional network names association with MD (“Lateral Frontoparietal Network”) regions), 
is thought to be involved in a wide array of cognitive processes, including but not limited to 
fluid intelligence (gf), a form of abstract reasoning discussed above. Furthermore, the MD 
system is only activated (the MD system has been studied mostly using fMRI, but in principle 
could be assessed using other functional modalities such as EEG, PET or MEG) whenever an 
individual performs a challenging task, and is, therefore, usually studied using an easy/hard 
task contrast. Composed primarily of frontal and parietal brain regions, the MD system acts 
as a functional network that, through its coordinated activity, enables intelligent behaviour. 
According to Duncan, 2010, the MD system’s principal function pertains to the solving of 
complex tasks by first partitioning them into smaller, simpler sub-tasks. This “sequential 
mental programming” (p. 177) allows for easier solvability and facilitates learning. To 




part) be explained by a unitary core (i.e., mainly frontal and parietal regions) of functional brain 
activity (see Figure 6).  
While early work on the MD system focused on fluid intelligence and complex 
problem-solving (see Duncan et al., 2020 for recent review of how the MD system integrates 
‘distributed’ brain activity to produce ‘organised’ cognition), it is known that gf represents 
only one facet of overall cognitive ability. In other words, the MD system, while responsible 
for higher-level complex problem-solving on challenging tasks, might play a smaller role in 
more elementary cognitive areas such as language abilities. One such study has recently 
supported this hypothesis (Woolgar et al., 2018). Using probabilistic volume maps obtained 
from MRI scans in 80 patients with either frontal or posterior lobe lesions, they found that 
MD-weighted, but not language-weighted, lesion volume (negatively) predicted change in 
fluid intelligence (lower scores represented greater deficit after injury). Moreover, a distinct 
effect was seen in the prediction of verbal fluency scores such that language-weighted rather 
than MD-weighted lesion volume was a significant (negative) indicator of change in verbal 
fluency (lower scores indicated greater postmorbid language deficit)2. The authors concluded 
that their results supported the notion that language (and the brain systems that support it) 
are not essential for complex thought. However, it is the case that many complex tasks, 
including but not limited to the translation of challenging academic texts and memory sports 
competitions, also tap into fluid-like cognitive resources to form associations (e.g., between 
concepts in different languages or dialects and mnemonic devices) that involve verbal 
(language) abilities. Therefore, an alternative interpretation could be that the MD and 
language systems are instead part of a larger conglomerate of brain regions that, although 
specialised with respect to their intrinsic function, work together to produce cognitive ability 
in all its diverse forms.  
 
2 Along these lines, a more recent study (Diachek et al., 2020) found similar results in a larger sample 
(N = 481) collected from datasets of 30 “word and sentence comprehension experiments” (p. 4537). 
Specifically, the left MD-system ROIs responded stronger to verbal tasks, indicating language 
lateralisation. In addition, the MD-system displayed weaker activation during sentence and ‘passive’ 
comprehension tasks, in contrast to the ‘language-selective network’. Therefore, the MD itself seems to 





Overlapping processes in the brain: 
The neural determinants of Process Overlap Theory 
Under Process Overlap Theory (POT, Kovacs and Conway, 2016), the primary focus is 
on executive processes such as fluid intelligence (gf) and working memory capacity (WMC), 
which act as bottlenecks to forming general intelligence (g, see Figure 5). According to the 
authors, a large body of evidence (starting with P-FIT theory, Jung and Haier, 2007, see above) 
implicates the frontal lobe (and some parietal regions) as the section of cortex essential for  gf 
and WMC. As part of the MD system/frontoparietal control network, the frontal lobe and 
especially the prefrontal cortex (PFC) functions as integration and regulatory hub that 
coordinates information exchange between it and more specialised regions (e.g., those 
responsible for specific abilities). Hence, the within-subject frontoparietal control network 
(mainly via frontal regions such as the PFC) represents the neural capacity limits/bottleneck 
in information processing (Dux et al., 2006; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007; Marois and Ivanoff, 
2005; Tombu et al., 2011) in a wide variety of cognitive demands and correspond to the 
overlapping executive processes that lead to between-subject differences in g.  
Further support for this claim can be found in lesion and statistical modelling studies 
that link executive processes (e.g., gf and WMC) to imaging metrics from the frontal lobe. For 
instance, in 80 patients Woolgar et al., 2010 used multiple regression to estimate the extent to 
which damage to specific brain regions-of-interests (ROIs) correlated with deficit in gf. They 
found that, on average, damage localised to prefrontal and parietal areas of the MD system 
resulted in greater loss (i.e., 6.5 points) in fluid ability than if injury was elsewhere in the brain 
Figure 6. The ‘Extended’ multiple-demand (MD) system represented by non-grey brain 





(1 point). Moreover, using partial correlations (see Chapter Three for use of this statistical 
technique), the researchers found that, regardless of location within the brain, each ROI 
studied explained unique variance in fluid IQ loss.  
Various multivariate techniques have been used to examine these questions. One such 
tool is structural equation modelling (see Chapter Two), which has been used to pinpoint the 
central influence of frontal areas in executive processes. For example, in 104 participants 
Román et al., 2014 examined the relationship between both general (e.g., g) and specific (e.g., 
crystallised (gc) and fluid ability (gf)) measures of intelligence and brain morphology, assessed 
by cortical surface area, thickness and volume. They found a ‘reversed hierarchy’ in the grey 
matter correlates of cognitive ability such that at higher-order, more general psychometric 
scales (e.g., general factors such as g) “the smaller the number of relevant gray matter clusters 
accounting for individual differences in intelligent performance” (p. 3805). In other words, as 
one moves from specific to general factors of intelligence, less total (but still predominantly 
frontal) brain structure is needed to explain variance in cognitive performance scores.  
Lastly, Kievit et al., 2016 investigated the relation of fluid reasoning to brain activity 
using task-based fMRI, which enabled the authors to simultaneously determine and distinguish 
between individual differences (between-subjects) in fluid ability as well as performance 
dependent upon the level of difficulty (within-subjects) of the gf-related task. Using 
conjunction analysis (see Nichols et al., 2005) in a small sample (N = 34), Kievit and colleagues 
found three cortical areas that showed greater activation depending both on between-subject 
ability and level of difficulty: right middle and superior frontal gyri, bilateral angular gyri 
(superior parietal cortex), and bilateral precunei. They termed this convergence “local neural 
ergodicity” (p. 13), which has proven challenging to find in neuroscience data (e.g., Medaglia 
et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2016; but also see Kievit et al., 2013 for a discussion of Simpson’s 
paradox in psychology). Altogether, the agreement in (statistical) neural evidence among this 
and the above studies, despite using diverse methods, led Kovacs and Conway, 2016 to 
conclude that “The present state of research in neuroscience demonstrates that…the overlap 







The watershed model of individual differences in fluid intelligence 
The watershed model of individual differences in fluid intelligence (Kievit et al., 2016; 
also see Penke et al., 2007) provides another example (as POT) of hierarchical representation 
and estimation of neurocognition. In a large (N = 555) adult lifespan (ages 18 – 87 years) 
sample (Cam-CAN, Shafto et al., 2014), Kievit and colleagues used a type of structural 
equation modelling formalisations known as MIMIC models (see Chapter Two for brief 
description and use of this model class) to explore the relations between processing speed, 
fluid intelligence, and white matter integrity. They found that a ‘watershed’ model, inspired 
by Cannon and Keller, 2006’s attempt to conceptualise and quantify the complex and 
multilevel causes of mental disorders, showed better fit to the data than competing models 
(i.e., a single factor/unidimensional model).  
The watershed model assumes ‘hierarchical dependence’, predicting that the most 
‘downstream’ phenotype (in this case fluid ability) is the final result of a cascade of multiple 
‘upstream’ causes (e.g., white matter integrity). Moreover, these factors only exert indirect 
influence on fluid intelligence via intermediate endophenotypes (Fornito and Bullmore, 2012), 
in this study tests of processing speed. This means that no causal pathway is drawn directly 
between, for example, specific white matter tracts and general (or fluid) cognitive ability. The 
watershed model also presupposes a many-to-one mapping of brain-behaviour relationships, 
known as degeneracy in neuroscience (Friston and Price, 2003 but also see Edelman and Gally, 
2001 for how the concept more broadly applies to biological systems), as well as increased 
statistical dimensionality for more upstream compared to downstream levels due to them being 
more partially independent from each other. The performance of this model has been 
replicated (Fuhrmann et al., 2020) in two childhood and adolescent (ages 5 – 17 years) cohorts 
(CALM, Holmes et al., 2019, and NKI-Rockland, Nooner et al., 2012), again using processing 
speed (i.e., N-back task, rapid naming and trail-making) but also working memory tasks (e.g., 
forward and backward digit recall). In doing so, they extended the explanatory power (in 
terms of variance) of the model to include developmental periods prior to adulthood. Lastly, 
although so far only examined for fluid intelligence, uncontrolled eating (Garcia-Garcia et al., 
2020) and nationalism (Zmigrod et al., 2018), the hierarchical watershed model can, in theory, 





The dawn of modern network neuroscience:  
The Network Neuroscience Theory of Human Intelligence 
More recently, network neuroscience (Bassett and Sporns, 2017; Betzel, 2020) has 
evolved into a more quantitatively-oriented (e.g., increasingly using methods from computer 
science, mathematics, physics, etc.) and established subfield. Under this theoretical 
framework, the brain is conceptualised as a complex system of interconnected (i.e., cortical 
structure such as grey and white matter) and interactive (e.g., functional brain regions with 
significantly correlated co-activation patterns) networks that enable various cognitive abilities 
including sensorimotor autonomy and learning (Bassett et al., 2015, 2011; Bassett and Mattar, 
2017). This view contrasts with previously dominant reductionist perspectives (see Kievit et 
al., 2011 for an overview of reductionism in cognitive neuroscience) that mostly focused on 
the isolated roles of individual brain regions (for example, primarily the prefrontal cortex) in 
contributing to cognition and other behaviours.      
Network neuroscience employs techniques from network science (Barabási, 2016) such 
as graph theory and centrality analysis to characterise both universal and specific aspects of 
brain structure and function (Fornito et al., 2016). These methods can be applied across spatial 
(from single-cells to whole-brain), temporal (from milliseconds to across the lifespan), and 
topological (from individual nodes to global network) scales (Betzel and Bassett, 2017), as well 
as between species (van den Heuvel et al., 2016). Toward this end, several pioneering studies 
have revealed pervasive properties of brain network structure and function. These include, 
for example, the discovery of hubs (Sporns et al., 2007; van den Heuvel and Sporns, 2013), or 
nodes (e.g., individual brain regions) that share many connections with other nodes within 
the brain. Subsequent research has built upon this finding by identifying specific classes of 
hub regions such as the ‘rich club’ (Heuvel and Sporns, 2011), the ‘diverse club’ (Bertolero et 
al., 2017), and the ‘flexible club’, (Yin et al., 2020). Due to their numerous links (whether 
physically as in white matter or statistically through co-activation patterns found in fMRI), 
hubs help relay informational content throughout the brain.  
Furthermore, nervous  systems have been shown to exhibit modularity (Meunier et 
al., 2010; Sporns and Betzel, 2016), small-world topology (Bassett and Bullmore, 2006, 2017), 
and an economical trade-off between minimising neural wiring cost and maximising 




both specialised (intra-modular) and global (inter-modular) processing and allow efficient 
information transfer to facilitate adaptive behaviours (e.g., intelligence). Lastly, concerted 
efforts have been made to formulate mathematical models to generate and mechanistically 
describe a variety of brain phenomena including (but not limited to) functional brain network 
organisation (Vertes et al., 2012), normal and abnormal neurodevelopment (Akarca et al., 
2020; Vértes and Bullmore, 2015), and how connector hubs and modularity relate to cognition 
(Bertolero et al., 2018).  
Drawing on these and other findings (further explored in Chapter Three), the latest 
network neuroscience proposal aiming to explain general intelligence (Spearman, 1904) is the 
Network Neuroscience Theory of Human Intelligence (Barbey, 2018). Barbey draws 
inspiration from four theories of intelligence: 1) Spearman’s g, 2) Cattell’s gc-gf theory and 3) 
the mutualism theory of cognitive ability (all explained above), and 4) Godfrey Thomson’s 
sampling theory (Thomson, 1939, 1919, 1916). Thomson, one of Spearman’s contemporaries, 
formulated his sampling theory of cognitive abilities and challenged Spearman’s g as the 
causal mechanism underlying the positive manifold. According to Thomson, the myriad of 
positive correlations between tasks stem from a given test (e.g., vocabulary) sampling a large 
number of mental ‘bonds’ that each partially contribute to cognition. Therefore, if one were to 
devise assessments that only measure specific abilities—for example, the fundamental 
building blocks of simple vocabulary—the positive manifold would disappear. However, in 
practice most tests measure mental constructs that are too broad (e.g., fluid or verbal ability) 
and, therefore, share cognitive processes. Although there are arguments to the contrary (i.e., 
see Savi et al., 2019), Thomson’s sampling theory, which states the positive manifold results 
from separate cognitive faculties each contributing to varying degrees to general cognitive 
ability, can be viewed as one of the first (and most forgotten) network perspectives and 
models of general intelligence.  
Barbey, 2018 conceptualises g as a global network phenomenon that arises from the 
small-world typology, modularity, and dynamics of the brain. He finds correspondence 
between Thomson’s sampling theory, Spearman’s s factors and Cattell’s gc-gf theory, and 
relates them to intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs, Laird et al., 2011; Seeley et al., 2007). For 
instance, it is well-known that many neural regions are specialised for particular functions 




local efficiency and minimises wiring cost (Bullmore and Sporns, 2012). The functional and 
structural specialisation of ICNs parallels Spearman’s s factors (specific abilities developed 
through practice) and Thomson’s narrow sampling of cognitive domains (a test that only 
measures verbal ability). Due to their intra-modular connectivity and hub architecture (De 
Domenico et al., 2016; Hilger et al., 2017; Power et al., 2013; van den Heuvel and Sporns, 2013), 
the presence of ICNs (e.g., the default mode network) allows individuals to access prior 
knowledge stores (i.e., those obtained via education), typically a hallmark of crystallised 
intelligence. According to Barbey, fluid ability, the second component of Cattell’s gc-gf theory 
(Cattell, 1963), arises from ICNs (e.g., cingulo-opercular and frontoparietal networks) that 
contain nodes with weaker inter-module ties, which is needed for collective behaviour 
(Schneidman et al., 2006). This enhances flexibility and the efficiency of global processing by 
forming new links between distinct modules (see Gallos et al., 2012), which in turn enable 
individuals to adapt to novel environments and situations (Barbey et al., 2014, 2012; Gläscher 
et al., 2010). 
These characteristics of brain functional and structural organisation (also see Bertolero 
et al., 2015), which balance short and long-range connections through dynamic small-world 
typology, facilitate transitions (Betzel et al., 2016) between two primary network states (Gu et 
al., 2015): 1) ‘easy-to-reach’ (those used to access prior knowledge needed to carry out 
crystallised tasks), and 2) ‘difficult-to-reach’ (necessary for integrating information, giving rise 
to fluid-like cognitive abilities). Therefore, general intelligence (or g) is best understood as the 
emergent result (similar, in principle, to mutualism and Process Overlap Theory) of this ‘tug 
of war’ between specific and broad ICNs. Broad ICNs (especially frontoparietal networks) 
help to drive the brain to difficult-to-reach or random states due to the greater variability of 
their connections between modules compared to within them (Braun et al., 2015; Cole et al., 
2013). Altogether, this constrained flexibility allows the brain to adapt to novel cognitive 
domains (e.g., in abstract reasoning), while preserving the retrieval of previously learned 
skills (e.g., from schooling). Barbey’s theory has been supported by some preliminary 
evidence, but more is needed to confirm its validity (Girn et al., 2019). One potentially 
promising avenue of new empirical evidence is the emerging insight coming from 





Jumping through the Developmental Windowpane: 
 Longitudinal Studies of Concurrent Structural Brain and Cognitive 
Changes from Childhood to Early Adulthood  
Cross-sectional data provide incomplete information about the  
development of general intelligence 
Any serious attempt at a mechanistic understanding of intelligence must involve 
consideration of developmental changes and trajectories. Longitudinal data, whereby 
participants undergo testing at two or more time points (also known as waves), are necessary 
to capture the dynamics of cognitive ability across the lifespan as cross-sectional data alone 
remain insufficient (see Raz and Lindenberger, 2011). Cross-sectional data can only be used 
to account for between-subject differences among individuals in a population at a single time 
point. For instance, if participant A scores higher than participants B and C on an IQ test on 
Monday, they are more intelligent according to that test, but only relative to their peers on that 
day. However, their score on Monday does not tell me how well they will score and compare 
with others throughout the week, or how they would develop over time. To answer these 
questions, I would need longitudinal data, which along with between-subject differences also 
permits the study of the within-person changes of participant A’s IQ trajectory over time (i.e., 
how their score fluctuates from Monday to Tuesday to Wednesday, etc.). Furthermore, 
longitudinal data allow me to compare participant A’s performance to themselves (i.e., rather 
than their peers), which provides subject-specific information about how participant A’s 
intelligence changes throughout development (e.g., ranging from day-to-day to across the 
lifespan), as well as a comparison of between-subject differences in rates of change. 
Echoing this point, one recent study (Schmiedek et al., 2020) has shown that a cross-
sectional analysis of the g factor of cognitive ability failed to capture within-person changes 
in cognitive abilities over time. This highlights the need to integrate between-person 
differences (cross-sectional) and within-person changes (longitudinal) when studying 
cognitive abilities. Such an approach must be extended to include concurrent changes in brain 
structure and function to examine how brain and behaviour correlate with (i.e., baseline-
baseline and baseline-second time point) and predict changes in each other (e.g., baseline-




slope)). In the next section, I will summarise the major findings from a recent review of 
longitudinal studies that jointly measure the relationship of cognitive ability to its neural 
correlates (particularly structural measures such as grey matter cortical volume and white 
matter fractional anisotropy) from childhood to early adulthood (Kievit and Simpson-Kent, 
2021).3 Doing so will further help elucidate the cognitive neuroscience of intelligence by also 
taking into account one of its central yet often neglected elements: (developmental) time.  
 
The structural scaffolding of cognitive ability from childhood through early adulthood 
The longitudinal cognitive neuroscience of intelligence from childhood to early 
adulthood is in its infancy (pun intended), with around 30 total studies to date (see Table 7.1 
of Kievit and Simpson-Kent, 2021), many of which were published within the last five years. 
Despite varying sample sizes (minimum N for first wave = 33, maximum N for first wave = 
2,091), cognitive measures (e.g., WISC, Mullen Scales of Early Learning, etc.), imaging metrics 
(e.g., cortical thickness, fractional anisotropy, etc.) and methodologies (e.g., simple 
correlations, latent change score models, etc.), three key interpretations stood out based on 
the aggregate findings from the studies: timing matters, methods matter, and convergent 
evidence in support of the structural scaffolding of intelligence (see Figure 7). 
First, timing matters: the relationship between brain structure and cognitive ability 
shows both negative and positive associations, which might depend on age and ability (e.g., 
see Shaw et al., 2006), and/or sample size. This should not be surprising as both neural and 
cognitive performance change rapidly during development as the brain matures and children 
and adolescents learn through education. Therefore, the age distribution—for example, 
samples with a disproportionally large number of participants of a certain age group (e.g., 
pre-teenagers), and/or studies with a long interval between baseline and follow-up testing 
(i.e., longer than 4 years)—might not be suitable for capturing fine-grained changes in brain 
and behaviour.  
Second, methods matter: due to methodological differences between most studies, 
direct comparisons among findings are difficult, if not impossible. However, this is only a 
challenge if one does not understand the differences (and similarities) between the 
 





quantitative methods used in longitudinal cognitive neuroscience. Different models entail 
different assumptions that can lead to different (and even seemingly contradictory) 
conclusions. Therefore, it is imperative that researchers understand not only the strengths but 
also the limitations of the statistical techniques they use to interpret data. Doing so allows for 
easier evaluations of theoretical frameworks across a variety of neurocognitive processes that 
encompass intelligence such as working memory and decision-making.  
Finally, a consistent pattern emerged from the results of the studies (e.g., Ferrer, 2018; 
Wendelken et al., 2017) surveyed in the review: current brain structure (e.g., grey matter 
cortical thickness and white matter fractional anisotropy) but not function significantly 
predicted the rate of change in cognitive performance over time. In other words, individuals 
with ‘better’ brain structure such as greater white matter integrity were associated with larger 
gains (in children) or shallower declines (in older participants) than individuals with lower 
scores on structural brain imaging metrics. Although preliminary, this pattern suggests that 
the structural connectivity of the brain at a previous time point lays the foundations for later 
















Figure 7. The ‘structural scaffolding’ model of human intelligence. Here, previous brain 
structure (time point 1) is thought to ‘set the stage’ from changes in intelligence (blue 
arrow). Alternatively (although not mutually exclusive of structural scaffolding), baseline 
cognition might predict changes in brain (structural) organisation over time (adaptive 
reorganisation, yellow arrow). Lastly, cognitive and brain changes might drive each other, 




Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis attempts to advance understanding of human intelligence by investigating 
how human brain structure (i.e., cortical grey and white matter) and measures of cognitive 
ability such as working memory and decision-making co-develop with each other from 
childhood to early adulthood (ages 5 – 22 years). Towards this end, over the course of three 
empirical studies, I analysed neurocognitive data from three large cohorts (N range: 337 – 
2072), combining insights from theory (i.e., gc and gf (Chapter Two), network neuroscience 
(Chapter Three), and brain-behaviour co-development (Chapter Four)) with rigorous and 
cutting-edge quantitative methods (i.e., structural equation modelling and network science). 
In the concluding remarks (Chapter Five), I argue that cognitive neuroscientists need to 
dedicate more time and effort towards building coherent, rigorous, and testable neurocognitive 




















Neurocognitive Reorganisation  
between Crystallised Intelligence, Fluid Intelligence, 
and White Matter Integrity in  
Childhood and Adolescence 
 
Chapter Two has been published (although appears in this thesis in a modified form to ensure 
consistent formatting and thesis coherence):  
Simpson-Kent I. L., Fuhrmann D., Bathelt J., Achterberg J., Borgeest G. S., the CALM Team, 
Kievit R. A. (2020).  Neurocognitive reorganization between crystallized intelligence, fluid 
intelligence and white matter microstructure in two age-heterogeneous developmental 
cohorts. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, Special Issue: Flux 2018: Mechanisms of Learning 
& Plasticity. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2019.100743 
 
Although first-person pronouns are used throughout the chapter, this work is the result of a 
collaborative research project. My contributions to the above publication are:  
1. I led conceptualisation and planning (aided by R. A. Kievit and D. Fuhrmann) about 
the scientific hypotheses, analysis methods, and interpretations of the project. 
2. I performed all manuscript analyses (aided by R. A. Kievit and D. Fuhrmann). 
3. I wrote the first full draft (with input from R. A. Kievit and D. Fuhrmann) of the 
manuscript and led the revisions and confirmation of the final version (aided by other 












In Chapter One, I described the positive manifold and the theoretical foundation and 
predictive ability of general intelligence or g (Spearman, 1904). Moreover, I also discussed 
how Spearman’s student, Raymond Cattell, proposed a division of Spearman’s g factor into 
two separate yet related constructs, crystallised (gc) and fluid (gf) intelligence (Cattell, 1967). 
In this chapter, I use a novel statistical method, structural equation modelling trees, to study 
how the associations between gc and gf, and white matter (specifically fractional anisotropy) 
differ from childhood to adolescence (ages 5 – 18 years) in two cross-sectional, age-
heterogeneous developmental samples (CALM and NKI-Rockland).  
Fluid and crystallised intelligence have proven especially insightful regarding 
developmental changes in intelligence. For instance, current understanding of lifespan 
trajectories of gc and gf using cross-sectional (Horn and Cattell, 1967) and longitudinal 
(McArdle et al., 2000; Schaie, 1994) cohorts indicates that gc slowly improves until late age 
while gf increases into early adulthood before steadily decreasing. However, most of the 
literature on individual differences between gc and gf has focused on early to late adulthood. 
As a result, considerably less is known about the association between gc and gf in childhood 
and adolescence (but see Hülür et al., 2011).  
There has, however, been a recent rise in interest in this topic in child and adolescent 
samples. For instance, research on age-related differentiation and its inverse, age 
dedifferentiation, in younger samples has greatly expanded since first being pioneered in the 
middle of the 20th century (Garrett, 1946). According to the age differentiation hypothesis, 
cognitive factors become less correlated (more differentiated) with increasing age. For 
example, the relationship (covariance) between gc and gf would decrease as children age into 
adolescence, suggesting that cognitive abilities increasingly specialise into adulthood. In 
contrast, the age dedifferentiation hypothesis predicts that cognitive abilities become more 
strongly related (less differentiated) throughout development. In this case, gc and gf 
covariance would increase between childhood and adolescence, potentially indicating a 
strengthening of the g factor across age. However, despite its increased attention in the 
literature, the age differentiation/dedifferentiation debate remains unsolved as evidence in 
support of both hypotheses has been found in child, adolescent, and adult samples (Bickley 




Tideman and Gustafsson, 2004). Together, this literature highlights the importance of a 
lifespan perspective on theories of cognitive development, as neither age differentiation nor 
dedifferentiation may be solely able to capture the dynamic changes that occur from 
childhood to adolescence and (late) adulthood (Hartung et al., 2018).   
The introduction of non-invasive brain imaging technology has complemented 
conventional psychometric approaches by allowing for fine-grained probing of the neural 
bases of human cognition. A particular focus in developmental cognitive neuroscience has 
been the study of white matter using techniques such as diffusion-weighted imaging, which 
allows for the estimation of white matter microstructure (Wandell, 2016). Both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal research in children and adolescents using fractional anisotropy (FA), a 
commonly used estimate of white matter integrity, have consistently revealed strong 
correlations between FA and cognitive ability using tests of working memory, verbal and non-
verbal performance (Koenis et al., 2015; Krogsrud et al., 2018; Peters et al., 2014; Tamnes et al., 
2010; Urger et al., 2015) and even mathematical giftedness (Navas-Sánchez et al., 2014). 
However, interpretations of these studies are limited due to restricted cognitive batteries (e.g., 
small number of tests used) and a dearth of theory-driven statistical analyses (e.g., structural 
equation modelling).  
For these reasons, several outstanding questions in the developmental cognitive 
neuroscience of intelligence remain: 1) Are the white matter substrates underlying intelligence 
in childhood and adolescence best understood as a single global factor, or do individual tracts 
provide specific contributions to gc and gf?, 2) If they are specific, are the tract contributions 
identical between gc and gf?, and 3) Does this brain-behaviour mapping differ across age (i.e., 
a neurocognitive interpretation of age differentiation/dedifferentiation or both)?  
To examine these questions, I statistically tested four preregistered hypotheses: 
1) gc and gf are separable constructs in childhood and adolescence. More specifically, 
the covariance among scores on cognitive tests are more adequately captured by 
the two-factor (gc-gf) model as opposed to a single-factor (i.e., g) model.  
2) The covariance between gc and gf differs (decreases) across childhood and 
adolescence, in line with the age differentiation hypothesis. 
3) White matter tracts make unique complementary contributions to gc and gf.  




To address these questions, I examined the relationship between gc and gf in two large 
cross-sectional child and adolescent samples. The first is the Centre for Attention, Learning 
and Memory (CALM, see Holmes et al., 2019). This atypical sample, included in the 
preregistration (see https://aspredicted.org/5pz52.pdf), generally includes children with 
slightly lower cognitive abilities than age-matched controls (see Methods for more detail). To 
examine whether findings from CALM would generalise to other samples, I also conducted 
non-preregistered replication analyses on the Nathan Kline Institute (NKI)-Rockland Sample, 
a cohort with similar population demographics to the United States (e.g., race and 
socioeconomic status, see Table 1 of Nooner et al., 2012). All analyses were carried out using 
structural equation modelling (SEM), a multivariate statistical framework combining factor 
and path analysis to examine the extent to which causal hypotheses concerning latent 
(unobserved, e.g., g) and manifest (observed, e.g., cognitive tests scores) variables are in line 
with the observed data (Schreiber et al., 2006). Taken together, this chapter sought to 
investigate the relationship between measures of intelligence (i.e., gc, gf and working memory) 
and white matter connectivity (i.e., fractional anisotropy) in typically and atypically 






















Participants: The CALM and NKI-Rockland cohorts 
For the CALM sample, I analysed the then most recent data release (N = 551, age range: 
5 – 18 years) at the time of preregistration (January 2018). Participants were recruited based 
on referrals made for possible attention, memory, language, reading and/or mathematics 
problems (Holmes et al., 2019). Participants with or without formal clinical diagnosis were 
referred to CALM. Exclusion criteria included known significant and uncorrected problems 
in vision or hearing and a native language other than English. A subset of participants 
completed MRI scanning (N = 165, age range: 6 – 18 years). 
Next, to assess the generalisability of the findings in CALM, I applied the same 
analyses to a non-preregistered subset of the data from the Nathan Kline Institute (NKI)-
Rockland Sample (N cognitive data = 337, age range: 6 – 18 years; N neural data = 65, age 
range: 7 – 18 years). This multi-institutional initiative recruited a lifespan (aged between 6 and 
85 years), community-ascertained sample (Nooner et al., 2012). This sample was chosen due 
to its representativeness (demographics resemble those of the United States population) and 
the fact that its cognitive battery assessments closely matched CALM.  
 
Cognitive assessments: gc, gf, and working memory 
All cognitive data from the CALM sample were collected on a one-to-one basis by an 
examiner in a dedicated child-friendly testing room. The test battery included a wide range 
of standardised assessments of cognition and learning (Holmes et al., 2019). Participants were 
given regular breaks throughout the session. Testing was divided into two sessions for 
participants who struggled to complete the assessments in one sitting. For analyses of the 
NKI-Rockland Sample cohort, I matched tasks used in CALM except for the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test, Dot Matrix, and Mr. X, which were only available for CALM. For the NKI-
Rockland Sample (Nooner et al., 2012), I included the N-Back task, which is not available in 
CALM, to help balance the number of working memory tasks between cohorts. In both 
samples, only raw scores obtained from assessments were included in analyses. Due to 
varying delays between recruitment and testing in the NKI-Rockland cohort, I only used 




recruitment. The cognitive tasks are further described in Table 1; the raw scores are depicted 
in Figure 8.  
The working memory digit recall/span tasks, while measuring the same cognitive 
abilities, used different test batteries and scoring protocols. For CALM, working memory 
scores indicate the total number of correctly recalled digits across all trials while the NKI-
Rockland scores were transformed into a span score. Due to this discrepancy (see References 
in Table 1 and Alloway et al., 2008 for statistical comparisons between the batteries), these 




Task and Description 









Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT): Participants were 
asked to choose the picture (out 
of four multiple-choice options) 
showing the meaning of a word 














Single Word Reading (SWR): 
Participants read aloud first a list 
of letters and then words that 
gradually increased in 
complexity. Correct responses 















Spelling (Spell): Participants 
spelled words with increasing 
difficulty one at a time that were 













Numerical Operations (NO): 
Participants answered written 
mathematical problems that 


















Matrix Reasoning (MR): 
Participants saw sequences of 
partial matrices and selected the 
response option that best 






















Digit Recall/Span (DR): 
Participants recalled sequences of 


















Backward Digit Recall/Span 
(BDR): Same as regular digit 













Dot Matrix (Dot): Participants 
were shown the location of a red 
dot in a sequence of 4x4 matrices 
and had to recollect the location 












Mr. X (MRX): Participants 
remembered spatial locations of 
a ball held by a cartoon man 












N-Back (NB): For 500 ms 
participants were presented letter 
sequences with a further 2000 ms 
to respond by pressing the 
computer spacebar. The task 
consisted of three separate 
conditions: 0-Back– participants 
pressed the spacebar whenever 
an “X” appeared; 1-Back– 
participants pressed the spacebar 
whenever the same letter was 
presented twice in a row; and, 

















pressed the spacebar each time 
the letter presented matched the 
one shown two letters 
beforehand.  
 
Table 1. List, descriptions, and summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, range, 
and percentage of missing data) of cognitive assessments used in CALM and NKI-






Figure 8 Top. Scatterplots of cognitive task scores across age for CALM and NKI-Rockland 
samples (Level I: tasks identical between cohorts; Level II: tasks similar between cohorts). 
Lines and shades reflect linear and polynomial fit and 95% confidence intervals, 
respectively. Solid lines: CALM. Dashed lines: NKI-Rockland. Abbreviations: Matrix 
Reasoning (MR), Spelling (Spell), Single Word Reading (SWR), Numerical Operations 





Structural MRI measures: Fractional anisotropy (FA) 
The CALM sample neuroimaging data were obtained at the MRC Cognition and Brain 
Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK. Scans were acquired on the Siemens 3T Tim Trio system 
(Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany) via a 32-channel quadrature head coil. All T1-
weighted volume scans were acquired using a whole brain coverage 3D magnetisation-
prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence with 1 millimetre (mm) 
isotropic image resolution with the following parameters: Repetition Time (TR) = 2250 
milliseconds (ms); Echo Time (TE) = 3.02 ms; Inversion Time (TI) = 900 ms; flip angle = 9 
degrees; voxel dimensions = 1 mm isotropic; GRAPPA acceleration factor = 2. Diffusion-
Weighted Images (DWI) were acquired using a Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) sequence with 
64 diffusion gradient directions with a b-value of 1000 s/mm2, plus one image acquired with a 
b-value of 0. Other relevant parameters include: TR = 8500 ms, TE = 90 ms, voxel 
dimensions = 2 mm isotropic.  
Figure 8 Bottom. Scatterplots of cognitive task scores across age for CALM and NKI-
Rockland samples (Level III: tasks unique between cohorts). Lines and shades reflect linear 
and polynomial fit and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Solid lines: CALM. Dashed 
lines: NKI-Rockland. Abbreviations: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), Dot Matrix 




The NKI-Rockland high-resolution 3D T1-weighted structural images were obtained 
using a Magnetisation Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) sequence with the following 
parameters: Repetition Time (TR) = 1900 ms; Echo Time (TE) = 2.52 ms; Inversion Time (TI) = 
900 ms; flip angle = 9 degrees; voxel dimensions = 1 mm isotropic (see 
http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/enhanced/NKI_MPRAGE.pdf for additional details). 
Diffusion-Weighted Images (DWI) were acquired with a Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) 
sequence with 137 diffusion gradient directions with a b-value of 1500 s/mm2. Other relevant 
parameters include: TR = 2400 ms, TE = 85 ms, voxel dimensions = 2 mm isotropic (see 
http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/pro/eNKI_RS_TRT/DIff_137.pdf for additional 
details). 
Note that part of the following pipeline for the white matter construction is identical 
to that described in Bathelt et al., 2019. Diffusion-weighted images were pre-processed to 
create a brain mask based on the b0-weighted image (FSL BET; Smith, 2002) and to correct for 
movement and eddy current-induced distortions (eddy; Graham et al., 2016). Subsequently, 
the diffusion tensor model was fitted and fractional anisotropy (FA) maps were calculated 
(dtifit). Images with a between-image displacement greater than 3 mm as indicated by FSL 
eddy were excluded from further analysis. All steps were carried out with FSL v5.0.9 and were 
implemented in a pipeline using NiPyPe v0.13.0 (Gorgolewski et al., 2011). To extract FA 
values for major white matter tracts, FA images were registered to the FMRIB58 FA template 
in MNI space using a sequence of rigid, affine, and symmetric diffeomorphic image 
registration (SyN) as implemented in ANTS v1.9 (Avants et al., 2008). Visual inspection 
indicated good image registration for all participants. Subsequently, binary masks from a 
probabilistic white matter atlas (threshold at > 50% probability) in the same space were 
applied to extract FA values for white matter tracts (see below). 
Participant movement, particularly in developmental samples, can significantly affect 
the quality, and, hence, statistical analyses of MRI data. Therefore, several procedures were 
undertaken to ensure adequate MRI data quality and minimise potential biases due to subject 
movement. First, for the CALM sample, children were trained to lie still inside a realistic mock 
scanner prior to their actual scans.  Secondly, for both samples, all T1-weighted images and 
FA maps were visually examined by a qualified researcher to remove low quality scans. 




the framewise displacement between subsequent volumes in the sequence. Only data with a 
maximum between-volume displacement below 3 mm were included in the analyses. All 
steps were carried out with FMRIB Software Library v5.0.9 and implemented in the pipeline 
using NiPyPe v0.13.0 (see https://nipype.readthedocs.io/en/latest/). 
Selection of FA tracts was based on previous studies of associations between cognition 
(e.g., fluid intelligence) and white matter in developmental samples (de Mooij et al., 2018; 
Kievit et al., 2016). I used FA as a general summary metric of white matter microstructure as 
it cannot directly discern between specific cellular components (e.g., axonal diameter, myelin 
density, and water fraction). Mean FA was computed for 10 bilateral tracts as defined by the 
Johns Hopkins University DTI-based white matter tractography atlas (see Hua et al., 2008): 
anterior thalamic radiations (ATR), corticospinal tract (CST), cingulate gyrus (CING), 
cingulum [hippocampus] (CINGh), forceps major (FMaj), forceps minor (FMin), inferior 
fronto-occipital fasciculus (IFOF), inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), superior longitudinal 
fasciculus (SLF), and uncinate fasciculus (UNC). Figure 9 shows visualisations (top) and cross-
sectional trends (bottom) of FA across the age range for both samples.  
Figure 9. Top: White matter ROIs based on the John’s Hopkin’s University atlas (fractional 
anisotropy in Transverse (superior) plane (left), Coronal plane (middle), and Transverse 






Figure 9. Bottom: Scatterplots of FA values for all white matter tracts across age for CALM 
and NKI- Rockland samples. Lines and shades reflect linear and polynomial fit and 95% 
confidence intervals, respectively. Solid lines: CALM. Dashed lines: NKI-Rockland. 
Abbreviations: anterior thalamic radiations (ATR), corticospinal tract (CST), cingulate 
gyrus (CING), cingulum [hippocampus] (CINGh), inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus 
(IFOF), inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF), 





Statistical analyses: Structural equation modelling (SEM) and SEM trees 
I used structural equation modelling (SEM), a multivariate approach that combines 
latent variables and path modelling to test causal hypotheses (Schreiber et al., 2006) as well as 
SEM trees, which combine SEM and decision tree paradigms to simultaneously permit 
exploratory and confirmatory data analysis (Brandmaier et al., 2013). Analyses were 
performed using the lavaan package version 0.5-22 (Rosseel, 2012) in R (R Core Team, 2020) 
and versions 2.9.9 and 0.9.12 of the R packages OpenMx (Boker et al., 2011) and semtree 
(Brandmaier et al., 2013), respectively. To account for missing data and deviations from 
multivariate normality, I used robust full information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML) 
with a Yuan-Bentler scaled test statistic (MLR) and robust standard errors (Rosseel, 2012). I 
evaluated overall model fit via the (Satorra-Bentler scaled) chi-squared test, the comparative 
fit index (CFI), the standardised root mean squared residuals (SRMR), and the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) with its confidence interval (Schermelleh-Engel et 
al., 2003). Assessment of model fit was defined as: CFI (acceptable fit 0.95 – 0.97, good fit > 
0.97), SRMR (acceptable fit 0.05 – 0.10, good fit < 0.05), and RMSEA (acceptable fit 0.05 – 0.08, 
good fit < 0.05).  
To determine whether gc and gf were separable constructs, I compared a two-factor 
(gc-gf) model to a single-factor (g) model. To investigate if the covariance between gc and gf 
differed across ages, I conducted multiple group comparisons between younger and older 
participants based on median splits (CALM split at 8.91 years yielding N = 279 young and N 
= 272 old; NKI-Rockland split at 11.38 years into N = 169 young and N = 168 old). Doing so 
inevitably led to slightly unbalanced numbers of participants with white matter data (CALM: 
N = 60 young and N = 105 old; NKI-Rockland: N = 19 young and N = 46 old). To test 
measurement invariance across age groups (Putnick and Bornstein, 2016), I fit multigroup 
models (French and Finch, 2008), constraining key parameters across groups. Model 
comparisons and deviations from measurement invariance were determined using the 
likelihood ratio test and Akaike information criterion (AIC, see Bozdogan, 1987). 
To examine whether white matter tracts made unique contributions to the latent 
variables (i.e., g, gc, and gf) I fit Multiple Indicator, Multiple Cause (MIMIC) models (Jöreskog 
and Goldberger, 1975; Kievit et al., 2012). MIMIC models enable neural variables (e.g., 




such as gc and gf. Lastly, I conducted a SEM tree analysis, a method that combines the 
confirmatory nature of SEM with the exploratory framework of decision trees (Brandmaier et 
al., 2013). SEM trees hierarchically and recursively partition datasets based on a covariate (in 
this case age). This creates data-driven age-groups which show differences in one or more 
paths of interest. The advantage of SEM trees is that they do not require a-priori decisions as 
to where potential categorical boundaries between age groups may lie (as was the case in the 
median split analysis). SEM trees also do not require a-priori knowledge as to the shape of 
developmental trajectories (as is usually the case when using age as a continuous covariate). 
Using this technique therefore allowed for the examination of: 1) the robustness of findings 
based on the median age split, and 2) whether white matter contributions differed across age 
groups of younger and older participants in a data-driven way (Hypothesis 4). Therefore, for 
the CALM and NKI-Rockland SEM tree analyses, age was used as a continuous covariate with 
a significance alpha level of .001 for each node split. Finally, I used Bonferroni-correction to 
correct for multiple comparisons, and the semtree cross-validation scheme, which “partitions 
the data for maximizing splits on each variable, then comparing maximum splits across each 
























Covariance among cognitive abilities cannot be captured by a single factor 
In accordance with the preregistered analysis plan, I first describe model fit for the 
measurement models of the cognitive data only. First, I tested hypothesis 1: that gc and gf are 
separable constructs in childhood and adolescence. More specifically, I tested the hypothesis 
that the covariance among scores on cognitive tests would be better captured by a two-factor 
(gc-gf) model than a single-factor (i.e., g) model. In support of this prediction, the single-factor 
model fit the data poorly: χ2(27) = 317.695, p < .001, CFI = .908, SRMR = .040, RMSEA = .146 
[.132 .161], Yuan-Bentler scaling factor = 1.090, suggesting that cognitive performance was not 
well represented by a single factor. The two-factor (gc-gf) model also displayed poor model fit 
(χ2(24) = 196.348, p < .001, CFI = .946, SRMR = .046, RMSEA = .119 [.104 .135], Yuan-Bentler 
scaling factor = 1.087), although it fit significantly better (χ2Δ = 119.41, dfΔ = 3, AICΔ = 127, p 
< .001) than the single-factor model.  
To investigate the source of poor fit, I examined modification indices (Schermelleh-
Engel et al., 2003), which quantify the expected improvement in model fit if a parameter is 
freed. Modification indices suggested that the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test had a very 
strong cross-loading onto the fluid intelligence latent factor. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT), often considered a crystallised measure in adult populations, asks participants 
to choose the picture (out of four multiple-choice options) corresponding to the meaning of 
the word spoken by an examiner. Including a cross-loading between gf and the PPVT 
drastically improved goodness of fit (χ2Δ = 67.52, dfΔ = 1, AICΔ = 100, p < .001) to adequate 
(χ2(23) = 104.533, p < .001, CFI = .975, SRMR = .025, RMSEA = .083 [.067 .099], Yuan-Bentler 
scaling factor = 1.069). A likely explanation of this result is that such tasks may draw 
considerably more on executive, gf-like abilities in younger, lower ability samples. For a more 
thorough investigation of the loading of PPVT across development, see Supplementary 
Material section Is the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test a measure of fluid ability?. 
Notably, fitting the PPVT as a solely fluid task (i.e., removing it as a measurement of gc 
entirely) did not significantly decrease model fit (χ2Δ = 2.058, dfΔ = 1, AICΔ = 1, p = .152). 
Therefore, I decided to proceed with the more parsimonious PPVT gf-only model (χ2(24) = 
106.382, p < .001, CFI = .972, SRMR = .025, RMSEA = .082 [.066 .098], Yuan-Bentler scaling factor 




Next, I examined whether the single- or two-factor model fit best in the NKI-Rockland 
sample. The single-factor model fit the data adequately (χ2(14) = 41.329, p < .001, CFI = .983, 
SRMR = .029, RMSEA = .075 [.049 .102], Yuan-Bentler scaling factor = .965). Still, the two-factor 
model showed considerably better fit (χ2(12) = 19.732, p = .072, CFI = .995, SRMR = .018, 
RMSEA = .043 [.000 .075], Yuan-Bentler scaling factor = .956) compared to the single-factor 
model (χ2Δ = 20.661, dfΔ = 2, AICΔ = 17, p < .001). It should be noted that, given the differences 
in tasks measured between the samples, gf and working memory were assumed to be 
measurements of the same latent factor, rather than separable factors. A similar competing 
model where gf and working memory were modelled as separate constructs with working 
memory loaded onto gf, similarly to the best-fitting model for the CALM sample (see Figure 
10), showed comparable model fit and converging conclusions with further analyses. Overall, 
these findings suggested, that for both the CALM and NKI-Rockland samples, a two-factor 
model with separate gc and gf factors provided a better account of individual differences in 
intelligence than a single-factor model. Note that, for both CALM and NKI-Rockland, these 
final models include a latent variable called ‘gc Verbal’ that is loaded onto the more 
fundamental gc factor.  
 
Evidence of age differentiation between crystallised and fluid ability 
I investigated the relationship between gc and gf in development to see whether I could 
observe evidence for age differentiation as predicted by hypothesis 2. Age differentiation (e.g., 
Hülür et al., 2011) would predict decreasing covariance between gc and gf from childhood to 
adolescence. I fit a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis to assess fit on the younger (N = 
279) and older (N = 272) participants from the CALM sample. The model had acceptable fit 
(χ2(48) = 142.214, p < .001, CFI = .960, SRMR = .037, RMSEA = .085 [.069 .102], Yuan-Bentler 
scaling factor = 1.019). However, a likelihood ratio test, showed that model fit did not decrease 
significantly when imposing equal covariance between gc and gf in the younger and older 
participant subgroups (χ2Δ = 0.323, dfΔ = 1 AICΔ = 2, p = .57). This suggested no evidence for 
age differentiation in the CALM sample. However, the lack of association could be due to 
limitations of using median splits to investigate age differences when independent (or latent 
in this case) variables are correlated (Iacobucci et al., 2015). For instance, if the age range of 




not be sensitive enough to detect it. To test this explicitly, I next fit SEM trees (Brandmaier et 
al., 2013) to the cognitive data.   
I estimated SEM trees in the CALM sample by specifying the cognitive model with age 
as a continuous covariate. I observed a SEM tree split at age 9.12 years, yielding two groups 
(younger participants = 290, older participants = 261). This split was accompanied by a 
decrease in the unstandardised parameter estimate between gc and gf (from .64 to .59, see 
Table 3), providing support for age differentiation using a more exploratory approach (SEM 
tree: 9.12 versus median split: 8.91). When fitting the two-factor model before and after the 
SEM tree age split, I found that the correlation between gc and gf increased slightly (from .90 
to .92), which supports age dedifferentiation. 
Next, as in the CALM cohort, I fit a multigroup model with younger (N = 169) and 
older (N = 168) age groups in the NKI-Rockland Sample, which produced good fit (χ2(24) = 
33.736, p = .089, CFI = .991, SRMR = .035, RMSEA = .047 [.000 .081], Yuan-Bentler scaling factor 
= .916). In contrast to CALM, imposing equality constraints on the covariance between gc and 
gf across age groups preferred the freely-estimated model (χ2Δ = 61.244, dfΔ = 1 AICΔ = 46, p 
< .001) and revealed a lower gc-gf correlation for the older (.811) compared to the younger 
participants (1.008). This suggested evidence for age differentiation in the NKI-Rockland 
Sample using multigroup models.  
In contrast to the multigroup model outcome, the NKI-Rockland SEM tree model 
under identical specifications as in CALM failed to produce an age split. A possible 
explanation is that, to penalise for multiple testing, I relied on Bonferroni-corrected alpha 
thresholds for the SEM tree. If, as seems to be the case here, the true split lies (almost) exactly 
on the median split, then the SEM tree will have slightly less power than conventional 
multigroup models, as the SEM tree likelihood ratio test is penalised for the number of tests 
(splits). These differences between analyses methods suggested that the age differentiation 
observed here is likely modest in size. Taken together, I interpret these findings as evidence 
for a small, age-specific but suggestive decrease in gc-gf covariance in both cohorts, which is 
compatible with age differentiation such that, for younger participants, gc and gf factors are 







Violation of metric invariance suggests differences in relationships among  
cognitive abilities in childhood and adolescence 
I more closely assessed age-related differences in cognitive architecture (i.e., factor 
loadings) by examining metric invariance (Putnick and Bornstein, 2016). Testing this in the 
CALM sample as a two-group model by imposing equality constraints on the factor loadings 
(fully constrained) showed that the freely-estimated model (no factor loading constraints) 
outperformed the fully-constrained model (χ2Δ = 107.05, dfΔ = 7, AICΔ = 82, p < .001), 
indicating that metric invariance was violated. This violation of metric invariance suggested 
that the relationship between the cognitive tests and latent variables was different in the two 
age groups. Closer inspection suggested that the differences in loadings were not uniform, 
but rather showed a more complex pattern of age-related differences (see Table 2 for more 
details). Some of the most pronounced differences include an increase of the loading of Matrix 
Reasoning onto gf as well as increased loading of Digit Recall and Dot Matrix onto working 
memory across age groups.  
Similarly, in the NKI-Rockland cohort, the freely-estimated model outperformed the 
constrained model (χ2Δ = 41.111, dfΔ = 5, AICΔ = 33, p < .001), indicating that metric invariance 
was again violated as in CALM. This suggests that the relationship between the cognitive tests 
and the latent factors differed across age groups. The pattern of factor loadings differed in 
some respects from CALM. For example, the loading of the N-back task onto gf showed the 
largest difference across age groups in the NKI-Rockland sample. However, as CALM did not 
include the N-back task, this finding cannot directly be interpreted as a difference between 
the cohorts. For detailed comparisons among factor loadings between age groups in both 
samples, refer to Table 2. The overall pattern in both samples suggested small and varied 
differences in the relationship between the latent factors and observed scores. A plausible 
explanation is that the same task draws on a different balance of skills as children differ in age 
and ability. Therefore, these findings concerning the latent factors should be interpreted in 
this light as it seems likely that in addition to age differentiation (and possibly 







Relationship CALM NKI-Rockland 
  Young Old Young Old 
gc➔gf(WM) 
0.89 0.93 1.01 0.81 
40.23 (5.40) 44.27 (4.50) 64.49 (8.64) 12.27 (2.68) 
[29.65, 50.82] [ 35.45, 53.09] [47.56, 81.43] [7.02, 17.52] 
gf➔WM 
0.96 0.9 
NA NA 1.06 (.19) .79 (.09) 
[.69, 1.44] [ .61, .97] 
gf(WM)➔MR 
0.59 0.74 0.69 0.6 
1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) 




7.49 (.84) 5.45 (.43) 
[5.84, 9.14] [ 4.60, 6.30] 
gf(WM)➔DR 
0.56 0.68 0.38 0.54 
1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) .12 (.03) .27 (.07) 
[1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] [.07, .17] [.13, .40] 
gf(WM)➔BDR 
0.76 0.79 0.5 0.53 
1.01 (.12) .94 (.09) .16 (.03) .30 (.08) 
[.77, 1.26] [ .76, 1.12] [.10, .22] [.13, .40] 
gfWM➔NB NA NA 
0.55 0.35 
.67 (.10) .54 (.14) 
[.48, .87] [.27, .81] 
WM➔Dot 
0.58 0.67 
NA NA .87 (.12) 1.06 (.12) 
[.63, 1.10] [ .82, 1.30] 
WM➔MRX 
0.59 0.56 
NA NA .80 (.11) .82 (.13) 
[.57, 1.02] [ .56, 1.08] 
gc➔gcV 
0.89 0.79 0.96 0.87 
1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) 1.00 (NA) 
[1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] 
gc➔NO 
0.87 0.87 0.9 0.76 
.19 (.01) .54 (.06) .42 (.03) 1.08 (.20) 
[ .17, .22] [ .43, .65] [.36, .49] [.69, 1.48] 
gcV➔SWR 
0.94 0.91 0.93 0.89 




[1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] 
gcV➔Spell 
0.87 0.91 0.97 0.88 
.28 (.02) .46 (.03) .48 (.02) .71 (.06) 
[ .25, .31] [ .40, .51] [.44, .52] [.60, .83] 
 
The neural architecture of gc and gf indicates unique contributions of  
multiple white matter tracts to cognitive ability 
I next focused on the white matter regression coefficients to inspect the neural 
underpinnings of gc and gf. In line with hypothesis 3, I wanted to explore whether individual 
white matter tracts made independent contributions to gc and gf. First, I examined whether a 
single-factor model could account for the covariance in white matter microstructure across 
the ten tracts (Figure 9). If so, then scores on such a latent factor would represent a 
parsimonious summary for neural integrity. However, this model showed poor fit (χ2(35) = 
124.810, p < .001, CFI = .938, SRMR = .039, RMSEA = .132 [.107 .157], Yuan-Bentler scaling factor 
= 1.114), suggesting that white matter integrity cannot be summarised by a single factor. To 
examine whether the white matter tracts showed specific and complementary associations 
with cognitive performance, I fit a MIMIC model in the CALM sample using the 10 white 
matter tracts mentioned above (see Figure 9). Doing so, I observed that 5 out of the 10 tracts 
showed significant relations with gc and/or gf (Figure 10). Specifically, the anterior thalamic 
radiations, forceps major, and forceps minor had moderate to strong associations with gc with 
similar relations seen for gf for the superior longitudinal fasciculus, forceps major, and the 
cingulate gyrus. Interestingly, the forceps minor exhibited a negative association with gf. This 
could be due to modelling several highly correlated paths simultaneously since this 
relationship was not found when only the forceps minor was modelled onto gc (standardised 
estimate = .426) and gf (standardized estimate = .386), see Tu et al., 2008. Together, individual 
differences in white matter microstructure explained 32.9% in crystallised and 33.6% in fluid 
ability. 
Table 2. First row: standardised path estimates for cognitive assessments in CALM and 
NKI-Rockland samples. Second row: raw path estimates with standard errors 
(parentheses). Third row: 95% confidence intervals [brackets]. NA = not applicable. 
Note that age groups were determined according to the median split (CALM: 8.91 





As in the CALM sample, the single-factor white matter model produced poor fit (χ2 
(35) = 131.637, p < .001, CFI = .924, SRMR = .023, RMSEA = .201 [.165 .238], Yuan-Bentler scaling 
factor = .950) in the NKI-Rockland Sample. Therefore, I fit a multi-tract MIMIC model. The 
superior longitudinal fasciculus emerged as the only tract to significantly load onto gc or gf 
(Figure 10). This result was likely due to lower power associated with a small subset of 
individuals with white matter data (see Discussion for further investigation). In NKI-
Rockland, the same set of tracts explained 29.7% and 26.7% of the variance in gc and gf, 
respectively. Together, these findings demonstrated generally similar associations (in terms 
of variance explained) between white matter microstructure and cognitive abilities in the 
CALM and NKI-Rockland samples. Therefore, it seems to be the case that, in both typically 
and atypically (struggling learners) developing children and adolescents, individual white 
matter tracts make distinct contributions to crystallised and fluid ability, as more than one 









Figure 10 Top. MIMIC model displaying standardised parameter estimates and regression 
coefficients for all cognitive measures and white matter tracts for complete CALM sample. Dotted, 
green, and red arrows indicate nonsignificant (> .05), positively significant, and negatively significant 






Support for neurocognitive reorganisation of crystallised and fluid ability in 
childhood and adolescence 
Lastly, to address the fourth and final hypothesis, I examined whether brain-
behaviour associations differed across the developmental age range. I hypothesised that the 
relationship between the white matter tracts and cognitive abilities would decrease across the 
age range, in support of the differentiation hypothesis, inclusive of neural associations. Using 
Figure 10 Bottom. MIMIC model displaying standardised parameter estimates and regression 
coefficients for all cognitive measures and white matter tracts for complete NKI-Rockland Sample. 
Dotted and green arrows indicate nonsignificant (> .05) and positively significant path estimates, 
respectively. Note standardised estimate exceeding 1 is likely the consequence of highly-correlated 




a multigroup model, I compared the strength of brain-behaviour relationships between 
younger and older participants to test whether white matter contributions to gc and gf differed 
in development. Contrary to this prediction, I observed that, in the CALM sample, a freely 
estimated model, where the brain-behaviour relationships were allowed to vary across age 
groups, did not outperform the constrained model (χ2Δ = 12.16, dfΔ = 10, AICΔ = 9, p = .27). 
This suggested that the contributions of white matter tracts did not vary significantly between 
age groups when examined using multigroup models. 
As before with the cognitive data, next I estimated a SEM tree model from the CALM 
MIMIC model. In contrast to the multigroup model, I observed that multiple white matter 
tracts did differ in their associations with gc and/or gf. These differences manifested in 
different ways for gc and gf. For example, the correlations between the cingulum, superior 
longitudinal fasciculus, and forceps major and gf decreased with increasing age, in line with 
age differentiation. On the other hand, the forceps major, forceps minor and anterior thalamic 
radiations demonstrated a more complicated pattern with each tract displaying two age splits. 
For the first split (around age 8), the regression strength decreased before spiking again 
around age 11 (Table 3). Given that all first splits showed a decrease between white matter 
and cognition, and all second splits revealed an increase compared to the first, this suggests a 
non-monotonic pattern of brain-behaviour reorganisation that cannot be fully captured by age 
differentiation or dedifferentiation (Hartung et al., 2018) but may be in line with theories such 
as Interactive Specialization (Johnson, 2011), which provides a range of mechanisms which 
may induce age-varying brain-behaviour strengths. One hypothesis that has previously been 
offered that may (partially) explain the nature of the age-varying associations between white 
matter and cognitive performance is the onset of puberty (Fuhrmann et al., 2020) and the 
associated hormonal changes. Previous work has shown that pubertal processes, including 
differences and changes in hormones such as testosterone, affect diffusion measures in ways 
that cannot be explained away by (only) age (Menzies et al., 2015). More work in large samples 
such as ABCD (Volkow et al., 2018), ideally including longitudinal changes in hormone levels, 
is needed to establish the robustness of this explanation. 
Lastly, I performed the same multigroup analysis for the NKI-Rockland MIMIC 
model, but it failed to converge or produce an age split, likely due to sparsity of the neural 




analyses (11.38 years) based on the median split. Further inspection with SEM trees of the only 
significantly associated tract, the superior longitudinal fasciculus, revealed the same trend for 
gc and gf with decreased correlations with increasing age (see Table 3). Overall, the findings 
suggest the need for a neurocognitive account of age differentiation-






































gc➔gf(WM) .64 (.01) 9.12 .59 (.01) NS NS .96 (.02) NS NS NS NS 
gf(WM)SLF .38 (.05) 7.38 .29 (.03) NS NS .35 (.09) 13.16 .21 (.09) NS NS 
gcSLF NA NA NA NA NA .91 (.09) 9.85 .69 (.06) NS NS 
gfFMaj .38 (.04) 7.38 .26 (.03) NS NS NA NA NA NA NA 
gcFMaj .24 (.04) 8.29 .04 (.05) 10.79 .42 (.05) NA NA NA NA NA 
gfCING .29 (.05) 7.38 .18 (.03) NS NS NA NA NA NA NA 
gcATR .30 (.05) 7.62 .13 (.05) 10.79 .37 (.05) NA NA NA NA NA 















Table 3. SEM tree Results for CALM and NKI-Rockland samples. Note: values listed represent 







Summary and interpretation of findings 
In this chapter, I examined the cognitive architecture as well as the white matter 
substrates of fluid and crystallised intelligence in children and adolescents in two 
developmental samples (CALM and NKI-Rockland). Analyses in both samples indicated that 
individual differences in intelligence were better captured by two separate but highly 
correlated factors (gc and gf) of cognitive ability as opposed to a single global factor (g). Further 
analysis suggested that the covariance between these factors decreased slightly from 
childhood to adolescence, in line with the age differentiation hypothesis of cognitive abilities 
(Garrett, 1946; Hülür et al., 2011).  
I observed multiple, partially independent contributions of specific tracts to individual 
differences in gc and gf (Figure 10). The clearest associations were observed for the anterior 
thalamic radiations, cingulum, forceps major, forceps minor, and superior longitudinal 
fasciculus, all of which have been implicated to play a role in cognitive functioning in 
childhood and adolescence (Krogsrud et al., 2018; Navas-Sánchez et al., 2014; Peters et al., 
2014; Tamnes et al., 2010; Urger et al., 2015; Vollmer et al., 2017).  However, except for the 
superior longitudinal fasciculus, these tracts were not significant in the NKI-Rockland 
Sample. A possible explanation for this is the difference in imaging sample size between the 
cohorts (N = 165 in the CALM sample vs N = 65 in the NKI-Rockland Sample). This difference 
implies sizeable differences in power (73.4% in CALM versus 36.2% in NKI-Rockland, 
assuming a standardised effect size of 0.2) to identify weaker individual pathways.  
The most consistent association, observed in both samples, was between the superior 
longitudinal fasciculus, a region known to be important for language and cognition, which 
significantly contributed to cognitive ability in both CALM (gf only) and NKI-Rockland (gc 
and gf). The superior longitudinal fasciculus is a long myelinated bidirectional association 
fibre pathway that runs from anterior to posterior cortical regions and through the major lobes 
of each hemisphere (Kamali et al., 2014), and has been associated with memory, attention, 
language, and executive function in childhood and adolescence in both healthy and atypical 
populations (Frye et al., 2010; Urger et al., 2015). Therefore, given its widespread links 
throughout the brain, which include temporal and fronto-parietal regions, it is no surprise 




Together, these results are in line with previous research relating fractional anisotropy 
(FA) and cognitive ability. For instance, Peters et al., 2014 found that age-related differences 
in cingulum FA mediated differences in executive functioning. Moreover, white matter 
changes in the forceps major have been linked to higher performance on working memory 
tasks (Krogsrud et al., 2018). The remaining tracts (superior longitudinal fasciculus and 
anterior thalamic radiations) have also been positively correlated with verbal and non-verbal 
cognitive performance in childhood and adolescence (Tamnes et al., 2010; Urger et al., 2015). 
I also observed a more surprising negative pathway, between gc and the forceps minor in the 
CALM sample. However, closer inspection showed that the simple association between 
forceps minor and gc was positive, suggesting the negative pathway is likely the consequence 
of the simultaneous inclusion of collinear predictors (see Tu et al., 2008). 
Finally, using SEM trees (Brandmaier et al., 2013), I observed that white matter 
contributions to gc and gf differed between participants of different ages (Table 3). In CALM, 
the contributions of the cingulum, superior longitudinal fasciculus, and forceps major 
weakened with increasing age for gf.  For gc, however, the forceps major and forceps minor, 
and the anterior thalamic radiations exhibited a more complex pattern with each tract 
providing significantly different effects on crystallised intelligence at two distinct time points 
in development. In NKI-Rockland, the superior longitudinal fasciculus became less associated 
with both gc and gf. Considering that decreases in white matter relations to gc and gf occurred 
before covariance decreases were found between gc and gf suggest that differences in white 
matter development may underlie subsequent individual differences in cognition.  
Overall, these findings align with a neurocognitive interpretation of age 
differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis, which would predict that cognitive abilities and 
their neural substrates become more differentiated (less correlated) until the onset of maturity, 
followed by an increase (dedifferentiation) in relation to each other until late adulthood 
(Hartung et al., 2018). However, I must note that the evidence for age 
differentiation/dedifferentiation was not always robust across analyses methods or samples, 







Limitations of the present study 
First and foremost, all findings here were observed in cross-sectional samples. To 
better understand effects such as age differentiation and dedifferentiation, future studies will 
need to model age-related changes within the same individual. The complexity and expense 
of collecting such longitudinal data has long precluded such investigations, but new cohorts 
such as the ABCD sample (Volkow et al., 2018) will allow researchers to model longitudinal 
changes in the future (see Chapter Four for longitudinal analyses in the IMAGEN study). 
Secondly, since the tasks modelled here were not identical between cohorts, detailed 
interpretations of similarities and differences between the CALM and NKI-Rockland samples 
should be treated with caution. Therefore, future research comparing cohorts may want to 
prioritise cohorts with matching tasks to maximise comparability. Thirdly, although most 
findings are similar across our cohorts, some differences were observed, particularly in white 
matter effects. Although the findings in the SEM tree analysis of age-related differences in 
white matter to cognition mapping are both cross-validated as well as corrected for multiple 
comparisons, they remain inherently exploratory. Furthermore, while these findings largely 
generalise across the two cohorts studied here, further work in larger (such as ABCD, Volkow 
et al., 2018), more age-heterogeneous (e.g., the Developing Human Connectome Project, 
Makropoulos et al., 2018) is needed to assess the robustness of these findings. The samples 
here are considerably larger than typical in the field (Poldrack et al., 2017)—however, even 
larger samples are desirable to gain truly precise estimates of the key parameters, especially 
regarding measures such as DTI in the NKI-Rockland sample that have a non-trivial 
proportion of missing data, which are known to inflate effect sizes (Gelman and Carlin, 2014; 
Vul et al., 2009). Moreover, the white matter differences observed could also be due to the 
scans being obtained at different scanner sites, although this is unlikely to have produced 
considerable differences for all raw images were processed using the same pipeline, and 
previous work suggests that FA is quite a robust measure in multi-site comparison (see 
Vollmar et al., 2010).   
In terms of analytical frameworks, here a relatively new analytical framework, called 
SEM trees (Brandmaier et al., 2013), was implemented to allow for recursive partitioning of 
the cohorts into age-demarcated subgroups to capture developmental heterogeneity. SEM 




implementation in open-source software, and the ability to combine measurement and 
structural model components as well as multiple simultaneous predictors. However, they also 
have challenges, including potential vulnerability to small fluctuations and overfitting (which 
may cascade down affecting other partitions), and are certainly not the only choice available 
to examine model heterogeneity. Alternative analytical strategies, varying in the degree to 
which they presuppose known group membership or estimate it, include finite mixture 
models (Zadelaar et al., 2019), Gaussian process structural equation models (Silva and 
Gramacy, 2010), latent class and latent profile analysis (Oberski, 2016), general frameworks 
such as decision trees (McArdle, 2013) and model-based cluster analysis (Fraley and Raftery, 
1999), as well as extensions of SEM trees such as SEM forests (Brandmaier et al., 2016). All 
these techniques differ in their strengths and weaknesses, ease of implementation, degree of 
confirmation versus exploration and their flexibility (e.g., can they accommodate latent 
variables or not). One particularly fruitful avenue for future research is to combine both, using 
exploratory as well as confirmatory methods to balance discovery and robustness. Here I 
hopefully illustrate how SEM trees can be one such tool, but would urge the reader to tailor 
their analytical framework to the question at hand, and be mindful of potential drawbacks. 
Nonetheless, my view is that SEM trees offer at least one fruitful avenue to formalise 
hypotheses in developmental cognitive neuroscience which would otherwise often remain 
mostly verbal.  
Related to this point, the findings are further limited by the selection of cognitive tasks 
for both cohorts. Although the battery of tests used in the current study span three cognitive 
domains (i.e., crystallised and fluid intelligence, and working memory), inclusion of 
additional tasks measuring abilities such as processing speed and other executive functions 
would capture a fuller picture of individual differences in intelligence. For example, including 
tests of processing speed in the CALM and NKI-Rockland samples would increase the number 
of indicators (and latent constructs) that can be related to gc and/or gf. Furthermore, while 
Matrix Reasoning is the only fluid task identical between both cohorts, NKI-Rockland also 
contains Block Design, Similarities, and Verbal Reasoning (see Fuhrmann et al., 2020), which 
were not considered and, therefore, not loaded onto gf in the SEM or SEM trees models in this 
study. Finally, in the CALM sample, the working memory latent variable could be partitioned 




Matrix and Mr X) to align with more canonical psychometric memory assessments. Taken 
together, this proposed expanded battery of intelligence-related tasks coupled with more 
standardised assignment of cognitive tasks to latent constructs would further improve 
inference for the SEM and SEM trees models as well as provide a more comprehensive and 
robust estimation of age (de)differentiation between gc and gf and their associations with 
white matter (i.e., FA). 
Lastly, CALM consists of children with referrals for any difficulties related to learning, 
attention or memory (Holmes et al., 2019). It should be noted that, since CALM is a sample of 
children and adolescents struggling to learn, and, therefore, ‘atypical’, a large percentage of 
this cohort had been assigned a diagnosis (36.12%). However, controlling for this possible 
confound through constrained multigroup models showed this did not affect the results of 
the models, as was seen in previous work using CALM (Fuhrmann et al., 2020). The NKI-
Rockland sample, in contrast, is a United States population representative sample (Nooner et 
al., 2012). Both samples are composed of large cohorts that underwent extensive phenotyping 
and population-specific representative sampling. Therefore, I argue that the results generalise 
to ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ samples of neurocognitive development, although further research 
















Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter, I presented analyses that suggested that crystallised and fluid 
intelligence factors explained a significant amount of variance in test performance in two large 
child and adolescent samples. These results were found in both typically and atypically 
(struggling learners) developing cohorts, demonstrating the generalised notion that cognitive 
ability is better understood as a two-factor (gc and gf) rather than a single-factor (g) phenomenon 
in childhood and adolescence. The addition of white matter microstructure indicated 
independent contributions from specific white matter tracts known to be involved in cognitive 
ability. Moreover, further analyses suggested that the associations between neural and 
behavioural measures differed during development.  
Overall, these results support a neurocognitive age differentiation-dedifferentiation 
hypothesis (reorganisation) of cognitive abilities whereby the relation between white matter 
and cognition become more differentiated (less correlated) in pre-puberty and then dedifferentiate 
(become more correlated) during early puberty. However, structural equation modelling, 
although a highly informative and flexible method, assumes the presence of (unobserved) 
latent variables that cause the variation among cognitive scores. Therefore, in Chapter Three, 
I now describe analyses done, again using the CALM sample, but this time using the tools of 
network science, which estimates interactions among observed variables rather than presuming 
the existence of unobserved entities. Here I use this approach to model intelligence and its 
structural brain correlates (i.e., grey and white matter) as a complex system—coinciding with 
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In Chapter Two, I took a traditional approach to studying associations between 
intelligence-related measures: structural equation modelling (SEM).  Although the use of SEM 
trees is novel and more data-driven than more widely used SEM methods, it uses a 
confirmatory factor modelling approach, which posits the existence of a latent (unobserved) 
variable that causes variation in the observed scores. However, SEM is not the only conceptual 
or methodological approach to study intelligence and its neural correlates. Other perspectives, 
for example, instead posit direct connections between cognitive domains. In this chapter, I use 
network analysis to study the associations between crystallised and fluid intelligence, 
working memory, and brain structure (cortical volume and fractional anisotropy) in the 
CALM sample (ages 5 – 18 years). Rather than opposing the results of Chapter Two, this 
network model of intelligence (i.e., mutualism) complements them and previous research. 
However, network science conceptualises intelligence as a complex system and uses 
exploratory methods (i.e., partial correlations and community detection), without presuming 
the influence of latent variables.    
In recent years, methods from network analysis have shed new light on both the 
cognitive abilities that make up general intelligence (Kievit et al., 2019; van der Maas et al., 
2017), as well as the brain systems purported to support them (Girn et al., 2019; Seidlitz et al., 
2018). For instance, the mutualism model (van der Maas et al., 2006) was inspired by an 
ecosystem model of prey-predator relations, and states that the positive manifold (Spearman, 
1904), rather than existing in final form since birth, emerges gradually from the positive 
interactions among different cognitive abilities (i.e., reasoning and vocabulary) over time (see 
Kievit et al., 2019, 2017). Hence, the positive manifold (and hence, general intelligence) can 
arise even from originally weakly correlated cognitive faculties. The mutualism model (also 
see van der Maas et al., 2017) therefore highlights the need to both conceptualise traits, 
abilities, or psychological constructs such as general intelligence as complex dynamical 
systems, as well as use appropriate statistical models (i.e., network analysis) to estimate 
relationships among elements of the systems under investigation (Fried, 2020; Fried and 
Robinaugh, 2020). 
For instance, new innovations in network psychometrics (Epskamp et al., 2018) have 




psychopathology (Borsboom, 2017; Robinaugh et al., 2019). In this framework, psychological 
constructs are theorised as complex systems, whereby relationships (edges) between nodes 
(e.g., item responses on a questionnaire) are estimated using weighted partial correlation 
networks. This use of partial correlations enables the determination of conditional dependencies 
among variables, after controlling for the associations among every other node in the network 
(Epskamp et al., 2018).  
This approach has also recently been used to analyse cross-sectional data on general 
intelligence. For instance, both Kan et al., 2019 (N = 1,800; age range: 16 – 89 years) as well as 
Schmank et al., 2019 (N = 1,112; age range: 12 – 90 years) used a network model approach to 
analyse data from the WAIS-IV cognitive battery (Wechsler, 2008). The network model 
showed better fit to the pattern of intelligence scores compared to a latent variable approach 
(g factor), in support of mutualism. Furthermore, Mareva and Holmes, 2020, in two separate 
samples, one the same group of struggling learners as studied here (CALM) but with fewer 
participants (N = 350), no neuroimaging data, and including tasks not analysed in this study 
(e.g., motor speed and tower achievement), observed links between cognitive abilities and 
learning, especially between mathematics skills and more ‘domain-general’ faculties such as 
backward digit span and matrix reasoning.  
Besides psychology, in neuroscience, network analysis methods have been widely 
used to describe the relations among brain regions, ushering in the field of network 
neuroscience (Bassett and Sporns, 2017; Fornito et al., 2016). Rather than focusing on 
individual brain regions in isolation, the brain is conceived as a complex system of 
interconnected networks that facilitate behavioural functions ranging from sensorimotor 
control to learning. Several influential studies have revealed pervasive properties of brain 
networks that enable adaptive behaviour such as small-world topology (Bassett and Bullmore, 
2006, 2017), modularity (Meunier et al., 2010; Sporns and Betzel, 2016) and ‘rich-club’ 
connector hubs (Heuvel and Sporns, 2011), consistent with an economical trade-off between 
minimising wiring cost and maximising efficiency (e.g., information transfer) (Bullmore and 
Sporns, 2012). Furthermore, in the same sample studied here, Akarca et al., 2020 applied a 
generative network modelling approach to simulate the growth of brain network 
connectomes. The findings demonstrate the possibility of simulating structural networks with 




brains. The parameters of these generative models were shown to correlate with 
neuroimaging measures not used to train the models (including grey matter measures), 
cognitive performance (including vocabulary and mathematics) and relate to gene expression 
in the cortex. Together these studies point the field toward a better mechanistic understanding 
of the development of human brain structure, function, and their relationship with cognitive 
ability.  
 Despite the success of network approaches in providing unique insights within both 
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, few studies have integrated them into a so-
called multilayer network paradigm (Bianconi, 2018), which models the relationships among 
variables simultaneously across time (e.g., days, weeks, months, and years) and/or levels of 
organisation (e.g., behaviour and brain  variables). Two studies have recently pushed this 
boundary. Hilland et al., 2020 examined the relations between brain structure (cortical 
thickness and volume) and depression symptoms. They found (via a partial correlation 
network model) that certain clusters of brain regions (i.e., the cingulate, fusiform gyrus, 
hippocampus, and insula) were conditionally dependent with a subset of depression 
symptoms (crying, irritability and sadness). Secondly, in 172 male autistic participants (ages 
10 – 21 years), Bathelt et al., 2020 used ‘network-based regression’ to estimate the relationship 
between the unique variance of both the autism symptom network and functional brain 
connectivity (resting-state fMRI). Moreover, they applied Bayesian network analysis to create 
a directed acyclic graph between subscores of autism symptoms and their neural correlates. 
They found that communication and social behaviour were predicted by their respective 
resting-state MRI neural correlates (termed ‘Comm Brain’ and ‘Social Brain’). 
In Chapter Two, I showed in two large samples (CALM and NKI-Rockland) that the 
variance of general intelligence (Spearman, 1904) and its white matter correlates (fractional 
anisotropy, see Wandell, 2016) were better captured by separate factors (i.e., gc, gf, and 5 of 10 
white matter tracts) rather than a single-factor model of cognition or global white matter (g). 
While factor models have traditionally been used to study intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1993), in 
the last two decades there has been a rise in use of the statistical tools of network science 
(Barabási, 2016) to show that examining relationships between cognitive abilities can help us 
better understand the development of general intelligence. In this chapter, I use techniques 




community detection algorithm) to extend previous work assessing the mutualism model of 
intelligence (Figure 4). I also expand on work in the previous chapter by including grey matter 
(i.e., cortical volume). I conduct these analyses in the CALM sample (behavioural, N = 805; 





















Participants: The CALM cohort 
The present cross-sectional sample (behavioural, N = 805; cortical volume, N = 246; 
fractional anisotropy, N = 165; age range: 5 to 18 years) was obtained from the Centre for 
Attention, Learning and Memory (CALM) located in Cambridge, UK (Holmes et al., 2019), 
which has been described in Chapter Two (Participants: The CALM and NKI-Rockland 
cohorts section). 
 
 Cognitive assessments: gc, gf, and working memory 
 
I analysed the same tasks (measures of crystallised and fluid intelligence, and working 
memory) outlined in Chapter Two (Table 1). Furthermore, I included the task Following 
Instructions (mean: 11.2, standard deviation: 4, range: [1, 33], missingness: 6.83%), which was 
not part of the previous study in Chapter Two. This was done to balance the number of 
variables analysed for cognitive and brain structure measures in the multilayer networks (i.e., 
cognition = grey matter = white matter = 10 nodes each). Moreover, doing so helps to prevent 
biased findings by ensuring that the partial correlation estimation procedures (see below) are 
applied across an equal number of nodes for each level of the multilayer networks. Following 
Instructions, a working memory task (Gathercole et al., 2008), requires participants to carry 
out various sequences of actions (touch and/or pick up) involving objects (a box, an eraser, a 
folder, a pencil or a ruler), which are presented in front of them. Participants undertake actions 
sequentially (do X “then” do Y), with increasingly longer instruction sequences, leading to 
increased difficulty. Performance scores denote total number of correct responses. To view 
age trends of the performance scores for the cognitive tasks, see Figure 11. It must be noted 
that, since the present sample size is larger (i.e., 805 vs 551), the descriptive statistics and 















Structural MRI measures: Cortical volume (CV) and fractional anisotropy (FA) 
 
All CALM T1-weighted volume scans and Diffusion-Weighted Images (DWI) 
acquisition protocols, parameters, MRI quality control procedures (to minimise potential 
biases due to subject movement), and steps/pipelines to compute regional CV estimation and 
Figure 11. Cross-sectional scatterplot for cognitive raw scores. Solid lines represent 
linear and polynomial fit while shades indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Abbreviations: Matrix Reasoning (MR), Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Pea), 
Spelling (Spell), Single Word Reading (Read), Numerical Operations (NO), Digit Recall 
(DR), Backward Digit Recall (BDR), Mr. X (MrX), Dot Matrix (Dot), and Following 
Instructions (Ins). Note, that this figure differs from Figure 8 by including a larger 




FA maps were the same as described in Chapter Two (section Structural MRI measures: 
Fractional anisotropy (FA)).  
As the grey matter metric, I used region-based cortical volume (CV, in mm3; N = 246, 
averaged across contralateral homologues), based on the Desikan-Killiany atlas (Desikan et 
al., 2006) and defined as the distance between the outer edge of cortical grey matter and 
subcortical white matter (Fischl and Dale, 2000). Tissue classification and anatomical labelling 
was performed based on the T1-weighted scan using FreeSurfer v5.3.0 software (see 
http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/ for free download and documentation) The technical 
details of these procedures are described in prior publications (Dale et al., 1999; Fischl et al., 
2002, 1999). FreeSurfer morphology output statistics were computed for each ROI, and also 
included cortical thickness and surface area (see Supplementary Material for Chapter Three, 
section Teasing apart the relations of cortical volume to general intelligence: Multilayer 
analysis using cortical surface area and thickness for analyses involving these two metrics). 
I included a subset of 10 cortical volume regions in this study: caudal anterior cingulate 
(CAC), caudal middle frontal gyrus (CMF), frontal pole (FP), medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(MOF), rostral anterior cingulate gyrus (RAC), rostral middle frontal gyrus (RMF), superior 
frontal gyrus (SFG), superior temporal gyrus (STG), supramarginal gyrus (SMG), and 
transverse temporal gyrus (TTG). Moreover, for fractional anisotropy (FA, N = 165), a proxy 
measure for white matter integrity (Wandell, 2016), I included 10 regions using the Johns 
Hopkins University DTI-based white matter tractography atlas (see Hua et al. 2008): anterior 
thalamic radiations (ATR), corticospinal tract (CST), cingulate gyrus (CING), cingulum 
[hippocampus] (CINGh), forceps major (FMaj), forceps minor (FMin), inferior fronto-occipital 
fasciculus (IFOF), inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF), 
and uncinate fasciculus (UNC). 
I used these region-based measures to study brain structural covariance (Alexander-
Bloch et al., 2013), which have been used in cross-sectional and longitudinal designs of 
cognitive ability in childhood and adolescence (e.g., Solé-Casals et al., 2019; see Kievit and 
Simpson-Kent, 2021 for a recent review of longitudinal studies). In addition, emerging 
theoretical proposals emphasise the role of networks of brain areas in producing intelligent 
behaviour (e.g., Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT),  Jung and Haier, 2007, and The 




regions-of-interest (ROIs) in isolation (e.g., primarily the prefrontal cortex). I selected these 10 
grey matter and 10 white matter ROIs based upon combined evidence from a recent meta-
analysis (Basten et al., 2015) on associations between functional and structural ROIs and 
cognitive ability that further extended the P-FIT theory, but also more recent work involving 
two large cohorts, one in longitudinal analysis of the UK Biobank sample (grey matter, Kievit 
et al., 2018b) and the other using the same (cross-sectional) CALM sample in Chapter Two 
(cognitive data, N = 551; white matter data, N = 165).  
To view age trends of CV and illustrations of ROIs, see Figure 12. For ROI 
visualisations and ages trends of FA, see Figure 9 of Chapter Two. For correlation plots of 




Figure 12. Top: Grey matter ROIs based on the DK atlas (cortical volume, N = 246) in 







Figure 12. Bottom: Cross-sectional scatterplot for bilateral cortical volume. Solid lines 
represent linear and polynomial fit while shades indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Abbreviations: caudal anterior cingulate (CAC), caudal middle frontal gyrus (CMF), 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOF), rostral anterior cingulate gyrus (RAC), rostral 
middle frontal gyrus (RMF), superior frontal gyrus (SFG), superior temporal gyrus 







Figure 13 Top. Correlation plot for cognitive raw scores and bilateral cortical volume 
ROIs. All coefficients shown are Pearson correlations. Blue represents positive 
correlations while red signifies negative correlations among variables. Size of circles 
indicates the magnitude of the association (e.g., larger circle = higher correlation). 
Correlations calculated using pairwise complete observations. Abbreviations: Matrix 
Reasoning (MR), Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Pea), Spelling (Spell), Single Word 
Reading (Read), Numerical Operations (NO), Digit Recall (DR), Backward Digit Recall 
(BDR), Mr. X (MrX), Dot Matrix (Dot), Following Instructions (Ins), caudal anterior 
cingulate (CAC), caudal middle frontal gyrus (CMF), medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(MOF), rostral anterior cingulate gyrus (RAC), rostral middle frontal gyrus (RMF), 
superior frontal gyrus (SFG), superior temporal gyrus (STG), supramarginal gyrus 







Figure 13 Bottom. Correlation plot for cognitive raw scores and bilateral fractional 
anisotropy ROIs. All coefficients shown are Pearson correlations. Blue represents 
positive correlations while red signifies negative correlations among variables. Size of 
circles indicates the magnitude of the association (e.g., larger circle = higher correlation). 
Correlations calculated using pairwise complete observations. Abbreviations: Matrix 
Reasoning (MR), Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Pea), Spelling (Spell), Single Word 
Reading (Read), Numerical Operations (NO), Digit Recall (DR), Backward Digit Recall 
(BDR), Mr. X (MrX), Dot Matrix (Dot), Following Instructions (Ins), anterior thalamic 
radiations (ATR), corticospinal tract (CST), cingulate gyrus (CING), cingulum 
[hippocampus] (CINGh), inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus (IFOF), inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF), uncinate fasciculus 




Statistical analyses: Network analyses and community detection 
All statistical analyses and plots were performed using R (R Core Team, 2020) version 
3.6.3 (“Holding the Windsock”). Network estimation was performed using the packages 
bootnet (version 1.4.3, Epskamp and Fried, 2020) , igraph (version 1.2.6, Amestoy et al., 2020), 
qgraph (version 1.6.5, Epskamp et al., 2020), and networktools (version 1.2.3, Jones, 2020). I 
used these tools to estimate weighted partial correlation networks, which allowed 
determination of conditional dependencies among the cognitive and neural variables. For 
example, in a multilayer network, any partial correlation between node A (e.g., Matrix 
Reasoning) and node B (e.g., the caudal anterior cingulate) is one that remains after controlling 
for the associations among A and B with every other node in the network (e.g., other cognitive 
abilities and cortical volume ROIs). To estimate these networks, I applied Gaussian Graphical 
Models (Pearson correlations) using regularisation (graphical lasso, see Friedman et al., 2008) 
with a threshold tuning parameter of 0.5 and pairwise deletion to account for missingness. 
These methods have been widely used to generate sparser networks by penalising for more 
complex models—thus, decreasing the risk of potentially spurious (e.g., false positive) 
connections and enabling simpler visualisation and interpretation of conditional 
dependencies between nodes (Epskamp and Fried, 2018). I hypothesised that the results 
would show positive partial correlations (in line with mutualism theory) both within 
cognitive (e.g., as observed in Mareva and Holmes, 2020 and Schmank et al., 2019) and within 
neural measures (single-layer networks) as well as between brain-behaviour variables in the 
multilayer networks.  
Age was included as a node in the estimation procedures of all partial correlation 
networks (i.e., edge weights, centrality, network stability, and community detection) but was 
not included in the visualisations of the networks and centrality plots, or in network 
descriptive statistics (i.e., mean, median, and range of edge weights). For a comparison and 
discussion of the use of age (i.e., included in network estimation, regressed out beforehand, 
or removed from dataset before network estimation), see the Supplementary Material for 
Chapter Three section How to deal with age?. 
To assess the statistical interconnectedness or connectivity of cognitive and neural 
nodes relative to their neighbours within the single-layer networks, I estimated node strength, 




coefficients (edge weights) between a node and all other nodes it connects to within the 
network. Note that the brain structural covariance networks involve ROIs that are not 
necessarily anatomically connected, preventing certain inferences such as information flow. 
Nodes were classified as central if the magnitude of their strength z-score was positive and 
equal to or greater than one standard deviation above the mean. I do not discuss or interpret 
negative centrality z-score values for the single-layer networks. 
In the multilayer networks, I applied the Walktrap community detection algorithm 
(Pons and Latapy, 2005) to determine in a data-driven manner whether clustering, or 
grouping, of nodes (e.g., cognitive and/or neural) occurred. The Walktrap algorithm assesses 
how strongly related nodes are to each other (that can be due to similarity, e.g., because nodes 
A and B are similar, or it can be because nodes A and B are different but node A has a strong 
impact on node B; see “Topological overlap and missing nodes” of Fried and Cramer, 2017). The 
Walktrap algorithm takes recursive random walks between node pairs and classifies 
communities according to how densely connected these parts are within the network 
(wherever the random walks become ‘trapped’). Walktrap is widely used in the network 
psychometrics literature and, in a Monte Carlo simulation study, was shown to outperform 
other algorithms (e.g., InfoMap) for sparse count networks (e.g., those used in diffusion tensor 
imaging). However, it must be noted that this result was found for networks made up of 500 
nodes or higher (Gates et al., 2016). I also calculated the maximum modularity index value 
(Q), which estimates the robustness of the community partition (Newman, 2006). I interpreted 
values of 0.5 or above as evidence for reliable grouping.  
Instead of traditional absolute strength, for the multilayer networks I calculated bridge 
strength, a novel weighted degree centrality measure originally developed to study 
comorbidity between mental disorders (see Jones et al., 2019 for overview). Bridge strength 
centrality sums the absolute value of every edge that connects one node (e.g., Matrix 
Reasoning) in one pre-assigned community (e.g., cognition) to another node (e.g., caudal 
anterior cingulate) in another pre-assigned community (e.g., brain). Recent simulation work 
has shown that the method can reliably recover true structures of bridge nodes in both 
directed and undirected networks (Jones et al., 2019). Rather than relying on straightforward 
‘brain’ or ‘behaviour’ assignments to classify nodes, I pre-assigned communities for bridge 




The presence of bridges between communities (e.g., if nodes from topological distinct 
clusters such as cognition vs brain feature relations) might suggests the existence of 
intermediate endophenotypes (Fornito and Bullmore, 2012; Kievit et al., 2016), and potentially 
identify nodes (both cognitive and neural) that might one day guide intervention studies. 
Nodes were classified as central if the magnitude of their bridge strength z-score was positive 
and equal to or greater than one standard deviation above the mean. I do not discuss or 
interpret negative centrality z-score values for the multilayer networks. 
Finally, I quantified the reliability of the centrality estimates for all single-layer 
(absolute strength of cognitive and brain structural covariance nodes) and multilayer 
networks (bridge strength). To do this, I estimated the correlation stability (CS)-coefficient. 
The CS-coefficient calculates the maximum proportion (out of 2000 bootstraps) of the sample 
that can be dropped out and, with 95% probability, still retain a correlation of 0.7 (correlation 
between rank order of centrality in network estimated on full sample with order of 
subsampled network in smaller N) (Epskamp et al., 2018). A CS-coefficient value of 0.5 is 
considered to be stable. Lastly, also using bootstrapping, I determined the stability of the 
edge-weight coefficients but present these results in the Supplementary Material for Chapter 














Single-layer network models (cognitive, cortical volume, and fractional anisotropy) 
The regularised partial correlation (PC) network for the CALM cognitive data is shown 
in Figure 14 (top left). This network shows that all partial correlations are positive, and most 
have small magnitude (mean PC = 0.08, median PC = 0.07, PC range = 0 – 0.63). One edge 
(between Reading and Spelling) was an outlier (PC = 0.63, all others are between 0 and 0.27), 
likely due to close content overlap (verbal ability). Regarding centrality, three nodes emerged 
as strong (positive z-score at or greater than one standard deviation above the mean): (in 
descending order of centrality strength) Reading, Numerical Operations, and Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test (Figure 14 top right). Overall, centrality estimates were stable, indicated by a 
high correlation stability (CS)-coefficient of 0.75, revealing that at least 75% of the sample 
could be dropped while maintaining a correlation of 0.7 with the original sample at 95% 
probability.  
Next, I estimated the partial correlation network among the 10 grey matter regions as 
shown in Figure 12 above. All edge weights (mean PC = 0.09, median PC = 0, PC range = -0.15 
– 0.52) of the cortical volume network (Figure 14, middle left) were positive apart from one 
negative path (caudal middle frontal gyrus and frontal pole PC = -0.15). Note, the negative 
path between the caudal middle frontal gyrus and frontal pole might be due to the weak 
correlations between the frontal pole with other grey matter nodes and displaying a steeper 
decrease pattern across age (Figures 12 and 13). Two ROIs emerged as central (in descending 
order of centrality strength): superior temporal gyrus and rostral middle frontal gyrus (Figure 
14, middle right). Similar to the cognitive network, cortical volume centrality was stable (CS-
coefficient = 0.52), indicating that about 52% of the sample could be subtracted to maintain a 
correlation of centrality estimates above 0.7 compared to the full sample. This finding is 
despite the lower sample size compared to the behavioural data (N = 805 for behaviour vs N 
= 246 for cortical volume).  
Finally, similar to the cognitive and the grey matter covariance network, the fractional 
anisotropy network (Figure 14, bottom left) has positive partial correlations with all edge 
weights varying between small and moderate values: mean PC = 0.08, median PC = 0, and PC 
range = 0 – 0.44. Two white matter ROIs displayed centrality (Figure 14, bottom right). These 




fractional anisotropy centrality was moderately stable (CS-coefficient = 0.44) indicating that 
about 44% of the sample could be removed while maintaining an association of 0.7 with 95% 
probability. This is possibly due to the much lower sample size (N = 165) compared to the 
cognitive (N = 805) and grey matter (N = 246) networks.  










Bridging the gap: Multilayer networks 
The regularised partial correlation network analyses for the CALM multilayer 
networks data are shown in Figure 15. Consistent with the pattern found in the single-layer 
networks, the cognitive and grey matter multilayer network (top left of Figure 15) edges are 
mostly positive with small to moderate weights (mean PC = 0.04, median PC = 0, PC range = -
0.12 – 0.64). Comparably, the cognitive and white matter multilayer network (Figure 15, top 
right) had similar edge weight estimates (mean PC = 0.04, median = 0, range = -0.2 – 0.65). 
Finally, combining all measures together (tri–layer network consisting of cognition, grey and 
white matter, bottom centre of Figure 15) produced a network with similar characteristics to 
the bi-layer networks (mean PC = 0.02, median PC = 0, PC range = -0.2 – 0.66). For the bi-layer 
networks, the Walktrap algorithm produced either three (cognition-white matter) or four 
(cognitive-grey matter) clusters that consisted entirely of cognitive or neural nodes except for 
Following Instructions (Ins), which was either separated from the network (cognition-grey 
matter, Q = 0.56, indicating strong modularity) or grouped with a neural node (forceps minor 
of the cognition-white matter network, Q = 0.39, indicating moderate modularity). The result 
for the tri-layer network (Q = 0.25, indicating weak modularity) was more complex with a 
total of 15 communities (Figure 15, bottom centre).    
 Regarding centrality, I report bridge strength (Figure 16). In the cognitive-grey matter 
network, three bridge nodes surfaced (in descending order: superior temporal gyrus, superior 
frontal gyrus, and rostral middle frontal gyrus, Figure 16 top left). In terms of stability, the 
CS-coefficient was 0.20, indicating that the bridge strength estimates were unstable under 
bootstrapping conditions. In the cognitive-white matter bi-layer network, three nodes (in 
descending order: uncinate fasciculus, inferior frontal-occipital fasciculus, and hippocampal 
cingulum) emerged as possible bridge nodes (Figure 16, top right). Moreover, the centrality 
estimates had a CS-coefficient of 0.13, once again suggesting that the bridge strength estimates 
Figure 14. Single-layer partial correlation networks. Top: Network visualisation (spring 
layout, left side) of CALM cognitive data (N = 805). Centrality estimates (z-scores) of all 
cognitive tasks (right). Middle: Network visualisation (spring layout, left side) of CALM 
cortical volume data (N = 246). Centrality estimates (z-scores) of all cortical volume nodes 
(right). Bottom: Network visualisation (spring layout, left side) of CALM fractional 
anisotropy data (N = 165). Centrality estimates (z-scores) of all fractional anisotropy nodes 







were unstable. Lastly, for the tri-layer network, five nodes displayed positive bridge strength 
equal to or greater than one standard deviation above the mean (Figure 16, bottom centre). 
These included (in descending order): Reading, Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, superior 
frontal gyrus, Spelling, and Numerical Operations. Much better than the bi-layer networks, 
the tri-layer network bridge strength estimates were moderately stable (CS-coefficient = 0.44).  
Lastly, I re-ran our analyses to test the sensitivity of the main findings (e.g., positive 
partial correlations and central nodes) to potential outliers (defined as ± 4 standard 
deviations). Doing so did not severely alter the partial correlation weights between nodes in 
the networks (see section The possible effect of outliers on major findings of 
Supplementary Material for Chapter Three for detailed comparisons). It must be restated 
that this study’s data comes from an atypical sample, which might influence brain metrics 
even with rigorous quality control procedures. Therefore, despite this discrepancy, the data 





   
Figure 15. Network visualisations (spring layout) of partial correlation multilayer networks 
for CALM data. Colors indicate groups determined by the Walktrap algorithm (see above). 
Top: Bi-layer networks consisting of cognition and grey matter (left), and cognition and white 
matter (right). Bottom: Tri-layer network consisting of cognition, grey matter and white 

























Figure 16. Bridge centrality estimates (z-scores) for multilayer networks. Top: Bi-layer 
networks consisting of cognition and grey matter (left), and cognition and white matter 
(right). Bottom: Tri-layer network consisting of cognition, grey matter and white matter 








Summary and interpretation of findings 
In this study, I used network analysis (partial correlations) to examine the 
neurocognitive structure of general intelligence in a childhood and adolescent cohort of 
struggling learners (CALM). For the single-layer networks (Figure 14), I found that cognitive, 
grey matter, and white matter networks contained mostly (if not all) positive partial 
correlations. Moreover, in all single-layer networks, at least two nodes emerged as more 
central than others (as indexed by node strength equal to or greater than one standard 
deviation above the mean), which varied in stability from moderately to highly reliable. In the 
cognitive network, this included two measures of verbal ability (specifically Reading and 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) and crystallised intelligence (i.e., Numerical Operations). 
In the structural brain networks (grey matter cortical volume and white matter fractional 
anisotropy), two nodes each from the grey matter network (superior temporal gyrus and 
rostral middle frontal gyrus) and white matter network (forceps minor and inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus) passed the centrality threshold.  
Furthermore, I extended previous approaches by integrating a cognitive network with 
networks of structural brain data, forming bi- and tri-layer networks (Figure 15). Doing so, I 
observed multiple (both positive and negative) partial correlations between brain and 
behaviour variables. Using bridge strength as a metric, I found that, in the bi-layer networks, 
only neural nodes harboured significant connections across communities (defined by the 
Walktrap algorithm) and levels of organisation (Figure 16, top). In contrast, in the tri-layer 
network, I found support that mostly cognitive nodes connect across different communities 
(Figure 16, bottom). Overall, my results suggest that specific behavioural and neural variables 
serve as ‘bridges’ between the brain and cognition within general intelligence. These variables 
may exert greater influence among nodes. Alternatively, these variables might be more 
influenced by other nodes. However, the literature on drawing inferences from networks to 
the most likely consequences of intervening on the network is complex and rapidly changing, 
(e.g., Dablander and Hinne, 2019; Henry et al., 2020; Levine and Leucht, 2016). 
Each node in the cognitive network corresponded to a single cognitive task (e.g., 
Matrix Reasoning) while partial correlations (weighted edges) between nodes were 




abilities during development. This interpretation is compatible with the mutualism theory of 
cognitive development (van der Maas et al., 2006), whereby cognitive abilities positively 
reinforce each other (e.g., positive partial correlations) over time to produce the positive 
manifold (Spearman, 1904). Mutualism hypothesises that general intelligence emerges from 
causal interactions among abilities rather than a general latent factor  (Fried, 2020; Kan et al., 
2019). Hence, cognition is viewed as a complex system derived from the dynamic relations of 
specific abilities that become more intertwined over development.  
The existence of only positive edges in the cognitive network would be expected under 
a mutualistic perspective (interactions among cognitive variables), which at its essence is a 
network theory of general intelligence. However, longitudinal analyses are needed to further 
substantiate this claim. Initially, it was surprising that two of the three most central nodes (i.e., 
Reading and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) relate to verbal ability rather than abilities 
such as fluid intelligence and working memory (Matrix Reasoning and (forward and 
backward) Digit Recall), which are traditionally viewed as having strong causal influences on 
cognitive development (Cattell, 1971). However, an emerging body of literature suggests that 
verbal ability plays a crucial role in cognitive development (e.g., between reading and 
working memory before 4th grade, Peng et al., 2018 and Zhang and Malatesha Joshi, 2020), as 
well as driving the emergence of reasoning (Kievit et al., 2019; also see Gathercole et al., 1999)). 
As for the neural networks (here, grey matter cortical volume and white matter 
fractional anisotropy), individual nodes were comprised of a single ROI. Importantly, I did 
not interpret weighted edges as an index of direct connectivity. Instead, the presence of strong 
associations between these ROIs would be compatible with the hypothesis of coordinated 
development (see Alexander-Bloch et al., 2013), whereby certain brain regions show 
preferential correlations to each other than more peripheral regions over time (e.g., childhood 
to late adolescence) as well as the notion of “rich” (Heuvel and Sporns, 2011) and “diverse” 
(Bertolero et al., 2017) clubs that enable local and global integration. The most central grey 
matter node was the superior temporal gyrus, which has been implicated in verbal reasoning 
(e.g., Khundrakpam et al., 2017). Regarding white matter, the two strongest nodes were the 
forceps minor and inferior longitudinal fasciculus, which while not anatomically close, 




mathematical ability (Navas-Sánchez et al., 2014) and visuospatial working memory 
(Krogsrud et al., 2018).  
Finally, I integrated both domains (cognitive abilities and brain metrics) into combined 
multilayer networks (cognition-grey matter, cognition-white matter, and cognition-grey and- 
white matter). Doing so enabled simultaneous comparison and integration across explanatory 
levels within the same analytical paradigm (network analysis) and statistical metrics (partial 
correlations, centrality, and community detection). From this analysis, three observations 
immediately stood out. First, there were multiple partial correlations between cognitive and 
neural nodes (especially in the cognitive-white matter and cognitive-grey matter and- white 
matter networks). Second, compared to the single-layer networks, the multilayer networks 
have more negative partial correlations. Together, these two findings further suggest that 
associations between the brain and cognition are complex as they defy straightforward (e.g., 
only positive and/or one-to-one) relationships and interpretations. However, it should be 
noted that causality (e.g., conditioning on colliders, see Rohrer, 2018 for overview of 
interpretations of correlations in graphical causal models in observational data) becomes even 
more difficult to determine with networks that include multiple levels of organisation (e.g., 
cognition and structural brain covariance). Finally, I found a peculiar role of the cognitive task 
Following Instructions (Ins) within all multilayer networks. For example, in the cognitive-grey 
matter network, Ins had no partial correlations with any other nodes within the network while 
in both the cognitive-white matter and tri-layer network (cognition, grey and white matter) 
Ins only correlated with the forceps minor (FMin), a neural node, and not any of the cognitive 
variables. This might suggest that Following Instructions, traditionally a working memory 
task and often analysed using structural equation modelling, may have distinct psychometric 
properties (e.g., one-to-one mapping) when compared to other cognitive tasks when modelled 
through network science approaches, and/or when adjusted for all shared correlations.   
Further inspection of bridge strength centrality showed an interesting pattern: 
(discounting the one standard deviation cut-off) the neural nodes are stronger than the 
cognitive variables within the multilayer networks, despite there being an equal number of 
cognitive nodes for each brain metric. This is possibly due to the large number of edges 
between them (grey and white matter regions) and both cognitive and other neural nodes. In 




correlations) across explanatory levels, they display greater bridge strength (bridge strength 
sums inter-network correlations).  
In other ways, the multilayer networks differed. First, in the tri-layer network, the four 
of the five central nodes were cognitive variables while, in the bi-layer networks, the central 
nodes were neural ROIs. Three of these central cognitive nodes in the tri-layer network 
(Reading, Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, and Numerical Operations) were also found to 
be central in the single-layer cognitive network. This further suggests the importance of 
mathematical and verbal ability in understanding the cognitive neuroscience of general 
intelligence. Secondly, the fact that cognitive nodes were found to be central only in the tri-
layer network suggests that grey and white matter, while related, possibly reveal unique 
information about cognition when combined and analysed together simultaneously.  
However, particularly for the cognition-grey matter bi-layer network, the conclusion 
that the presence of only central neural nodes indicates that these ROIs form strong 
connections ‘between’ brain and cognition might be confounded due to the ten cortical 
volume nodes being clustered into two separate communities. For instance, for the two most 
central regions in this network, the superior temporal gyrus and the superior frontal gyrus, 
the majority of partial correlations bridge between the two grey matter clusters rather than 
the cognitive group. On the other hand, in the cognition-white matter network, the Walktrap 
algorithm produced a more straightforward grouping (besides UNC) of brain and behaviour. 
For this network, the three strongest bridge nodes (the uncinate fasciculus, inferior fronto-
occipital fasciculus, and hippocampal cingulum) show more associations between neural and 
cognitive clusters, which support the conclusion of bridging ‘between’ brain and cognition. 
Lastly, for the tri-layer network, the large number of clusters identified (i.e., 15 including age) 
further complicates the interpretations of the findings. Perhaps the clearest example of this is 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Pea), which connects to four separate communities, 
three of which are cognitive nodes. Moreover, the Pea and these three nodes each form 
communities of which they are the sole member. Therefore, before any strong claims can be 
made, these analyses should be conducted using different cognitive batteries (but similar 






Limitations of the present study 
This study contains several limitations that require caution when interpreting the 
results. First and foremost, these findings are based on cross-sectional data. While adequate 
to help tease apart individual differences in cognition between people, cross-sectional data 
cannot be used to elucidate differences in changes within individuals over time, such as 
during development. Therefore, longitudinal analyses are needed before attempting to make 
strong inferences about the dynamics of these networks. Reiterating this point, a recent study 
using intelligence data (Schmiedek et al., 2020) found that a cross-sectional analysis of the g 
factor of cognitive ability was unable to capture within-person changes in cognitive abilities 
over time. This finding further stresses the necessity to integrate cross-sectional (between-
person) differences and longitudinal (within-person) changes when studying cognition.  
Moreover, as also detailed in Chapter Two, the CALM sample represents an atypical 
sample (Holmes et al., 2019), with participants who consistently score lower on measures of 
attention, learning and/or memory than age-matched controls (see Figure 8 (Level I) of 
Chapter Two for comparison to a typically developing sample). As a result, these analyses 
would need to be replicated in additional (ideally larger) samples with different cognitive 
profiles before the results can be said to generalise. This shortcoming of the present study is 
echoed by the low stability estimates found for the centrality values in the bi-layer networks, 
which might be due to the differences between the sample sizes of the neural data (grey 
matter, N = 246; white matter, N = 165) compared to cognition (N = 805). Interestingly, the tri-
layer network showed moderate bridge strength stability, but also displayed weak 
modularity. Moreover, given that the Walktrap algorithm produced 15 communities in the 
network, which contained only 31 nodes (including age), I further state that this result should 
be interpreted with caution and must be corroborated in larger cohorts (e.g., ABCD study, 










Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter builds on the findings from Chapter Two, by using a network 
psychometrics approach to understand individual differences in cognitive ability (general 
intelligence) with structural covariance networks derived from structural brain properties 
(i.e., grey matter cortical volume and white matter fractional anisotropy). In doing so, I created 
a network of networks, which differs from multiplex (same nodes, different edge types across 
layers) and multi-slice (same nodes and edge types over time such as in fMRI time-series data) 
networks (see figure 4.1 of Bianconi, 2018). The advantages of applying this approach are 
threefold and complementary. First, it places the brain and behaviour, which often do not map 
onto each other in a simple and reductionist one-to-one fashion, into the same analytical 
paradigm (network analysis). This allows for simultaneous estimation and easier visualisations 
of potential causal links between cognition and structural brain properties, which to my 
knowledge, has only been done in a similar way in two other studies, one involving 
depression (Hilland et al., 2020), the other in autism (Bathelt et al., 2020). Second, it enables 
the use of community detection algorithms to tease apart major clusters of cognitive abilities, 
which could help pinpoint potential intervention targets (e.g., using cognitive training and/or 
transcranial magnetic stimulation). Lastly, it aids in establishing a coherent framework for 
theory building, which has been lacking in both the neuroscience (Levenstein et al., 2020) and 
psychological (Fried, 2020) literature, by treating both the brain (algorithmic) and behaviour 
(computational) as equally important levels of analysis to study (Marr and Poggio, 1976), and 
attempting to more directly translate findings from one level to the other.  
 In Chapter Four, I finally overcome a key limitation of the past two empirical chapters: 
the lack of longitudinal data. In the IMAGEN study (Schumann et al., 2010), I use longitudinal 
structural equation modelling to examine how brain-behaviour relations change over time 
from mid-adolescence to early adulthood (ages 14 to 22 years). By doing so I statistically test 
for evidence in support of the structural scaffolding hypothesis mentioned in Chapter One 








Longitudinal Analyses of Individual Differences and 
Change between Human Cortical Grey Matter Structure 
and Measures of Decision-making, Risk-related 
Behaviours, and Spatial Working Memory from 
Adolescence to Early Adulthood in the IMAGEN Study 
 
Chapter Four is in preparation for submission to a journal for publication and includes 
additional co-authors. 
 
Although first-person pronouns are used throughout the chapter, this work is the result of a 
collaborative research project. My contributions to this study are:  
1. I led conceptualisation and planning (aided by R. A. Kievit) about the scientific 
hypotheses, analysis methods, and interpretations of the project. 
2. I performed all manuscript analyses (aided by R. A. Kievit). 


















In Chapters Two and Three, I analysed cross-sectional data in two samples (i.e., CALM 
and NKI-Rockland) using structural equation modelling (SEM) and network analysis, 
respectively, to tease apart the brain-behaviour relationships between brain structure and 
measures of intelligence in childhood and adolescence. However, a major limitation of these 
analyses was the lack of repeat (longitudinal) assessments to not only examine how these 
variables differ between individuals, but also how they change within individuals over time. 
Hence, in the final empirical chapter of this thesis, I will describe longitudinal analyses used 
to investigate the structural scaffolding hypothesis of human intelligence (see Figure 7). 
Specifically, I use latent growth curve modelling to estimate intercept and slope associations 
between grey matter structure (i.e., cortical surface area, thickness, and volume) and 
behavioural performance (here measured by decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and 
spatial working memory) from mid-adolescence to early adulthood (ages 14 to 22 years), all 
performed in the IMAGEN study.    
Adolescence, defined as the developmental period between childhood and adulthood 
(e.g., ages 10 and 24 years, Sawyer et al., 2018), is marked by distinct changes in biological (i.e., 
physical maturation resulting from pubertal hormones), cognitive (e.g., increase in risky 
behaviours more likely to result in injury or death, see Eaton et al., 2006), and social (e.g., 
advanced levels of schooling such as high school and undergraduate studies) functioning. 
Moreover, both cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence has found associations between 
adolescence and developmental differences in brain structure such as synaptic pruning 
(Huttenlocher, 1990), white matter microstructure (Simmonds et al., 2014) and volume 
(Vijayakumar et al., 2018), and grey matter metrics such as cortical surface area, thickness, and 
volume (Becht and Mills, 2020; Ducharme et al., 2015; Giedd et al., 1999; Tamnes et al., 2017; 
Vijayakumar et al., 2016).  
    Furthermore, differences in adolescent brain structure are related to various 
cognitive and affective functions ranging from decision-making and risk-related behaviours 
(Steinberg, 2008) and social cognition (i.e., the social brain, see Blakemore, 2008 and Andrews 
et al., 2021) to intelligence measures (Ferrer, 2018; Ritchie et al., 2019; Wendelken et al., 2017). 
For example, in a previous release of the IMAGEN cohort (also used here, see Schumann et 




between a general factor of cognitive ability (obtained by extracting the first component of a 
battery of CANTAB tasks) and measures of cortical brain structure (i.e., total surface area, 
mean cortical thickness, and grey matter volume). Using latent change score modelling (Kievit 
et al., 2018a), they observed that the general cognitive ability factor (based on CANTAB tasks, 
see Haring et al., 2015) at baseline (age 14 years) had significant associations with surface and 
volume, but not cortical thickness. Moreover, higher scores on the baseline CANTAB factor 
predicted more rapid cortical thinning and volume loss between 14 and 19 years. In contrast, 
baseline brain structure did not significantly correlate with change/slope of the general 
CANTAB factor.  
A recent review of developmental associations between brain structure and 
intelligence from childhood to early adulthood found that longitudinal studies (i.e., at least 
two time points) that combine both brain structure and intelligence-related measures are 
scarce, with about 30 total studies to date (see Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2 of Kievit and Simpson-
Kent, 2021). Furthermore, most of these studies have been published within the last five years, 
indicating that this approach is very much in its infancy. Although only a modest number of 
studies exist, several patterns emerged: In multiple studies, baseline brain structure (e.g., grey 
matter cortical thickness and white matter fractional anisotropy) significantly predicted the 
rate of change in cognitive performance over time (Ferrer, 2018; Wendelken et al., 2017). In 
other words, individuals with ‘better’ brain structure such as greater white matter integrity 
on average also showed larger gains (in children and adolescents) than individuals with lower 
scores on structural brain imaging metrics. This pattern, termed ‘structural scaffolding’, 
suggests that the structural integrity of the brain at a previous time point lays the foundations 
for later changes in cognition over time. On the other hand, it was also found that baseline 
cognitive scores significantly predict changes in brain structure over time (e.g., Ritchie et al., 
2019). This is referred to as ‘adaptive reorganisation’. Lastly, ‘correlated change’ could also 
exist between the slopes of behavioural performance and brain structure such that changes in 
one of these measures are correlated. 
The purpose of the present study was to further investigate structural scaffolding, as 
well as adaptive reorganisation and correlated change from adolescence to early adulthood 
(ages 14 – 22 years). In the IMAGEN consortium, I fit latent growth curve models (Duncan 




of three psychometric domains (decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial 
working memory), and three metrics of cortical brain structure (i.e., surface area, thickness, 
and volume). In contrast to my hypothesis, I found evidence for adaptive reorganisation but 
not structural scaffolding. Furthermore, findings suggested that there were no correlated 































Participants: The IMAGEN study 
Participants from the present study were obtained from the IMAGEN study 
(Schumann et al., 2010), a longitudinal (four time points, three of which include neuroimaging 
and are analysed in this study), multi-centre (research sites are located in Berlin, Dresden, 
Dublin, Hamburg, London, Mannheim, Nottingham, and Paris) consortium formed to study 
reinforcement-related behaviour in both typical and atypical brain function associated with 
psychopathology. For this study, I included participants across three time points (waves) from 
middle adolescence to early adulthood (wave 1 ≈ 14 years old, N = 2072; wave 2 ≈ 19 years old, 
N = 1436; wave 3 ≈ 22 years old, N = 1256). I did not include the first follow up after baseline 
in my analyses because neuroimaging data were not collected during this assessment. 
 
Cognitive assessments:  
Decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial working memory 
Previous studies tend to focus on more narrow cognitive domains. However, this 
approach might fail to discover broader behavioural patterns of change, as well as specific 
associations between behavioural domains (see Table 4) and different brain metrics (Figure 
18). Therefore, here I examine a broader sample of eight measures, which I group descriptively 
into three behavioural domains. First, as representative of classic intelligence-type tasks, I 
used two spatial working memory measures (Between Errors and Strategy). Beyond standard 
general cognitive ability measures, I also incorporated measures of decision-making (Delay 
Aversion, Deliberation Time, and Quality of Decision-making), and risk-related behaviours 
(Overall Proportion Bet, Risk Adjustment, and Risk Taking). These will allow me to compare 
and contrast the neurocognitive development of intelligence and other domains. See Table 4 
for descriptions and summary statistics of behavioural measures for all three waves. 
Behavioural measures originated from the from the Cambridge Neuropsychological 
Test Automated Battery (CANTAB, Haring et al., 2015), which includes spatial working 
memory and the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT, renamed Cambridge Guessing Task for 
the IMAGEN study, Deakin et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 1999), which contained the measures of 




During the spatial working memory portion of CANTAB, participants are presented 
with varying numbers of coloured boxes shown on a screen. The goal of this task is to (via 
process of elimination) find the boxes that contain a yellow token inside them and use those 
tokens to fill up an empty column positioned on the right-hand side of the screen. Difficulty 
(more boxes to choose from) increases until up to 12 boxes at a time are displayed for 
participants to search and pick from. Over successive trails, both the colour and location of 
the boxes are changed to inhibit stereotyped search strategies used for selection. 
For the Cambridge Gambling/Guessing Task (CGT), participants are presented with a 
row of ten boxes (located at the top of a screen), with some coloured in blue while the others 
are coloured in red. One of these boxes contains a yellow token, which is concealed inside. 
Across trials, the ratio of red to blue boxes changes but, in every trial, one box (either blue or 
red) always contains a yellow token. In each trial, participants select the box colour they think 
contains the token. Participants are also given 100 points at the start of the task, a proportion 
of which they bet (by pressing a button when the value displayed on the screen matches the 
amount they wish to bet) per decision on each trial. The bet value counter increases 
(ascending) or decreases (descending) depending on the trial and points are added or 
subtracted for correct (yellow token present in box) or incorrect (wrong box colour choice) 
responses, respectively.       
Notably, for both spatial working memory measures, Between Errors and Strategy, 
and Delay Aversion (decision-making), higher scores designate poorer performance. For the 
other tasks, higher scores either indicate better performance (i.e., Quality of Decision-making) 
or their interpretations are ambiguous regarding the magnitude of the score (i.e., Deliberation 
Time, Overall Proportion Bet, Risk Adjustment, and Risk Taking). See Figure 17 for age trends 








Delay Aversion: difference 
(ascending vs descending) in 
proportion a participant bet 
across trial conditions.  
Wave 1: 0.24 (0.14) [-0.20, 0.70] 
Wave 2: 0.19 (0.14) [-0.13, 0.65] 
Wave 3: 0.16 (0.13) [-0.20, 0.60] 
Wave 1: 18.82% 
Wave 2: 34.26% 





 Deliberation Time: average 
time taken by a participant to 
choose a box colour (red or 
blue). 
Wave 1: 2.00 (0.56) [0.74, 4.15] 
Wave 2: 1.60 (0.42) [0.73, 3.03] 
Wave 3: 1.52 (0.43) [0.74, 3.67] 
Wave 1: 19.66% 
Wave 2: 35.19% 
Wave 3: 42.51% 
CGT 
Quality of Decision-making: 
average proportion of trials 
whereby a participant chose 
the box colour (red or blue) 
containing the yellow token 
(correct response).   
Wave 1: 0.94 (0.08) [0.66, 1.00] 
Wave 2: 0.96 (0.05) [0.75, 1.00] 
Wave 3: 0.96 (0.06) [0.55, 1.00] 
 
Wave 1: 20.12% 
Wave 2: 34.77% 





Overall Proportion Bet: 
average proportion a 
participant bets across all 
trials.  
Wave 1: 0.50 (0.13) [0.09, 0.89] 
Wave 2: 0.49 (0.12) [0.14, 0.83] 
Wave 3: 0.52 (0.12) [0.11, 0.91] 
Wave 1: 18.59% 
Wave 2: 33.43% 
Wave 3: 41.77% 
CGT 
Risk Adjustment: degree to 
which participant betting 
behaviour was influenced by 
the box ratio (red vs blue). 
Hence, this measure gauges a 
participant’s tendency to 
make higher or lower bets 
based on which box colour is 
likely to be favourable 
(contains yellow token) or 
unfavourable (no yellow 
token), respectively, on a 
given trial.    
Wave 1: 1.52 (0.96) [-1.02, 4.42] 
Wave 2: 1.90 (0.98) [-1.04, 4.77] 
Wave 3: 1.99 (1.00) [-0.82, 4.83] 
 
 
Wave 1: 18.64% 
Wave 2: 33.47% 




Risk Taking: average 
proportion of total points a 
participant bets on trials 
when they chose the most 
likely outcome. 
Wave 1: 0.54 (0.14) [0.13, 0.95] 
Wave 2: 0.54 (0.12) [0.17, 0.90] 
Wave 3: 0.57 (0.13) [0.11, 0.90] 
Wave 1: 18.54% 
Wave 2: 33.43% 







Between Errors: a measure of 
the tendency (i.e., number of 
times) of participants to go 
back to boxes previously 
found to contain a yellow 
token.  
Wave 1: 19.40 (13.64) [0, 62] 
Wave 2: 10.46 (10.12) [0, 47] 
Wave 3: 11.75 (10.94) [0, 49] 
 
 
Wave 1: 4.64% 
Wave 2: 53.69% 








Strategy: quantifies how 
often (i.e., number of times) 
participants began a new 
search by selecting a different 
box and, therefore, deviating 
from a more efficient 
‘predetermined sequence’ of 
revisiting a box where a 
yellow token was previously 
found.  
Wave 1: 31.28 (5.43) [18, 46] 
Wave 2: 27.66 (6.20) [18, 45] 
Wave 3: 27.74 (6.13) [10, 46] 
Wave 1: 3.94% 
Wave 2: 52.67% 
Wave 3: 41.86% 
CANTAB 
 
Table 4. Behavioural domains, descriptions, summary statistics, missingness, and test 
battery of IMAGEN behavioural data across all three waves (ages 14 – 22 years) used 
in this study. Descriptions of measures are paraphrased from Cacciamani et al., 2018 








Figure 17 Top. Spaghetti plots showing (first half of) age trends of IMAGEN 




      
 
Figure 17 Bottom. Spaghetti plots showing (second half of) age trends of IMAGEN 




Structural MRI measures: Cortical surface area, thickness, and volume 
The IMAGEN study neuroimaging data were obtained on the 3T MRI scanners from 
four different manufacturers (Bruker, Ettlingen, Germany; General Electrics, Chalfont St 
Giles, UK; Philips, Best, The Netherlands; and Siemens, Munich, Germany) at eight different 
European locations (i.e., Berlin, Dresden, Dublin, Hamburg, London, Mannheim, 
Nottingham, and Paris). Scanning protocol parameters, particularly those related to image 
contrast or signal-to-noise ratio were synchronised (held constant) across manufacturers at all 
acquisition sites. The 3D T1-weighted images were acquired using a 3D magnetisation-
prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence with 1.1 millimetre (mm) 
isotropic image resolution, and is based on the ADNI protocol (see Jack et al., 2008) with the 
following parameters: Repetition Time (TR) = 2300 milliseconds (ms); Echo Time (TE) = 2.80 
ms; Inversion Time (TI) = 900 ms; flip angle = 8 – 9 degrees; voxel dimensions = 1.1 mm 
isotropic. All segmentation of structural MRI data was performed with FreeSurfer version 
5.3.0 (see http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). For details about quality control measures, see 
Supplementary Tables 3 and 4 of Schumann et al., 2010.  
The neural data used in this study consisted of three cortical grey matter metrics: 
cortical surface area, thickness, and volume. Regions-of-interest (ROIs) were derived from the 
Desikan-Killiany atlas (Desikan et al., 2006). Rather than incorporating whole-brain grey 
matter cortical structure into the analyses, I instead selected a subset of 10 cortical regions (see 
top Figure 12 from Chapter Three for visualisation) for this study (caudal anterior cingulate, 
caudal middle frontal gyrus, frontal pole, medial orbitofrontal cortex, rostral anterior 
cingulate gyrus, rostral middle frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, 
supramarginal gyrus, and transverse temporal gyrus). These ROIs were selected based on a 
meta-analysis on functional and structural correlates of intelligence (Basten et al., 2015), as 
well as from previous studies where evidence was found for an important role of these regions 
in predicting and/or correlating with performance on tests of intelligence (Kievit et al., 2018b; 
also see Chapter Three). I then calculated the average for these 10 ROIs across both 
hemispheres to create a global mean bilateral estimate of grey matter cortical structure in this 
network of regions (referred to from here on as Surface Area, Thickness, and Volume). I 
speculated that, given these 10 regions have been found to robustly correlate with intelligence, 




making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial working memory. See Figure 18 for age trends of 




Figure 18. Spaghetti plots showing age trends of IMAGEN neural (grey matter 




Statistical analyses: Latent growth curve models 
I used latent growth curve modelling (Duncan and Duncan, 2004), a longitudinal class 
of structural equation modelling techniques (Kline, 2015), which allows the estimation of 
trajectories (i.e., intercepts and slopes) and associations (i.e., variances and covariances) of the 
behavioural and brain structure measures across the three time points (age 14, 19, and 22 
years). Since, by definition, unobserved/latent variables (LVs) cannot be observed directly, the 
statistical properties (i.e., intercepts, slopes, and variances) of psychological and neural LVs 
are estimated through observed/manifest variables such as behavioural and brain structure 
measures.   
To estimate the latent growth curve models, I used the lavaan package (version 0.6-6, 
see Rosseel, 2012) of the R language (R Core Team, 2020). I implemented two variants of these 
models: linear (Figure 19 left) and basis (Figure 19 right) models. In the linear model, change 
(slope) is specified to increase in equal amounts (here, 0.25 per year) for every year between 
time points/waves of data (t2 – t1 = 5 years; t3 – t2 = 3 years). In contrast, the basis model 
assumes that change in slope is nonlinear. In terms of model specification, in the basis model 
the second wave (age 19) is freely estimated (instead of being set to 1.25), with the first and 
third wave being constrained to 0 and 2, respectively, as in the linear model. If, based on a 
likelihood ratio test, the basis model outperforms the linear model, it would suggest that, from 
mid-adolescence to early adulthood (ages 14 – 22 years), participants changed/increased at a 
rate faster, or more slowly, than would be expected if the growth was equally distributed at 
each year.  
Prior to fitting models, I removed outliers (defined as ± 3 standard deviations from the 
mean) for both behavioural and neural data. I repeated this procedure for Deliberation Time 
after noticing additional outliers when plotting the data. To account for data missingness and 
deviations from multivariate normality, I used robust full information maximum likelihood 
estimator (FIML, see Enders, 2001). I assessed overall model fit using the robust estimates of 
chi-squared test, the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) with its confidence interval, and the standardised root mean squared residuals 
(SRMR) (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). Interpretation of model fit was defined as: CFI 
(acceptable fit 0.95 – 0.97, good fit > 0.97), RMSEA (acceptable fit 0.05 – 0.08, good fit < 0.05), 




basis) using the likelihood ratio test, which determines whether the complexity of the basis 
model leads to a sufficient improvement in fit. Additionally, I examined the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC, see Akaike, 1998) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC, see 
Schwarz, 1978).  
For all models I allowed the residual variance of time point 2 (around age 19) to be 
unique (whereas time points 1 and 3 were constrained to be equal) to achieve proper solutions. 
Furthermore, fitting some univariate models led to convergence issues (e.g., negative latent 
variable slope variances). For these models, I incorporated necessary model restrictions (e.g., 
setting slope to be positive) to achieve proper solutions (e.g., no Heywood cases). Lastly, the 
best fitting models from the univariate model selection were used in the bivariate models (i.e., 
brain and behaviour combined). For the bivariate models, I also incorporated model 
restrictions only where necessary (as with the univariate models). All these modifications 
were made solely to achieve proper fit, rather than based on other criteria (e.g., parameters of 
interest). 
I evaluated five hypotheses using latent growth curve modelling: 
1. Participants will change (i.e., increase or have a non-zero slope) in decision-
making, risk-related behaviour, spatial working memory, and cortical 
brain structure from mid-adolescence (age 14) to early adulthood (age 22). 
2. These changes will not be fully linear (i.e., a basis model will outperform a 
linear model). 
3. There will be significant (p < .05) individual differences among participants 
in mean and variances of baseline (intercept) and change (slope) estimates. 
4. Intercepts and slopes within the same variables will be significantly 
correlated. This will be the case for both behavioural and brain variables. 
The direction of this association was not specified before analyses were 
conducted. 
5. There will be ubiquitous covariance between brain structure slope (e.g., 
Surface Area, Thickness, and/or Volume) and change in behavioural 
performance, providing further longitudinal evidence for the structural 










Basis Model Linear Model 
Figure 19. Left: Example of linear univariate latent growth curve model. Right: Example 
of basis/nonlinear univariate latent growth curve model. Circles and squares represent 
latent (LV) and manifest (MV) variables, respectively. Single and double-headed 
arrows indicate factor loadings (intercepts and slopes) and covariances, respectively. 







Figure 20. Example of bivariate latent growth curve model illustrating theorised 
longitudinal changes in brain-behaviour relationships (adaptive reorganisation, structural 
scaffolding, and correlated change) across development. Est. = slope estimate at time 
point/wave 2 (1.25 for linear model, freely estimated for basis model). Residual variances 
are also estimated in these models but are not shown for easier illustration.  
 






Univariate models show that most behavioural and all cortical grey matter structural 
measures change nonlinearly from mid-adolescence to early adulthood 
First, I fit univariate latent growth curve models, separately for each behavioural 
measure and grey matter metric. For each behavioural domain and brain metric, I compared 
a linear growth model with a basis (nonlinear) model, where the slope factor loading of the 
middle time point (i.e., age 19) is freely estimated. If developmental change is truly linear, the 
penalty for the complexity (estimated using the AIC and BIC) of the basis model will indicate 
that the linear model is preferred. If, however, change is nonlinear, such that change is more 
(or less) rapid between ages 14 and 19 than between 19 and 22 (or vice versa), then the basis 
model will be preferred. 
I found that the basis model outperformed the linear model for most behavioural 
measures (Between Errors: χ2∆ = 87.16, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 179.20, BIC∆ = 173.50, p < .001; Delay 
Aversion: χ2∆ = 5.90, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 3.54, BIC∆ = 2.08 (Note: the linear model had a lower BIC, 
suggesting a small benefit of the linear model), p < .05; Deliberation Time: χ2∆ = 63.06, df∆ = 1, 
AIC∆ = 89.15, BIC∆ = 83.53, p < .001; Quality of Decision-making: χ2∆ = 29.26, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 
81.60, BIC∆ = 76.00, p < .001; Risk Adjustment: χ2∆ = 10.18, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 10.50, BIC∆ = 4.90, 
p < .05; Strategy (χ2∆ = 31.42, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 40.40, BIC∆ = 34.70, p < .001). All nonlinear models 
had good fit (Table 5). Exceptions to this trend of nonlinear change in behaviour included 
Overall Proportion Bet (χ2∆ = 1.12, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 0.59, BIC∆ = 6.22, p > .05; I chose the linear 
model as the winning model since it had better overall fit, and a lower AIC and BIC), and Risk 
Taking (χ2∆ = 2.07, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 0.59 (the basis model had a lower AIC), BIC∆ = 5.04 (the 
linear model had a lower BIC), p > .05; I chose the linear model as the winning model since it 
had better overall fit, and a lower BIC). All these models also fit well to the behavioural data 
(Table 5).  
Behavioural slope estimates (see Figure 21 left) showed substantial evidence for 
change during adolescence (i.e., from age 14 until age 22, with all slopes showing a significant 
mean intercept (all p < .001)). Notably, risk-related behaviours (here measured by Overall 
Proportion Bet, Risk Adjustment, and Risk Taking) was the only construct where the model 
fit revealed mixed results in relation to the shape of their trajectories (linear or nonlinear). For 




increases from the first to third wave, while Overall Proportion Bet and Risk Taking grew 
linearly. Between Errors displayed the largest increase between waves 1 and 2 of any 
behavioural measure (slope factor loading estimate at wave 2 (age 19) = 2.28; second highest 
estimate: Quality of Decision-making = 1.85, also at age 19; third highest estimate at age 19: 
Strategy = 1.84).  
Together, these findings overall support hypothesis 1 that behavioural performance in 
decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial working memory changed (particularly 
increased) from mid-adolescence (age 14) to early adulthood (age 22). Moreover, these 
changes in behaviour tended to be nonlinear (supporting hypothesis 2), with exceptions for 
two risk-related behaviours (Overall Proportion Bet and Risk Taking). This suggests that 
adolescents change linearly in managing risk as they age into early adulthood.  
In terms of cortical grey matter structure, the pattern of change was consistent (Table 
5 and Figure 21 right): the basis model outperformed the linear model for each brain metric 
(Surface Area: χ2∆ = 30.36, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 183.71, BIC∆ = 178.06, p < .001; Thickness: χ2∆ = 
63.23, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 60.44, BIC∆ = 54.79, p < .001; Volume: χ2∆ = 83.77, df∆ = 1, AIC∆ = 212.70, 
BIC∆ = 207.10, p < .001). This indicated that brain maturation changed nonlinearly (i.e., 
decreased except for Surface Area, which increased over time, see Figure 18) from mid-
adolescence to early adulthood, thereby further supporting hypotheses 1 and 2, this time for 
neural measures.   
 
Measure Model χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR AIC BIC 
Between Errors 
 
Linear*** 121.16 2 .739 .205 [.175 .237] .127 32971.790 33011.401 
Basis .66 1 1.000 .000 [.000 .000] .008 32792.618 32837.888 
Delay Aversion 
 
Linear** 10.10 2 .965 .045 [.021 .075] .026 -5091.057 -5051.699 




Linear*** 76.24 2 .823 .157 [.128 .188] .078 5358.397 5397.732 




Linear*** 32.09 2 .954 .089 [.064 .118] .038 -6574.895 -6535.516 







Linear*** 45.45 2 .883 .141 [.107 .178] .061 -12234.723 -12195.412 
Basis .76 1 1.000 .000 [.000 .000] .006 -12316.315 -12271.388 
Risk Adjustment 
 
Linear** 12.30 2 .988 .053 [.027 .082] .022 11515.535 11554.904 
Basis 1.01 1 1.000 .000 [.000 .058] ┼ .006 11505.007 11550.000 
Risk Taking 
 
Linear*** 33.30 2 .956 .092 [.066 .120] .038 -6117.493 -6078.120 
Basis*** 35.76 1 .957 .127 [.093 .165] ┼ .037 -6118.075 -6073.078 
Strategy 
 
Linear*** 40.10 2 .945 .099 [.074 .127] .051 26912.742 26952.390 
Basis 1.65 1 .999 .013 [.000 .061] ┼ .010 26872.345 26917.656 
Surface Area 
 
Linear*** 78.08 2 .939 .241 [.197 .289] .043 -2151.555 -2112.014 
Basis*** 211.71 1 .984 .175 [.140 .212] ┼ .020 -2335.264 -2290.074 
Thickness 
 
Linear*** 78.53 2 .914 .134 [.109 .160] .060 -7071.839 -7032.242 
Basis*** 15.26 1 .984 .081 [.049 .120] ┼ .027 -7132.284 -7087.029 
Volume 
 
Linear*** 133.11 2 .891 .240 [.207 .276] .083 10442.303 10481.877 
Basis*** 28.27 1 .986 .122 [.086 .163] .032 10229.578 10274.806 
 
Table 5. Goodness-of-fit indices for linear and basis models of behavioural measures and 
brain structure (grey matter) metrics. χ2 = Chi-squared, df = degrees of freedom, CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Residual, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, BIC = Bayesian 
Information Criterion, denotes the best-fitting model, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001., ┼ 






Univariate model estimates show that participants significantly differed in  
means and variances for intercepts (baseline) and slopes (rates of change)  
Next, I inspected the means and variances for the intercepts and slopes of the 
univariate models. This revealed (see Table 6) that participants significantly (all p < .001 except 
for Strategy slope variance) differed from each other at both baseline levels (intercepts, age 14 
years) and rate of change/slopes (ages 14 – 22 years). This occurred for both the means (except 
for Surface Area mean slope, p > .05) and variances, indicating that individuals not only began 
assessment at different behavioural and neural levels, but they also showed patterns of change 
that varied from each other across waves. Lastly, mean intercept-slope covariances showed 
consistently significant (besides Strategy) and negative correlations, suggesting that, the lower 
participants ‘started off’ in behavioural performance or the larger initial brain structure, the 
more they ‘gained’ (regardless of whether change specified an improvement or a decline) 
Figure 21. Left: Slope parameter estimates for the winning (linear or basis) univariate 
behavioural latent growth curve models. Note, Quality of Decision-making and 
Strategy show substantial overlap in this plot since their slope estimates at age 19 are 
1.846 and 1.836, respectively. Right: Slope parameter estimates for the univariate brain 
structure (grey matter) latent growth curve models, where the basis model was always 
preferred. Horizontal dashed lines indicate the slope estimate (1.25) for linear growth 




during development (from 14 to 22 years). This pattern is commonly found and taken to reflect 
a ceiling or floor effect of the nearing end of maturation, as well as regression to the mean due 















Between Errors Basis 19.484*** -3.610*** 131.539*** 10.531*** -.735*** 
Delay Aversion Basis .244*** -.038*** .011*** .003*** -.665*** 
Deliberation Time Basis 2.007*** -.237*** .216*** .031*** -.767*** 
Overall Proportion 
Bet 
Linear .491*** .011*** .011*** .002*** -.527*** 
Quality of 
Decision-Making 
Basis .937*** .013*** .004*** .001*** -.698*** 
Risk Adjustment Basis 1.522*** .215*** .580*** .082*** -.304* 
Risk Taking Linear .539*** .012*** .013*** .002*** -.528*** 
Strategy Basis 31.286*** -1.749*** 16.147*** 2.304** -.050 
Surface Area Basis 2.718*** .004 .088*** .005*** -.389*** 
Thickness Basis 2.812*** -.072*** .016*** .004*** -.695*** 
Volume Basis 8.923*** -.350*** 1.107*** .153*** -.594*** 
 
 
Bivariate models corroborate univariate findings for mean and variance  
estimates of intercepts and slopes 
Next, I estimated bivariate latent growth curve models to quantify the associations 
between each behavioural and neural measure across time points (ages 14, 19, and 22 years). 
Similar to the univariate models, bivariate models had acceptable to good fit (Table 7), 
although RMSEA estimates and ranges were consistently worse (but still acceptable) in 
Table 6. Mean, variance, and covariance estimates for intercepts and slopes of the 
winning (linear vs basis) behavioural and brain structure (grey matter) univariate 





models that included Surface Area. These results extend support for hypotheses 1 and 2 to 
include bivariate models. Note that, although the results for hypotheses 3 and 4 are shown for 
the bivariate models (Table 8; columns four and seven of Table 9), I do not discuss them as 
their values represent the same estimates (with minor discrepancies in magnitude) as the 
univariate models. An exception to this was Risk Taking-Volume, which had a non-significant 
brain slope variance (estimate = .045, p > .05), which was significant in the univariate model 




Brain Metric χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR AIC BIC 
Between 
Errors 
Surface Area*** 74.84 7 .987 .065 [.052 .078] .014 51271.855 51385.348 
Thickness* 18.58 7 .992 .028 [.013 .044] .018 46321.192 46434.685 
Volume*** 39.88 7 .989 .047 [.034 .062] .020 42983.378 43096.880 
Delay 
Aversion 
Surface Area*** 73.61 7 .984 .067 [.053 .081] .018 -7445.307 -7331.870 
Thickness*** 26.60 7 .982 .036 [.022 .052] .022 -12225.075 -12111.648 
Volume*** 44.99 7 .985 .050 [.037 .065] .024 5108.825 5222.243 
Deliberation 
Time 
Surface Area*** 102.87 7 .983 .071 [.059 .084] .020 2940.499 3053.936 
Thickness*** 36.91 7 .979 .044 [.031 .059] .025 -1858.996 -1745.559 
Volume*** 63.82 7 .980 .061 [.048 .075] .027 15505.563 15618.981 
Overall 
Proportion Bet 
Surface Area*** 135.40 8 .977 .080 [.068 .092] .026 -8934.464 -8826.690 
Thickness*** 54.80 8 .970 .053 [.040 .066] .028 -13708.310 -13600.545 




Surface Area*** 88.77 7 .985 .069 [.057 .083] .014 -14651.406 -14537.960 
Thickness* 18.52 7 .993 .027 [.012 .042] .017 -19444.322 -19330.886 
Volume*** 34.74 7 .990 .045 [.031 .061] .021 -2090.874 -1977.446 
Risk 
Adjustment 
Surface Area*** 84.12 7 .986 .067 [.055 .080] .017 9136.726 9250.171 




Volume*** 38.41 7 .990 .045 [.032 .060] .021 21688.028 21801.455 
Risk Taking 
Surface Area*** 137.73 8 .977 .080 [.069 .092] .026 -8478.744 -8370.970 
Thickness*** 57.88 8 .969 .055 [.042 .068] .029 -13253.139 -13145.374 
Volume*** 40.61 7 .989 .048 [.034 .062] .024 4070.185 4183.612 
Strategy 
Surface Area*** 88.26 7 .986 .067 [.055 .080] .014 24464.161 24577.682 
Thickness** 22.36 7 .991 .031 [.017 .047] .020 40416.631 40530.142 
Volume*** 41.60 7 .989 .046 [.033 .061] .020 37045.282 37158.803 
 










19.486*** 27.183*** -3.609*** .035 132.112*** 8.835*** 10.606*** .463*** 
Thickness 19.492*** 28.123*** -3.617*** -.719*** 131.534*** 1.595*** 10.565*** .364*** 





.243*** 2.718*** -.038*** .004 .011*** .088*** .003*** .005*** 
Thickness .243*** 2.812*** -.038*** -.072*** .012*** .016*** .003*** .004*** 





2.007*** 2.718*** -.236*** .004 .216*** .088*** .031*** .005*** 
Thickness 2.008*** 2.812*** -.237*** -.072*** .216*** .016*** .031*** .004*** 






.492*** 2.718*** .011*** .004 .011*** .089*** .002*** .005*** 
Thickness .491*** 2.812*** .011*** -.072*** .011*** .016*** .002*** .004*** 
Volume .492*** 8.923*** .011*** -.350*** .011*** 1.106*** .002*** .154*** 
Table 7. Goodness-of-fit indices for bivariate models of behavioural measures and 
structural grey matter metrics. χ2 = Chi-squared, df = degrees of freedom, CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Residual, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, BIC = Bayesian 










.937*** 2.718*** .013*** .003 .004*** .088*** .001*** .005** 
Thickness .937*** 2.812*** .013*** -.072*** .004*** .016*** .001*** .004*** 





1.524*** 2.718*** .213*** .004 .572*** .088*** .078*** .005*** 
Thickness 1.522*** 2.812*** .214*** -.072*** .577*** .016*** .082*** .004*** 
Volume 1.525*** 8.924*** .212*** -.351*** .574*** 1.107*** .079*** .153*** 
Risk Taking Surface 
Area 
.539*** 2.718*** .012*** .004 .013*** .089*** .002*** .005*** 
Thickness .538*** 2.812*** .013*** -.072*** .013*** .016*** .002*** .004*** 
Volume .539*** 8.922*** .012*** -.356*** .013*** .721*** .002*** 0.045 
Strategy Surface 
Area 
31.284*** 2.718*** -1.745*** .003 16.120*** .088*** 2.267** .005*** 
Thickness 31.289*** 28.123*** -1.748*** -.722*** 16.056*** 1.595*** 2.280** .363*** 
Volume 31.285*** 8.923*** -1.746*** -.350*** 16.144*** 1.107*** 2.273** .153*** 
 
 
Bivariate latent growth models fail to support the structural scaffolding hypothesis 
Next, I examined the covariances between the slopes and intercepts in the bivariate 
models. First, I observed that a subset of intercepts between behavioural abilities and brain 
structure were significant (p < .05, see column three of Table 9). Exceptions included 
Deliberation Time (no statistically significant covariances), as well as Between Errors and Risk 
Taking (all covariances with brain structure were statistically significant). There were several 
brain-behaviour intercept associations that were negative, implying a negative (although 
small) relationship between starting brain structure and behavioural performance for some 
measures: Between Errors-Volume, Delay Aversion-Surface Area, Delay Aversion-Volume, 
Risk Taking-Thickness, Strategy-Surface Area, and Strategy-Volume. For surface area and 
volume, these findings suggest that participants with larger baseline brain structure (i.e., 
greater volume and surface) also performed better on measures of decision-making and 
spatial working memory. Moreover, for cortical thickness, this interpretation suggests that 
Table 8. Mean and variance estimates for intercepts and slopes of the bivariate models. 




individuals with a thicker cortex at the onset of assessment were also better able to assess risk, 
again at age 14. 
To statistically test for structural scaffolding of the cognitive measures (hypothesis 5), 
I inspected the covariance estimates for brain structure intercept and change/slope in 
behaviour. Doing this, I found no statistical evidence for structural scaffolding (Table 9, 
column six). In other words, contrary to my hypothesis, in this sample it was not the case that 
individual differences in brain structure at age 14 was associated with the rate of behavioural 
development across any measure of the three psychometric domains. 
Next, I examined the reverse association: Does the current state of behavioural abilities 
(intercept) predict the rate of brain change (which was previously coined ‘adaptive 
reorganisation’, Kievit and Simpson-Kent, 2021). I observed several associations compatible 
with this hypothesis (see column five of Table 9 and Figure 22): For multiple bivariate models 
the intercept of the behavioural measure significantly predicted change in brain structure. 
This was found for three behaviour-brain couplings: Between Errors-Thickness (standardised 
covariance = .068, p < .05), Between Errors-Volume (standardised covariance = .116, p < .01), 
and Strategy-Volume (standardised covariance = .130, p < .001). This pattern suggests that, for 
these bivariate associations, baseline behavioural performance significantly predicted change 
in brain structure (i.e., cortical Thickness, and Volume) development. Moreover, the direction 
of these associations implies that, on average, lower starting scores (i.e., better performance) 
on spatial working memory (Between Errors and Strategy) led to a steeper (negative) brain 
change (e.g., more rapid thinning and/or larger volume loss in brain structure across waves). 
Finally, I did not observe correlated change (i.e., statistically significant covariances between 
behavioural and brain structure slopes). Therefore, in this sample and modelling framework, 
the rate of change at one level (e.g., behaviour) is not significantly associated with the rate of 

































Between Errors Surface 
Area 




Thickness .073** -.734*** .068* -.081 -.696*** -.034 
Volume -.143*** -.732*** .116** .013 -.594*** -.059 
Delay Aversion Surface 
Area 
-.082* -.662*** .013 -.049 -.389*** .009 
Thickness -.052 -.665*** .02 -.014 -.695*** .024 





-.024 -.767*** .035 .008 -.389*** -.032 
Thickness .016 -.767*** -.032 -.052 -.695*** .03 





.115*** -.528*** .036 .01 -.392*** -.055 
Thickness -.056 -.525*** .003 .027 -.695*** -.042 






.046 -.698*** -.044 .017 -.387*** .016 
Thickness .047 -.698*** -.043 -.026 -.695*** .045 





.154*** -.286* -.042 .029 -.389*** -.009 
Thickness .031 -.300* -.03 .052 -.696*** -.059 
Volume .164*** -.288* -.059 .061 -.593*** -.071 
Risk Taking Surface 
Area 
.124*** -.529*** .024 -.002 -.392*** -.037 
Thickness -.064* -.524*** .009 .039 -.695*** -.057 
Volume .125** -.530*** -.007 -.034 -.228 -.050 
Strategy Surface 
Area 
-.241*** -.040 .077 -.034 -.389*** .011 
Thickness .051 -.044 .046 -.054 -.695*** .043 
Volume -.207*** -.040 .130*** -.057 -.594*** .019 
 
Table 9. Standardised covariance estimates for bivariate models. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** 










Figure 22. Left: Example of adaptive reorganisation using the predicted intercept and 
slope estimates of the Between Errors-Thickness model (i.e., lower intercept scores 
(better performance) on Between Errors predicted a faster rate of brain cortical thinning; 
r = .08). Right: Example of adaptive reorganisation using the predicted intercept and 
slope estimates of the Strategy-Volume model (i.e., lower intercept scores (better 






Summary and interpretation of findings 
The present study sought to estimate the baseline, growth trajectories, and covariances 
between measures of decision-making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial working memory, 
as well as cortical brain structure (i.e., surface area, thickness, and volume) from mid-
adolescence (age 14 years) to early adulthood (age 22 years). Using latent growth curve 
modelling, I found that most measures for behaviour (except for Overall Proportion Bet and 
Risk Taking) and all for neural structure change, and do so nonlinearly, across development 
(Figure 21).  In addition, the univariate models also indicated that participants differed from 
one another both in baseline (age 14) and slope estimates (ages 14 – 22). This result held true 
for both the means (apart from Surface Area mean slope) and variances, implying that 
individuals not only started assessment at different behavioural and neural levels (i.e., 
baseline), but they also showed individual differences in patterns of change (i.e., slopes) across 
the time points included in this analysis (Table 6). When I inspected the mean intercept-slope 
covariances within domains, I also found that these relationships were universally significant 
(besides Strategy) and negatively correlated. This suggests that adolescents who began the 
IMAGEN study with lower behavioural performance and/or larger initial cortical brain 
structure tended to change more (i.e., behaviour: improved in performance, brain structure: 
showed less steep decrease) up until early adulthood. This is compatible with the growth 
models capturing differences in rates of maturation: Those who have already matured a lot 
(e.g., improved cognitive performance, or thinned their cortex) will, on average, change less 
rapidly, inducing a negative within-domain covariance. 
Following these results, I fit bivariate latent growth curve models to estimate the 
correlations and covariances (i.e., intercepts and slopes) between each behavioural measure 
and brain structure metric. As expected, mean and variances estimates for intercepts and 
slopes were similar in magnitude and statistical significance as in the univariate models (Table 
8). Finally, I examined brain-behaviour associations to statistically test for the presence of 
structural scaffolding, a phenomenon whereby baseline (intercept) cortical brain structure 
(whether surface area, thickness, and/or volume) predicts change (slope) in behavioural 
performance (e.g., spatial working memory). I found no support for structural scaffolding or 




reorganisation, which states that the behavioural intercept(s) significantly predict change in 
brain structure in subsequent time points. This was found for three bivariate brain-
behavioural models: Between Errors-Thickness, Between Errors-Volume, and Strategy-
Volume (see Figure 22). This suggests that, on average, better starting scores on spatial 
working memory (i.e., Between Errors and Strategy) led to more rapid cortical thinning and/or 
volume loss across waves. 
The observation that most behavioural (besides Overall Proportion Bet and Risk 
Taking) and all neural (i.e., cortical Surface Area, Thickness, and Volume) measures changed, 
and did so nonlinearly (i.e., increased behavioural performance and cortical shrinkage except 
for Surface Area) aligns with previous studies that demonstrated adolescence to be a period 
characterised by substantial alterations in behaviour (see Luna, 2009; Steinberg, 2005) and 
brain structure development (e.g., Becht and Mills, 2020; Tamnes et al., 2017). Therefore, 
strictly linear change (i.e., increase) and/or negative nonlinear change in behavioural abilities 
(except those similar to the ones shown to be linear in this study) and/or brain structure (e.g., 
cortical thinning) might serve as a potential neurocognitive marker of abnormal development, 
although one would need more waves of data to reliably predict this abnormality for a single 
individual. In other words, if a middle adolescent (e.g., ages 14 – 16 years) fails to show 
substantial behavioural development accompanied by abnormal (e.g., slow, or greater than 
average exponential) reductions in structural brain maturation, it could signify that they will 
face problems adjusting to future cognitive demands (e.g., success in undergraduate studies 
and/or occupational attainment).  
The finding that Between Errors and Strategy, both spatial working memory 
measures, changed nonlinearly supports the notion that participants became significantly less 
error-prone and planned their choices better over successive assessments. This interpretation 
corroborates prior research, which demonstrated that working memory increases in 
childhood and adolescence (Best and Miller, 2010; Conklin et al., 2007; Huizinga et al., 2006). 
This coupled with the fact that Quality of Decision-making also showed pronounced 
nonlinear changes further hints that, in this sample, adolescents made better decisions and 
improved in cognitive ability up until early adulthood. 
An alternative explanation for the nonlinear change in performance scores is a 




the same tasks across multiple waves, rather than nonlinear change in behavioural scores 
being the result of developmental factors (e.g., improved cognition and/or brain maturation), 
participants could have adjusted their strategy use (not to be confused with the Strategy 
measure used in this study) from mid-adolescence to early adulthood. On the other hand, 
instead of due to strategy adjustment, participants could have changed nonlinearly simply 
from being more familiar with the tasks across time points. Therefore, if change is truly linear, 
the presence of a retest/practice effect (whether through strategy adjustment and/or 
familiarity with the tasks) will make the trajectory appear nonlinear. While retest/practice 
effects were not estimated in this study, it is doubtful that strategy use and/or practice effects 
can account for the pattern of change in behavioural scores since the intervals between waves 
are no less than two years apart across the duration of the IMAGEN protocol (see 
https://imagen-europe.com/about/project/). Contrasting this point, a recent meta-analysis 
suggests that longer test-retest intervals (around 8 years) might be necessary to eliminate the 
influence of test-retest interval on retest/practice effects on cognitive tests (Scharfen et al., 
2018). Therefore, future longitudinal studies should directly estimate the possible role of 
retest/practice effects before making strong claims about developmental change.  
A final point worth discussing about nonlinear change in behavioural/cognitive 
performance is whether the degree of difficulty related to percentage changes in task 
performance across waves/time points is the ‘same’ at all ability levels. For example, is it easier 
to improve 5% in a task/measure when you previously scored below average (e.g., going from 
50% to 55%) than it is to gain 5% points when your baseline performance is already near 
ceiling (e.g., increasing from 90% to 95%)? Although not tested in this study, an approach to 
answering this question is to use item response theory (IRT) modelling to establish an interval 
or ratio scale, which would enable one to confidently conclude whether behavioural 
development/change is truly nonlinear. 
Overall Proportion Bet and Risk Taking showing linear change from ages 14 to 22 
suggest that adolescents were relatively stable in their increase in risk-related behaviours. The 
only other risk-related behaviour, Risk Adjustment, although increasing nonlinearly, has an 
ambiguous interpretation (e.g., whether that change implies more erratic risk behaviour). 
Therefore, I conclude that from mid-adolescence to early adulthood, participants did not 




challenge popular opinions and stereotypes of adolescents as purely irrational, instead 
providing a more nuanced view of adolescence as a formative transitional period into 
adulthood with both positive and negative consequences of risk-related behaviours (e.g., 
Blakemore, 2018; Do et al., 2020; Duell and Steinberg, 2019; Khurana et al., 2018; Maslowsky 
et al., 2019; Romer et al., 2017).   
Interestingly, Surface Area, despite showing rapid growth from age 14 to 19 (slope 
was freely estimated), was the only variable with a non-significant mean intercept-slope 
covariance, which indicates that one cannot predict the trajectory of participants’ cortical 
surface area from their baseline. This result hints that Surface Area has a distinct 
developmental pattern compared to Thickness and, hence, Volume (cortical volume is the 
product of surface area and thickness). Along these lines, recent research has suggested that 
the growth of cortical surface area and thickness (as well as and white matter maturation) is 
related to myelination. In particular, using functional, quantitative, and diffusion MRI as well 
as post-mortem histological methods, Natu et al., 2019 found that tissue growth in the ventral 
temporal cortex was associated with increased myelination from childhood to adulthood. 
This, in turn, affects the grey-white matter contrast in MRI scans, resulting in the apparent 
thinning of the cortex (e.g., see Becht and Mills, 2020; Tamnes et al., 2017; Vijayakumar et al., 
2016). Therefore, and given that thickness and surface area were significantly (negatively) 
correlated in that study (i.e., Natu et al., 2019), increased myelination might lead to cortical 
thinning and a potential increase in surface area metrics.  
In the bivariate behaviour-brain structure models, covariance estimates failed to 
support the structural scaffolding hypothesis. In other words, for all bivariate models, brain 
structure intercepts did not significantly predict changes in behavioural slopes across time 
points. There are at least three possible explanations for this finding. First, and perhaps the 
simplest, the structural scaffolding hypothesis may be false. Therefore, the pattern found in 
the studies (e.g., see Wendelken et al., 2017 and Ferrer, 2018) mentioned in Kievit and 
Simpson-Kent, 2021 might not generalise to other samples and cohorts. Second, in this study 
I used measures that are not typically associated with intelligence, except for spatial working 
memory (i.e., Between Errors and Strategy). Moreover, outside of spatial working memory, 
only Quality of Decision-making and Risk Adjustment have been found to positively associate 




gains in IQ (Flouri et al., 2019). Moreover, in that study, Overall Proportion Bet was excluded 
from the analyses since it very strongly correlated with Risk Taking (r = .962). When I 
correlated these variables in the present dataset, I also found that Overall Proportion Bet and 
Risk Taking displayed a strong association (all r > .980 across waves), while no other abilities 
correlated with each other to that extent. In other words, the failure to find the predicted 
associations may be because of the particular measures used—I discuss this possibility in 
more detail below. Third and related to the second point, the 10 ROIs that I used to calculate 
the mean bilateral cortical brain structure were all regions known to be associated with 
traditional tests of intelligence. As a result, it might be possible that structural scaffolding does 
exists for these measures but requires a broader or alternative network of brain regions to 
discover its effect.  
I observed some evidence for adaptive reorganisation, which predicts that behavioural 
intercept(s) will significantly covary with change in brain structure across waves. This effect 
was only found for three bivariate brain-behavioural models: Between Errors-Thickness, 
Between Errors-Volume, and Strategy-Volume. Furthermore, all three of these associations 
were positive. Therefore, given that higher values for these two abilities indicate worse 
performance, this relationship suggests that, on average, participants with better spatial 
working memory performance at baseline had more cortical volume loss and/or thinning from 
age 14 to 22. Adaptive reorganisation is in line with a study by Shaw et al., 2006, who found 
that individuals with higher IQ showed dynamic changes in cortical thickness from childhood 
to late adolescence. Specially, those with ‘superior’ intelligence underwent more pronounced 
cortical thickening in childhood, followed by intense cortical thinning by early adolescence 
(age 11.2 years). However, this study (IMAGEN) began assessment at age 14, after this 11.2-
year-old cut-off. Therefore, even though the increased thinning continued until around age 16 
(Shaw et al., 2006), further research is needed to substantiate adaptive reorganisation in 
adolescence. Finally, and surprisingly, there was no evidence for correlated change 
(significant covariances between behavioural and neural slopes). In close, in this cohort, 
behavioural performance and cortical brain structure did not significantly predict each other 






Limitations of the present study 
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the current study are the behavioural measures 
used. Structural scaffolding, adaptive reorganisation and correlated change, while possible to 
generalise to all behaviour-brain structure associations, were formulated as hypotheses about 
intelligence (Kievit and Simpson-Kent, 2021). Therefore, if these phenomena exist, their 
effect(s) should be most discoverable using assessments that have been verified to robustly 
correlate with IQ (e.g., fluid intelligence tasks such as Raven’s Matrices, see Bilker et al., 2012). 
Therefore, future studies should examine these associations using more widely used tasks 
(e.g., working memory tasks such as digit recall, see Alloway, 2007). Furthermore, observation 
of these longitudinal bivariate hypotheses might require whole-brain (or more regionally 
specific) structure estimates rather than the reduced 10 ROIs used here (however, I do not test 
this here since whole-brain analyses were not part of the original conceptualisation and 
planning of the study). Relatedly, this study only incorporated grey matter metrics, although 
it is also known that white matter (e.g., fractional anisotropy, see Wandell, 2016) also 
significantly predict change in cognition from childhood to early adulthood (e.g., Wendelken 
et al., 2017).  
Although the IMAGEN study has a substantially larger sample size compared to most 
neuroimaging studies (Poldrack et al., 2017), this cohort still contains fewer participants than 
might be necessary to find replicable results of brain-behaviour associations of small 
magnitude (Marek et al., 2020). As a result, future studies should seek to investigate these 
hypotheses in larger cohorts (e.g., ABCD, see Casey et al., 2018; Volkow et al., 2018) that 
surpass the “consortium” level for imaging (N > 2000, see Marek et al., 2020). Lastly, the time 
intervals between behavioural assessment and neuroimaging (i.e., t2 – t1 = 5 years; t3 – t2 = 3 
years) might prevent the detection of neurocognitive changes that occur over a shorter time 
period (e.g., 1 year). Therefore, future studies should examine developmental changes in 
samples with more frequent behavioural and/or neural testing to help determine whether the 
patterns observed in this study using these measures translate to smaller developmental 







Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter, I extended upon the findings from Chapter Two and Chapter Three by 
using longitudinal statistical methodology (i.e., latent growth curve modelling) to test within-
person hypotheses of neurocognitive development (i.e., structural scaffolding, but also 
adaptive reorganisation and correlated change) from mid-adolescence to early adulthood 
(ages 14 – 22 years, using the IMAGEN study). I found no evidence for structural scaffolding 
or correlated change but did observe some support for adaptive reorganisation (current 
behavioural performance predicts change in brain structure). However, this result was only 
found for spatial working memory. Therefore, this finding suggests that, on average, greater 
performance on spatial working memory tasks (here measured by Between Errors and 
Strategy) led to more rapid cortical thinning and/or volume loss over time.  
 This concludes the empirical part of this dissertation. Now, in the final chapter, I 
summarise the main findings across the studies included in this thesis, address key 
limitations, and speculate about future directions towards advancing understanding of the 






















Concluding Remarks:  
Summary, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 
Summary of Thesis Findings 
This dissertation has attempted to further understand the associations between human 
brain structure (i.e., grey matter and white matter) and intelligence (e.g., decision-making and 
working memory), particularly how they develop from early childhood to early adulthood 
(ages 5 – 22 years). These investigations were based on neurocognitive theory (i.e., crystallised 
and fluid intelligence, mutualism and network neuroscience, and structural scaffolding, 
adaptive reorganisation, and correlated change) and assessed in large (N range: 337 – 2072) 
developmental cohorts (i.e., CALM, IMAGEN, and NKI-Rockland) using well-established 
statistical methods (i.e., structural equation modelling and network science). Here I 
summarise the findings from each empirical chapter. 
Chapter Two examined the latent variable structure and white matter determinants 
(i.e., fractional anisotropy) of child and adolescent intelligence (measured via tasks of 
crystallised and fluid intelligence, and working memory) using two cross-sectional, 
developmental samples (CALM: N = 551 (N = 165 neuroimaging), age range: 5 –18 years; NKI-
Rockland: N = 337 (N = 65 neuroimaging), age range: 6 – 18 years). After estimating and 
comparing a series of structural equation models (SEM, see Kline, 2015), I found in both 
samples that, rather than the g factor, cognitive ability is best modelled as two separable but 
highly correlated constructs, crystallised (gc) and fluid (gf) intelligence. Interestingly, the best-
fitting model for the CALM sample occurred when the working memory latent variable (LV) 
was assigned as an indicator of fluid intelligence, while for NKI-Rockland, the model fit best 
when working memory and gf were combined into a single LV, which has been suggested in 
prior research when participants are under increased time constraints (Chuderski, 2015, 2013). 
Moreover, in line with the age differentiation hypothesis (de Mooij et al., 2018; Garrett, 1946; 
Hülür et al., 2011), the covariance between gc and gf decreased from childhood to adolescence. 




and Bornstein, 2016), which revealed that gc and gf  became more distinct (i.e., less correlated) 
as the age of participants increased (i.e., cross-sectional childhood scores to cross-sectional 
adolescent scores). In terms of brain structure, I used Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause 
(MIMIC) analysis, which indicated that individual differences in white matter fractional 
anisotropy, especially of the superior longitudinal fasciculus, was strongly associated with gc 
and gf abilities. Finally, using a novel analysis framework, SEM trees (Brandmaier et al., 2013), 
a method that combines traditional SEM with decision trees, provided evidence for 
neurocognitive reorganisation of gc and gf and their white matter substrates. Hence, the 
relationships between gc, gf and a subset of white matter tracts (i.e., anterior thalamic 
radiations, cingulate gyrus, forceps major, forceps minor, and the superior longitudinal 
fasciculus, see Table 3) decreased between ages 7 – 8 years before increasing around age 10. 
Together, these results suggested that shortly before puberty marks a pivotal phase of change 
in the neurocognitive architecture of intelligence.  
Chapter Three complemented and extended the analyses done in Chapter Two and 
sought to assess the mutualism theory of cognitive ability (van der Maas et al., 2006). 
Mutualism is a network model of general intelligence (see van der Maas et al., 2021, 2017) that 
claims that the positive manifold and g factor (Spearman, 1927, 1904) arise from direct 
(statistical) interactions among cognitive abilities such as reasoning and vocabulary 
throughout development (Kievit et al., 2019, 2017). Instead of using the SEM framework, 
which presumes the existence of unobserved LVs, this project used techniques from network 
science (Barabási, 2016), specifically network psychometrics (Epskamp et al., 2018). This 
analytic framework conceptualises psychological constructs such as general intelligence as a 
complex system and uses partial correlations, which estimate statistical dependencies among 
variables of interest (see also Epskamp et al., 2018). Hence, Chapter Three simultaneously 
modelled the brain-behaviour relationships essential for general intelligence in the same 
cohort as in Chapter Two (i.e., the CALM sample, see Holmes et al., 2019) but with more 
participants (ages 5 – 18 years; behavioural, N = 805; cortical volume, N = 246), except for white 
matter (fractional anisotropy, N = 165), which was the same as Chapter Two. The results of 
this analysis revealed that both single-layer (cognitive or neural nodes) and multilayer 
(combined cognitive and neural variables) networks contained mainly small and positive partial 




2019). Furthermore, I attempted to identify possible groups of cognitive and/or neural nodes. 
To do this, I used community detection, particularly the Walktrap algorithm (Pons and 
Latapy, 2005) and calculated node centrality, both absolute strength (Bringmann et al., 2019) 
and bridge strength (see Jones et al., 2019). I found convergent evidence that certain cognitive 
(e.g., Reading) and neural (e.g., superior frontal gyrus) nodes may have had greater influence 
among (or might have been more influenced by) other nodes within the neurocognitive 
network. Together, these findings suggest that specific behavioural and neural variables 
function as intermediary nodes ‘between’ brain structure and cognitive ability. 
Lastly, Chapter Four sought to statistically test for evidence of the structural 
scaffolding hypothesis of intelligence (see Figures 7 and 20). To do this, I employed latent 
growth curve modelling (Duncan and Duncan, 2004) to estimate the longitudinal 
relationships between human cortical grey matter structure (i.e., mean bilateral cortical 
surface area, thickness, and volume), and measures of decision-making, risk-related 
behaviours and spatial working memory from adolescence to early adulthood in the IMAGEN 
study (maximum N across time points/waves = 2072; age range: 14 – 22 years). For univariate 
models (i.e., solely behavioural or neural measures), comparisons between a linear and basis 
model of developmental growth revealed that both behavioural performance (here decision-
making, risk-related behaviours, and spatial working memory), and cortical brain structure 
changed nonlinearly from mid-adolescence (age 14) to early adulthood (age 22). Moreover, 
bivariate models, which combined behavioural and neural measures, displayed support for 
adaptive reorganisation (behavioural intercept/baseline predicts changes/slopes in brain 
structure). However, no evidence was observed for structural scaffolding (brain structure 
intercept/baseline predicts changes/slopes in behaviour). Lastly, findings also failed to 
support the phenomenon of correlated change, whereby rates of change (i.e., covariance 
between behavioural and neural slopes) significantly predict each other, between ages 14 and 
22 years. Overall, results from this study further suggest that mid-adolescence to early 
adulthood marks a distinct developmental period of brain-behaviour changes related to 







Limitations of this Dissertation 
First, besides Chapter Four (IMAGEN study), the rest of the empirical chapters 
(Chapters Two and Three) in this dissertation only analyse cross-sectional data (CALM and 
NKI-Rockland cohorts). However, that is not to say that cross-sectional data are 
uninformative. Rather, cross-sectional analyses must be complemented by longitudinal 
analyses to understand neurocognitive processes more fully (e.g., see Raz and Lindenberger, 
2011 and Schmiedek et al., 2020). Therefore, while cross-sectional data is informative relating 
to between-subject differences (e.g., group-level differences in cognitive ability), longitudinal 
samples are required to help tease apart within-subject differences in neurocognition. As noted 
in Kievit and Simpson-Kent, 2021, studies with longitudinal data for both 
behavioural/cognitive measures and structural neural metrics (e.g., grey matter: cortical 
surface area, thickness and volume; and white matter: fractional anisotropy) from childhood 
to early adulthood are scarce, with many having been published within the last five years. 
This rise in studying longitudinal developmental cohorts suggests that this approach, while 
growing, is still in its infancy. Therefore, future research programs should build upon this 
trend for a truly developmental cognitive neuroscience of intelligence. 
Second, the cohorts included in this dissertation (i.e., CALM, IMAGEN and NKI-
Rockland), while relatively representative of childhood, adolescent and/or early adulthood 
persons for their respective territories (CALM: East and South East of England; IMAGEN: 
Western Europe; NKI-Rockland: United States), still consists entirely of participants from 
WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic) countries, which are 
known to often not generalise to non-WEIRD populations (Henrich et al., 2010). Therefore, 
future research is needed to assess the replicability of these findings in traditionally under-
represented groups (such as, but not limited to, the Global South and other traditionally 
under-sampled populations).  
Third, cohorts also tend to be extremely broad in their age ranges (e.g., see list of 
cohorts mentioned in Walhovd et al., 2018). While ambitious in their scope, studies that 
examine long-term changes might miss more fine-grained developmental shifts. For instance, 
if adolescence, a period marked by distinct behavioural and neural development, is defined 
as occurring between the ages of 10 and 24 (Sawyer et al., 2018), it is perhaps more informative 




adolescence may show differences from mid- and late adolescence). Related to this point, 
many longitudinal designs assess change over periods of months or years, which might fail 
to capture very acute (e.g., minutes or days) changes in behaviour and/or brain structure. 
While collection of such frequent data of both behavioural and neural dynamics in large 
samples (e.g., N ≥ 2000, see Marek et al., 2020) is not feasible due to the extreme logistical, 
monetary, and labour-intensive nature of such an endeavour, future cohorts should aim to 
shorten the window of assessment to approximate the outcomes of drastic developmental 
alterations (interval between assessments < 6 months).  
Last but not least, given the observational nature of this thesis (i.e., non-experimental), 
one cannot conclusively determine cause-effect relationships due to the presence of possible 
confounding variables (e.g., see Rohrer, 2018). For example, I cannot confidently claim that, 
on average, having better spatial working memory performance causes more rapid cortical 
thinning or volume loss (adaptive reorganisation, see Chapter Four). Instead, I would have to 
directly intervene on behaviour (e.g., through cognitive training) and then compare brain 
structure shortly before and after the intervention. Conversely, I could use brain stimulation 
combined with cognitive training to measure the presence or absence of transfer effects for 
various intelligence-related tasks (e.g., for gf, see Brem et al., 2018).  Moreover, I could perform 
analyses on lesion participants to study the neural determinants of intelligence (e.g., how loss 
of specific brain regions affect g, see Barbey et al., 2014, 2012; Gläscher et al., 2010; Woolgar et 
al., 2018, 2010). Therefore, while large observational studies such as those found in this 
dissertation are suitable to discover general trends in brain-behaviour associations, they must 
be complemented with experimental, lesion-symptom mapping, and meta-analytic 
methodology to further test mechanistic hypotheses. Related to this point, there exist many 
additional behavioural domains (e.g., cognitive constructs related to intelligence such as 
creativity, see Jauk et al., 2013 and Karwowski et al., 2017) and neural measures (e.g., brain 
function via activity patterns and cell recordings, or other structural correlates obtained 
through lesion studies) that also can provide further insight into neurocognitive function. As 
a result, future studies should seek to incorporate related cognitive abilities, brain metrics, 
and experimental/meta-analytic designs to more comprehensively tease apart the causal links 




This is by no means an exhaustive list as any study, no matter how rigorous, will 
contain areas for improvement and motivations for further study. Rather, these four 
limitations act as guiding principles to attempt to overcome in future studies on the 
development of human brain structure and intelligence from childhood to early adulthood. 
To close, I will now discuss what I argue can help overcome these limitations in research on 


































Towards mechanistic theory building in developmental cognitive neuroscience 
My results from Chapter Two and Three that suggest verbal abilities (e.g., Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test and Reading) rather than fluid intelligence might play a more pivotal 
role in the development of cognitive ability fit with the gradual progression in schooling. For 
example, before children can successfully be taught more advanced subjects (e.g., history, 
reading comprehension, etc.), they must first become competent in basic language faculties. 
In other words, it may be that verbal skills (e.g., reading and spelling) facilitate performance 
on abstract tests, even in the absence of direct knowledge-based task demands. Recent 
evidence has been found supporting this notion and suggest that verbal ability, particularly 
reading and vocabulary in relation to working memory and reasoning, might drive early 
cognitive development (Kievit et al., 2019; Peng et al., 2018; Zhang and Malatesha Joshi, 2020). 
Therefore, future studies could further examine whether greater verbal ability in early 
development facilitates greater acquisition of higher-level cognitive skills by lowering 
computational demands in working memory.   
Moreover, the fact that the Numerical Operations task was also found to be central 
(tri-layer network only, see Chapter Three) should be expected since mathematics (e.g., 
arithmetic) also involves symbol manipulation, as does language. In terms of mutualism (van 
der Maas et al., 2017, 2006), future models (ideally in longitudinal samples) could test whether 
language and other symbolic abilities show progressively higher reciprocal associations 
during early development compared to other abilities until more complex cognitive abilities 
(i.e., fluid reasoning and working memory) develop in later childhood (also see Kievit et al., 
2019 and Peng et al., 2018).  
These insights help to build coherent, rigorous, and testable neurocognitive theories of 
intelligence that have lacked in the psychology and neuroscience literature (Fried, 2020; 
Levenstein et al., 2020). In doing so, cognitive neuroscientists can help mitigate the limitations 
mentioned above as they would have more tangible interpretations of their results. Therefore, 
I argue that future research should aim to incorporate data from different scales, not only 
temporal (e.g., development across the lifespan) but also levels of organisation (e.g., brain, 
behaviour, genetics, and the environment). Furthermore, results from different levels can 




quantitative framework (e.g., complex systems theory, see Siegenfeld and Bar-Yam, 2020) that 
combines strengths from various statistical techniques. Last, and perhaps most important, 
cognitive neuroscientists must formulate mechanistic (e.g., Bertolero et al., 2018) and 
generative models (for instance, Akarca et al., 2020) to gain further insights from past and help 
guide future controlled experiments. Researchers must not shy away from but rather embrace 
the complexity of the brain and cognition (see Fried and Robinaugh, 2020 for similar argument 
for mental health research).  
One such proposal mentioned in Chapter One that attempts to explain general 
intelligence using a complex systems approach is The Network Neuroscience Theory of 
Human Intelligence (NNTHI, Barbey, 2018). Barbey argues that general intelligence arises 
from the dynamic small-world typology of the brain, which permits transitions between 
‘regular’ or ‘easy-to-reach’ network states (needed to access prior knowledge for specific 
abilities) and ‘random’ or ‘difficult-to-reach’ (required to integrate information for broad 
abilities) network states (i.e., as in network control theory, see Gu et al., 2015). Together, this 
constrained flexibility allows the brain to adapt to novel cognitive domains (e.g., in abstract 
reasoning) while still preserving access to previously learned skills (e.g., from schooling). 
While evidence supporting the NNTHI has been inconclusive so far (Girn et al., 2019), it is a 
step (also see Process Overlap Theory, Kovacs and Conway, 2016, also mentioned in Chapter 
One) in the right direction toward a complex systems theory of human intelligence. Intelligence is 














The Supplementary Material of Chapter Two has been published (although appears in this 
thesis in a modified form to ensure consistent formatting and thesis coherence):  
Simpson-Kent I. L., Fuhrmann D., Bathelt J., Achterberg J., Borgeest G. S., the CALM Team, 
Kievit R. A. (2020).  Neurocognitive reorganization between crystallized intelligence, fluid 
intelligence and white matter microstructure in two age-heterogeneous developmental 
cohorts. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, Special Issue: Flux 2018: Mechanisms of Learning 
& Plasticity. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2019.100743 
 
The Supplementary Material of Chapter Three is available as a preprint (although appears in 
this thesis in a modified form to ensure consistent formatting and thesis coherence): 
Simpson-Kent I. L., Fried E.I., Akarca D., Mareva S., Bullmore E.T., the CALM Team, Kievit 
R. A. (2021). Bridging brain and cognition: A multilayer network analysis of brain structural 
covariance and general intelligence in a developmental sample of struggling learners. 
Accepted, Journal of Intelligence. Preprint: Biorxiv. doi: 10.1101/2020.11.15.383869 
Note: Supplementary Table 3 was created for this dissertation but is not included in the 
preprint. Also, Supplementary Figures 5 and 6 are different from the preprint due to an error 
discovered after uploading. 
 
Although first-person pronouns are used throughout the chapter, this work is the result of 
collaborative research projects. My contributions to the above publications are:  
1. I led conceptualisation and planning (aided by R. A. Kievit and/or D. Fuhrmann) about 
the scientific hypotheses, analysis methods, and interpretations of the project. 
2. I performed all manuscript analyses (aided by R. A. Kievit, D. Fuhrmann, Eiko I. Fried, 
and/or S. Mareva). 
3. I wrote the first full draft (with input from R. A. Kievit and D. Fuhrmann) of the 
manuscript and led the revisions and confirmation of the final version (aided by other 





Supplementary Material for Chapter Two 
Is the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test a measure of fluid ability? 
As a non-preregistered exploratory analysis, I more closely examined the cross-
loading of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT). This task asks participants to select 
the correct picture (out of four multiple-choice options) corresponding to the meaning of a 
word spoken by an examiner (Dunn and Dunn, 2007). As discussed previously in the Results 
section Covariance among cognitive abilities cannot be captured by a single factor, 
modification indices suggested the PPVT should either be cross-loaded or solely loaded onto 
gf. To better understand this cross-loading, I performed an exploratory (i.e., not part of 
preregistration, see https://aspredicted.org/5pz52.pdf) analysis using SEM tree analysis. In 
this analysis, I allowed the PPVT to load on both gc and gf and examined whether using age 
as a covariate yielded a developmental period where the associations between the latent 
factors and the PPVT task differed. This generated an age split for gf at around age 9.5 years 
whereby the loading of the PPVT decreased (from 1 to .87, unstandardised estimate).  
Conversely, for gc, the loading remained the same (.12, unstandardised estimate). This 
suggested the PPVT as commonly implemented behaved as a fluid, rather than a crystallised, 
task, especially in younger participants of lower ability. A possible explanation for this pattern 
is that, while the PPVT draws on gc, the demanding nature of the task may require more fluid, 
executive components in younger children, especially in a cohort with comparatively low 
overall performance (e.g., CALM). Moreover, the surprisingly strong (.84, standardised) 
association between gf and PPVT in the full sample is similar to previous research in children 
(Naglieri, 1981) and adults (Bell et al., 2001), although with small, typically developing 
























Supplementary Figure 1. Depiction of SEM tree analyses. Left: SEM tree results for the 
relationship between gc and the anterior thalamic radiations (ATR) (see Table 3 for full 
results). Figure adapted from Fuhrmann et al., 2020. Right: Visualisation of the nature of 
the effect for one path (ATR➔gc). The association between FA in the ATR and scores on 
the gc factor are moderately to strongly positive in the youngest children (r = .22) and the 
oldest children (r = .29), but effectively absent in the intermediate group (r = 0.02). Notably, 
the reader can see in this figure the steady increase in fractional anisotropy across ages 






Supplementary Material for Chapter Three 
Edge-weight stability analyses 
To further quantify the reliability of the partial correlation network edge-weights, I 
performed 2000 bootstraps and compared the bootstrapped mean values to the original 
sample estimates (Supplementary Figures 2 – 4). I do not show the bootstraps for the 
multilayer networks due to the size of the plots, but they can be found online 
(https://osf.io/36d2n/). Bootstrapped edge-weight means were consistently near the original 
sample value with the most variable being the white matter network (Supplementary Figure 
4) and the multilayer networks (not shown). The low edge-weight stability in these networks 
could possibly be due to lower sample sizes of neural data (especially in the white matter 
network, N = 165, although centrality strength was moderately stable, CS-coefficient = 0.44), 
including when structural brain and cognitive data were combined. This, in turn, could have 
influenced the low stability estimates of the bridge centrality values in the multilayer 












Supplementary Figure 2. Comparisons between bootstrapped means and original 











Supplementary Figure 3. Comparisons between bootstrapped means and original 





The possible effect of outliers on major findings 
In a previous version (https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.11.15.383869v1) 
of this study, I observed that two FA values (one for the uncinate fasciculus, one for the forceps 
major), represented potential outliers with undue influence on the partitioning of the 
Walktrap algorithm in the single-layer white matter network. Removing this data yielded a 
distinct, and more parsimonious clustering solution (2 communities vs 5). Moreover, 
removing this outlier did not affect any summary statistics for the white matter partial 
correlation (single-layer) network except for range. Nevertheless, below I present the Pearson 
Supplementary Figure 4. Comparisons between bootstrapped means and original 




correlations between the weights obtained from the original data presented in the main 
manuscript and those from the data after all outliers (defined as ± 4 standard deviations) are 
removed (Supplementary Table 1). Due to the vast similarity in descriptive statistics and high 
correlations between partial correlation weights, I conclude that outliers did not confound the 
results of this study. However, it must be noted that outliers might slightly affect community 
detection, but I chose to keep the original data due to the nature of the sample (struggling 
learners, therefore behavioural and neural data might be atypical to begin with) and given the 
fact that the neural data was already quality controlled. Furthermore, the two outlier white 
matter ROIs occurred in two separate participants (one outlier each) while the rest of their 
ROIs were consistent with the rest of the sample. In close, I argue that outliers (both cognitive 
and neural) are likely not due to measurement error but instead represent realistic values of 
an atypically developing sample.    
 







































Supplementary Table 1. Comparisons between partial correlation (PC) networks 
(original data vs outliers removed). These include summary statistics such as mean, 
(standard deviation), [range] and Pearson correlations between PC graph weights using 





How to deal with age? 
As in previous literature, in the CALM sample age shows a clear positive association 
with intelligence measures (Figures 8 and 11) and brain structure (Figures 9 and 12). This fact, 
however, may further complicate any interpretations of (possible) causal interactions between 
cognitive and/or neural nodes. This is due to the multitude of reasons age might correlate with 
cognition and brain structure. For instance, this pattern could be due to the fact that older 
participants normally score higher on cognitive tasks and have greater brain maturation. In 
this case age functions as an underlying driver of (even greater) covariance between the two 
domains. There are at least two options (included in the original preprint) of how to deal with 
the relationship of age to cognitive ability, and grey and white matter structural covariance: 
1) I could estimate the partial correlation network and include age as a node, therefore, 
choosing to estimate it simultaneously with the cognitive and neural variables (this is the option 
I chose for the non-Supplemental part of the analyses), or 2) I could regress out the association 
of age for each variable (age would show no correlation with cognitive and/or neural 
measures) before network estimation. Both approaches are related and have corresponding 
pros and cons. For example, these two options might enable the detection of correlations 
beyond age, possibility revealing core relations among variables independent of stereotypical 
neurocognitive development (e.g., older participants normally score higher on cognitive tasks 
and have larger brains as they mature). However, this might also remove developmental 
associations of interest (e.g., age may function as a moderator of cognitive and neural growth 
as in the above example).  
Notably, a third possible option (assessed for this thesis and to be included in the 
revision of the preprint for future publication), which addresses this limitation, is to estimate 
the network ignoring age (i.e., removing it from dataset before estimation). Specifically, choosing 
not to include age as a node has the benefit of revealing the ‘actual correlations’ (i.e., those 
dependent on neurocognitive development in childhood and adolescence) among cognitive 
abilities and brain structure in the population, as the ‘effects’ of age are not controlled for 
before (regressed out) or during (age node associations with other nodes removed during 
calculation of partial correlations) network estimation. However, a drawback to this approach 




Here I compare the partial correlations matrices for the three analysis paths (i.e., age 
node used in network estimation vs age node regressed out before estimation; and age node 
used in network estimation vs age node removed from dataset prior to network estimation) 
for both single and multilayer networks (Supplementary Tables 2 and 3). This analysis 
demonstrates that, regardless of how age is accounted for in estimation, the partial correlation 
networks are very similar to each other. 
 
Network Type 
Age Included in 
Estimation 
Age Regressed Out 
before Estimation 
Pearson Correlation 









1(rounded from 0.999) 



























Supplementary Table 2. Comparisons between partial correlation networks (age 
included in estimation vs age regressed out before estimation). These include summary 
statistics such as mean, (standard deviation), [range] and Pearson correlations between 






Age Included in 
Estimation 
Age Removed from 
Dataset before Estimation 
Pearson Correlation 































Teasing apart the relations of cortical volume to general intelligence: 
 Multilayer analysis using cortical surface area and thickness 
Lastly, I partitioned cortical volume into its constituent parts, cortical surface area and 
thickness, to compare their partial correlations and community structures when combined 
with white matter and general intelligence (Supplementary Figures 5 and 6). This produced 
bilayer networks that were much less connected between domains (brain vs behaviour) than 
the cognition-volume bilayer network in Figure 15 (top left). Finally, bridge strength showed 
the same pattern as in the main manuscript, except for the surface area tri-layer network, 
where neural regions (both grey and white) appear to dominate the bridge strength centrality 
(Supplementary Figure 6), rather than cognition (Figure 16, bottom). 
 
Supplementary Table 3. Comparisons between partial correlation networks (age 
included in estimation vs age node removed from dataset prior to network estimation). 
These include summary statistics such as mean, (standard deviation), [range] and 
Pearson correlations between PC graph weights using pairwise complete observations 






Supplementary Figure 5. Top: Network visualisations (spring layout) of partial correlation 
CALM bi-layer grey matter (surface area (left) and cortical thickness (right)) networks. Nodes 
are grouped according to Walktrap algorithm results. Bottom: Bridge centrality estimates (z-
scores) for CALM bi-layer grey matter (surface area (left) and cortical thickness (right)) 






Supplementary Figure 6. Top: Network visualisations (spring layout) of partial correlation 
CALM tri-layer grey matter (surface area (left) and cortical thickness (right)) networks. Nodes 
are grouped according to Walktrap algorithm results. Bottom: Bridge centrality estimates (z-
scores) for CALM tri-layer grey matter (surface area (left) and cortical thickness (right)) 
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